Law Commons^™

Caremark's Irrelevance, Mercer E. Bullard

Mercer E Bullard

In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. is commonly held out as the iconic corporate law case on liability for a failure of legal compliance, but the true source of corporate law as to legal compliance is the higher standard established by other sources of law. The expected cost of liability, both criminal and civil, for violations of federal healthcare regulations, for example, is a far stronger determinant of corporate compliance systems than potential liability under Caremark. Other areas of industry-specific regulation, such as for financial services, telecommunications and energy, similarly play a greater role than state corporate law in …

Caremark's Irrelevance, Mercer E. Bullard

Mercer E Bullard

In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. is commonly held out as the iconic corporate law case on liability for a failure of legal compliance, but the true source of corporate law as to legal compliance is the higher standard established by other sources of law. The expected cost of liability, both criminal and civil, for violations of federal healthcare regulations, for example, is a far stronger determinant of corporate compliance systems than potential liability under Caremark. Other areas of industry-specific regulation, such as for financial services, telecommunications and energy, similarly play a greater role than state corporate law in …

A Review Of The Proposed Amendments To Be Made To S 216a Of The Companies Act, Linus Koh

Linus Koh

No abstract provided.

Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative Claims Of Corporate Waste To Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, William Alan Nelson Ii

William Alan Nelson II

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC allows companies to spend unlimited sums from their treasuries on advertisements that promote or oppose political candidates. This issue has taken the main stage in American politics, especially with the current Republican primary race and the Presidential election in November. This article discusses how shareholders may use derivative claims of corporate waste to challenge independent political expenditures that they believe are detrimental to the corporation. The article begins by discussing the history of the corporate waste doctrine and looks at the standard for pleading a claim of corporate waste. The …

Judges Who Settle, Hillary A. Sale

Hillary A Sale

This Article develops a construct of judges as gatekeepers in corporate and securities litigation, focusing on the last-period, or settlement stage of the cases. Many accounts of corporate scandals have focused on gatekeepers and the roles they played or, in some cases, abdicated. Corporate gatekeepers, like investment bankers, accountants, and lawyers, function as enablers and monitors. They facilitate transactions and enable corporate actors to access the financial and securities markets. Without them the transactions would not happen. In class actions and derivative litigation, judges are the monitors and enablers. They are required to oversee the litigation arising from bad transactions …

Hedge Funds’ Empty Voting In Mergers And Acquisitions: A Fiduciary Duties Perspective, Andrea Zanoni

Andrea Zanoni

Hedge funds have become lately active also in the market for corporate control. Their active involvement has been propelled by a tactic allowing them to decouple voting rights from economic ownership and labelled in the literature as “encumbered shares” or “empty voting”.

The aim of this Article is twofold. On the one hand, I address the impact of hedge funds’ activism on the financial markets and on the portfolio companies. In general terms, hedge funds’ activism should be seen as a neutral element. After a cost-benefit analysis, I show that the costs implied by hedge funds’ activism are at least …

Code, Crash, And Open Source: The Outsourcing Of Financial Regulation To Risk Models And The Global Financial Crisis, Erik F. Gerding

Erik F. Gerding

The widespread use computer-based risk models in the financial industry in the last two decades enabled the marketing of more complex financial products to consumers, the growth of securitization and derivatives, and the development of sophisticated risk management strategies by financial institutions. Over this same period, regulators increasingly delegated or outsourced vast responsibility for regulating risk in both consumer finance and financial markets to these private industry models. The proprietary risk models of financial institutions thus came to serve as a “new financial code” that regulated transfers of risk among consumers, financial institutions, and investors.

The spectacular failure of financial …