Law Commons^™

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Watching The Hen House: Judicial Review Of Judicial Rulemaking, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

Courts regularly engage in rulemaking of questionable constitutionality, then exercise the exclusive jurisdiction of judicial review to rule on constitutional challenges to the rules that they themselves have promulgated, obfuscating the appearance of impartiality and accountability and preventing the unsophisticated from realizing that a benefit has been conferred on a more sophisticated faction.

Quasi-legislative judicial rulemaking that has resulted from Congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to the courts is increasingly prevalent in the past half century, the result of which is a multi-tiered system of consultation, review, and revision that depends heavily upon nonlegislative actors and a Balkanization of the …

Human Rights Adjudication In Contemporary Democracies: Courts’ Specific Moral Insight As A Decisive Advantage Over Legislatures (A Modest And Partial Response To Jeremy Waldron’S Core Case Against Judicial Review), Francisco Verbic

Francisco Verbic

No abstract provided.

Toward Adequacy: Sense And Statutory Construction In The Judicial Review Provisions Of The Apa, Sarah L. Olson

Sarah L Olson

Each year, hundreds of people, companies, organizations, and associations sue the federal government for injuries they have suffered at the hands of federal agencies. Such suits are often brought under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which Congress enacted expressly to allow broad access to courts in an age of increasing administrative agency action. By the terms of the APA itself, all final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court is reviewable under the APA.

But the very language meant to welcome such suits into court also acts as a …

Deference And Judicial Review In Eminent Domain Cases, Lynda J. Oswald

Lynda J Oswald

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New London, emphasized its “longstanding policy of deference” to legislative determinations of public use. However, the Court also explicitly acknowledged that the federal Constitution sets a floor, not a ceiling, on individual rights, and that the state courts were entitled to take a less deferential approach under their own state constitutions or statutes. This manuscript examines the various ways in which public use analysis can vary between federal and state courts and among state jurisdictions and the difficult issues raised by the interplay between legislatures and courts in takings analysis. Because …

Between Judicial And Legislative Supremacy: A Cautious Defense Of Constrained Judicial Review, Alon Harel, Adam Shinar

Alon Harel

This Article explores and evaluates theories that we label “theories of constrained judicial review.” These theories, which include popular constitutionalism, departmentalism, and weak judicial review, challenge both the constitutional supremacy of courts and adopt an intermediate position that grants courts a privileged but not supreme role in interpreting the Constitution.

To evaluate such theories, this Article develops both a negative and a positive argument. It criticizes the existing justifications of constrained judicial review and provides a new justification for such theories. More specifically, we argue that the ultimate justification for constrained judicial review cannot be grounded in instrumentalist or consequentialist …

Taking War Seriously: A Model For Constitutional Constraints On The Use Of Force, In Compliance With International Law, Craig Martin

Craig Martin

This article develops an argument for increased constitutional control over the decision to use armed force or engage in armed conflict, as a means of reducing the incidence of illegitimate armed conflict. In particular, the Model would involve three elements: a process-based constitutional incorporation of the principles of international law relating to the use of force (the jus ad bellum regime); a constitutional requirement that the legislature approve any use of force rising above a de minimus level; and an explicit provision for limited judicial review of the decision-making process. The Model is not designed with any one country in …

The Japanese Constitution As Law And The Legitimacy Of The Supreme Court’S Constitutional Decisions: A Response To Matsui, Craig Martin

Craig Martin

This article, from a conference at Washington University School of Law on the Supreme Court of Japan, responds to an article by Shigenori Matsui, “Why is the Japanese Supreme Court is so conservative?” Professor Matsui’s article makes the argument that a significant factor is the extent to which the judges fail to view the Constitution as positive law requiring judicial enforcement. It is novel in its emphasis on an explanation grounded in law, and the decision-making process, rather than the political, institutional, and cultural explanations that are so often offered. In this article, Borrowing from Kermit Roosevelt’s arguments on judicial …