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Articles 1 - 21 of 21
Full-Text Articles in Law
Free Expression, In-Group Bias, And The Court's Conservatives: A Critique Of The Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, Todd E. Pettys
Free Expression, In-Group Bias, And The Court's Conservatives: A Critique Of The Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In a recent, widely publicized study, a prestigious team of political scientists concluded that there is strong evidence of ideological in-group bias among the Supreme Court’s members in First Amendment free-expression cases, with the current four most conservative justices being the Roberts Court’s worst offenders. Beneath the surface of the authors’ conclusions, however, one finds a surprisingly sizable combination of coding errors, superficial case readings, and questionable judgments about litigants’ ideological affiliations. Many of those problems likely flow either from shortcomings that reportedly afflict the Supreme Court Database (the data set that nearly always provides the starting point for empirical …
Campaign Finance, Federalism, And The Case Of The Long-Armed Donor, Todd E. Pettys
Campaign Finance, Federalism, And The Case Of The Long-Armed Donor, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In its ruling last Term in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court struck down federal campaign-finance laws that limited the aggregate amount of money that Shaun McCutcheon and other would-be campaign donors could give to a variety of political committees and to individuals running for Congress in states and districts other than their own. Chief Justice Roberts began his opinion for the plurality by declaring that "[t]here is no right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing our political leaders." Retired justice John Paul Stevens has argued that the Court's ruling in McCutcheon is "a grossly …
Unions, Corporations, And The First Amendment: A Response To Professors Fisk And Chemerinsky, Todd E. Pettys
Unions, Corporations, And The First Amendment: A Response To Professors Fisk And Chemerinsky, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In this response to Professor Fisk and Chemerinsky’s critique of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, I make two arguments. First, I challenge the premise of shareholder-employee equivalency that undergirds key portions of Fisk and Chemerinsky’s analysis. Second, I contest the claim that Knox contributes to incoherence in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, I challenge Fisk and Chemerinsky’s argument that Knox is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s leading precedents on the speech rights of government employees, and I raise doubts about their reading of the Court’s compelled-speech cases involving complaints that one’s resources are …
Retention Redux: Iowa 2012, Todd E. Pettys
Retention Redux: Iowa 2012, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In 2010, Iowa voters ousted three members of the Iowa Supreme Court for their participation in that court's ruling that Iowa's statutory ban on same-sex marriage violated the Iowa Constitution. In 2012, however, Iowa voters opted to retain a fourth member of that same court. This article examines the differences between the two elections.
The Analytic Classroom, Todd E. Pettys
The Analytic Classroom, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
This article proposes a dramatic shift in law schools’ approach to teaching doctrinal courses. The proposal flows in large part from three separate developments: (1) the rise of strong economic headwinds in the market for legal education; (2) the emergence of empirical evidence that law schools are falling short of their goal of equipping students with powerful analytic abilities that transcend the particular doctrinal frameworks law schools teach; and (3) the incipient revolution in higher education, with prestigious universities now aggressively pursuing the opportunity to provide the public with free or low-cost access to many of their courses through the …
Judicial Retention Elections, The Rule Of Law, And The Rhetorical Weaknesses Of Consequentialism, Todd E. Pettys
Judicial Retention Elections, The Rule Of Law, And The Rhetorical Weaknesses Of Consequentialism, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
From Alaska to Florida, the 2010 election season brought the nation an unprecedented number of organized campaigns aimed at denying retention to judges who had ruled in ways that some voters found objectionable. Judges in those and other retention-election states can no longer rest comfortably on the assumption that voters will routinely exempt them from meaningful scrutiny. Anxious judges, state bar officials, and others have responded with a set of deontological and consequentialist arguments aimed at persuading voters not to use retention elections as an opportunity to oust judges who have issued controversial rulings. The deontological arguments posit that ousting …
Judicial Discretion In Constitutional Cases, Todd E. Pettys
Judicial Discretion In Constitutional Cases, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
A damaging dichotomy is hindering the nation’s ability to talk intelligently and constructively about the constitutional work of the courts. The “legitimacy dichotomy” holds that, when adjudicating constitutional disputes, judges either obey the sovereign people’s determinate constitutional instructions or illegitimately trump the sovereign people’s value judgments with their own. The legitimacy dichotomy leaves little or no room for the possibility that an array of conflicting interpretations of the Constitution might be reasonably available to a judge; it leaves little or no room, in other words, for judicial discretion. This article begins by examining the legitimacy dichotomy from three different vantage …
Instrumentalizing Jurors: An Argument Against The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Todd E. Pettys
Instrumentalizing Jurors: An Argument Against The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In this symposium contribution, I argue that (1) courts infringe on jurors' deliberative autonomy in a morally problematic way whenever they refuse to admit evidence that is both relevant and reasonably available; (2) this infringement is especially problematic in the Fourth Amendment setting; and (3) although there are several ways in which these moral problems could be at least partially mitigated, the best approach might be to abandon the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule entirely.
Sodom's Shadow: The Uncertain Line Between Public And Private Morality, Todd E. Pettys
Sodom's Shadow: The Uncertain Line Between Public And Private Morality, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In citizens’ debates about issues of public policy, we frequently encounter what this Article calls the divine accountability thesis—the controversial claim that the divine realm will punish a city, state, or nation unless it performs or proscribes certain forms of conduct. Many of us reject that claim, but its persistent usage in numerous societies over the past five thousand years teaches us a great deal about citizens’ political self-conceptions. This Article begins by arguing that the divine accountability thesis illustrates human beings’ deeply ingrained tendency to regard their political communities as discrete moral entities, individually deserving of punishment or reward. …
The Vitality Of The American Sovereign, Todd E. Pettys
The Vitality Of The American Sovereign, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In this book review, I examine Christian Fritz's "American Sovereigns: The People and America's Constitutional Tradition Before the Civil War." I dispute Fritz's claim that Americans today have essentially ceded their sovereign prerogatives to government officials. Contrary to Fritz's suggestion, ordinary Americans do still sometimes intervene directly in day-to-day governmental affairs in ways that are unauthorized by their elected leaders, and they do alter their constitutional landscape by means other than those formally authorized by Article V. Americans have determined that their long-term interests are often best served by manifesting their sovereign desires through extended interactions with government officials and …
Counsel And Confrontation, Todd E. Pettys
Counsel And Confrontation, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
Responding to the Court’s recent reworking of its confrontation jurisprudence, I argue that, under the Anglo-American common-law principles that the Confrontation Clause now incorporates, defendants are not entitled to an attorney’s assistance when interrogating witnesses prior to trial. Although the Assistance of Counsel Clause and the Due Process Clauses will pick up the slack in many cases, I contend that there are other instances in which the Constitution now leaves unrepresented defendants responsible for cross-examining witnesses on their own. I suggest that legislative reform may be necessary to ameliorate the new constitutional landscape’s deficiencies.
The Myth Of The Written Constitution, Todd E. Pettys
The Myth Of The Written Constitution, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
Many Americans have long subscribed to what this Article calls the myth of the written constitution—the claim that the nation’s Constitution consists entirely of those texts that the sovereign American people have formally ratified, and the claim that the will of the American people, as expressed in those ratified texts, determines the way in which properly behaving judges resolve constitutional disputes. Drawing on two different meanings of the term myth, this Article contends that neither of those claims is literally true, but that Americans’ attachment to those claims serves at least three crucial functions. Subscribing to the myth helps to …
Popular Constitutionalism And Relaxing The Dead Hand: Can The People Be Trusted?, Todd E. Pettys
Popular Constitutionalism And Relaxing The Dead Hand: Can The People Be Trusted?, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
A growing number of constitutional scholars are urging the nation to rethink its commitment to judicial supremacy. Popular constitutionalists argue that the American people, not the courts, hold the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution’s many open-ended provisions whose meanings are reasonably contestable. This Article defends popular constitutionalism on two important fronts. First, using originalism as a paradigmatic example of the ways in which courts frequently draw constitutional meaning from sources rooted deep in the past, the Article contends that defenders of judicial supremacy still have not persuasively responded to the familiar dead-hand query: Why should constitutional meanings that prevailed …
The Immoral Application Of Exclusionary Rules, Todd E. Pettys
The Immoral Application Of Exclusionary Rules, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In both civil and criminal cases today, judges routinely withhold relevant evidence from jurors, fearing that jurors would use it in an irrational or legally impermissible manner. Forcing jurors to take responsibility for a verdict based upon a government-screened pool of evidence stands in sharp contrast to the way we ordinarily think about government efforts to withhold potentially useful information from citizens faced with important decisions. The First Amendment’s guarantee of the freedom of speech, for example, reflects a moral judgment that the government offends its citizens’ deliberative autonomy when it restricts speech based upon fears about what that speech …
The Emotional Juror, Todd E. Pettys
The Emotional Juror, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
Addressing the dichotomy often drawn between emotions and rationality, I argue that, while emotions sometimes exert undesirable influences in the courtroom, there are a variety of ways in which emotions aid rational decision-making by jurors.
Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, And The Innocence Gap, Todd E. Pettys
Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, And The Innocence Gap, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
For the past fifteen years, the execution of Roger Coleman has served as perhaps the most infamous illustration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination to help the states achieve finality in their criminal cases. Convicted of rape and murder in 1982, Coleman steadfastly maintained his innocence and drew many supporters to his cause. In its 1991 ruling in Coleman v. Thompson, however, the Court refused to consider the constitutional claims raised in Coleman’s habeas petition. The Court ruled that Coleman had forfeited his right to seek habeas relief when, in prior state proceedings, his attorneys mistakenly filed their notice of …
Our Anticompetitive Patriotism, Todd E. Pettys
Our Anticompetitive Patriotism, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In this article, I contend that the nation’s seemingly exclusive claim to citizens’ patriotism significantly shields the federal government from the competitive forces that the Framers believed would restrain Congress’s and the President’s ability to govern in objectionable ways. I argue that, because America is a nation-state built upon certain core convictions about public life, there are strong connections in this country between the entity about which people feel patriotic and the sovereign that people would like to govern many—perhaps even most—of their important public affairs. I argue that American patriotism was constructed in a manner that led nineteenth- and …
Choosing A Chief Justice: Presidential Prerogative Or A Job For The Court?, Todd E. Pettys
Choosing A Chief Justice: Presidential Prerogative Or A Job For The Court?, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
After identifying the original rationales for our longstanding tradition of permitting the President and Senate to decide which of the Court’s nine members will serve as Chief Justice, I argue that those rationales are anachronistic, that the tradition creates unnecessary conflicts of interest and separation-of-powers concerns, and that the Court’s members should be permitted to decide for themselves which of them will serve as Chief Justice.
The Mobility Paradox, Todd E. Pettys
The Mobility Paradox, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
Nearly half a century ago, in an article spanning a mere nine pages, Charles Tiebout revolutionized the way many think about American federalism. Using the analytic tools Tiebout gave them, numerous scholars now contend that, in our mobile society, citizens’ interests would best be served by dramatically shrinking the federal government and permitting state and local governments to regulate a far greater number of important matters. In this article, I argue that citizens’ interests and the dynamics of federalism are far more complicated than the devolutionary proposals of Tiebout’s adherents suggest. I identify three reasons why a mobile—and rational—public might …
Federal Habeas Relief And The New Tolerance For "Reasonably Erroneous" Applications Of Federal Law, Todd E. Pettys
Federal Habeas Relief And The New Tolerance For "Reasonably Erroneous" Applications Of Federal Law, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In Williams v. Taylor and Ramdass v. Angelone, the United States Supreme Court confronted one of the core provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and confirmed what some had hoped and others had feared: A federal court may no longer grant habeas relief merely because it concludes that a state court erroneously applied federal law when it rejected a state prisoner’s federal constitutional claim. Instead, a federal court must deny habeas relief to a state prisoner whose federal constitutional rights have been violated and whose requests for relief have been erroneously denied by a state …
Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, And Jury Nullification, Todd E. Pettys
Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, And Jury Nullification, Todd E. Pettys
Todd E. Pettys
In Old Chief v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that evidence offered by the Government in a criminal case has “fair and legitimate weight” if it tends to show that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable. This Article focuses on that proposition. First, it discusses the ways in which Old Chief’s analysis rests upon a broadened understanding of evidentiary relevance. Second, it argues that significant theoretical difficulties impede any effort to determine whether evidence tends to show that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable. Third, it argues that adopting Old Chief’s conception of relevance would necessitate significant …