Law Commons^™

Is The Eu Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously? An Essay On The Impotence Of Shareholdership In Corporate Europe, Pavlos E. Masouros

Pavlos E. Masouros

This article critically analyzes the Shareholder Rights Directive ("SRD") (Directive 2007/36/EC). It is essentially an attempt to show that the deficit in the European corporate governance model with regard to the status of the shareholders persists even in the post-SRD era and that we still have a long distance to cover in order to truly empower shareholders in the EU. The SRD along with certain other Company Law Directives and the various European national corporate laws form a synthesis that falls short of providing shareholders with the full potential of getting their corporate governance voice through within listed corporations.

First …

A Japanese Calpers Or A New Model For Institutional Investor Activism? Japan's Pension Fund Association And The Emergence Of Shareholder Activism In Japan, Bruce Aronson

Bruce Aronson

If activist institutional investors are arguably the primary external monitors of management under leading corporate governance systems in the United States and the United Kingdom, who might assume that role in other countries? And, more importantly, what activist shareholder strategies may be possible under different corporate governance systems and operating environments that are generally less supportive of shareholder activism than the United States and the United Kingdom? This Article seeks to address that question through a comparison of the well-known strategy of CalPERS with that of a rare, real-world example of institutional investor activism outside of the “Anglo-Saxon” model—Japan’s Pension …

Auditors' Multi-Layered Liability Regime, Paolo E. Giudici

Paolo E. Giudici

The proposals to limit auditor liability, principally aimed at protecting the Big-4 from the risk of a catastrophic exposure to damages, are grounded on the assumption that auditors are generally over-deterred. The 2008 EC Commission Recommendation on auditor liability relies heavily on this assumption and the economic rationale that underpins it, which is entirely focused on liability towards investors and the US narrative concerning securities class actions. However, the case is much more complex. Any discussion about auditor liability must investigate the following questions: who the auditor’s principals are; whether they are in a position to negotiate in order to …

"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond The Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, Virginia E. Ho

Virginia E Ho

The global financial crisis has led to calls for greater corporate accountability and heightened controls over public corporations. As a result, the past year has seen a marked increase in regulatory initiatives that give shareholders a greater voice in corporate affairs. While debate continues to rage in the academy and beyond over the promise and pitfalls of shareholder empowerment, an important undercurrent in the controversy is the potential impact of "shareholder democracy" on corporate stakeholders.

This Article urges a vision of the corporation and its purpose that transcends the shareholder-stakeholder divide. Under this "enlightened shareholder value" approach, which has been …

"Enlightened Shareholder Value": Corporate Governance Beyond The Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, Virginia E. Harper Ho

Virginia E Ho

The global financial crisis has led to calls for greater corporate accountability and heightened controls over public corporations. As a result, the past year has seen a marked increase in regulatory initiatives that give shareholders a greater voice in corporate affairs. While debate continues to rage in the academy and beyond over the promise and pitfalls of shareholder empowerment, an important undercurrent in the controversy is the potential impact of "shareholder democracy" on corporate stakeholders.

This Article urges a vision of the corporation and its purpose that transcends the shareholder-stakeholder divide. Under this "enlightened shareholder value" approach, which has been …

Voluntary And Mandatory Skin In The Game:Understanding Outside Directors' Stock Holdings, Sanjai Bhagat

Sanjai Bhagat

We examine the determinants of equity ownership by outside directors as well as the relationship between ownership and operating performance. Unlike previous studies of equity ownership by directors, we use hand-collected data on firm-level policies requiring director ownership for S&P 500 firms during the years 2003 and 2005. Ownership requirements allow us to shed further light on the determinants of director holdings and to separate voluntary from mandatory holdings of directors. If ownership requirements reflect optimal ownership levels, they provide a useful identification tool in the examination of ownership-performance relationships. Our primary findings are as follows: ownership requirements are more …

Corporate Governance And The Impact Of Controlling Shareholders, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

Good corporate governance practices at a publicly held firm will not necessarily be good practices at a publicly traded firm in which there is a controlling shareholder. This is because board independence, a key concept in structuring appropriate corporate governance practices, has a different meaning when a controlling shareholder is present.

However, identifying whether or not a board is truly independent is just the first step in evaluating the quality of corporate governance at a controlled corporation. After all, a controlling shareholder still has the power to dominate an independent board through his direct voting power and by threats of …

Oregon's Experiment With Sustainable Corporate Governance: A Friendly Critique, Robert C. Illig

Robert C Illig

No abstract provided.