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Texas Versus Federal Law On Deference To Administrative Interpretations Of Statutes, Scott A. Keller
Texas Versus Federal Law On Deference To Administrative Interpretations Of Statutes, Scott A. Keller
Scott A Keller
The growth of the administrative state in recent decades means that the issue of deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it enforces arises in many contexts. As the issue of agency deference pervades Texas’s legal system, courts and litigants will need to understand when agency statutory interpretations merit deference.
As this article shows, Texas’s doctrine on deference to agency statutory interpretations is not as developed as the federal doctrine. However, the Texas Supreme Court in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water recently began to develop a comprehensive doctrine on deference …
Texas Versus Federal Law On Deference To Administrative Interpretations Of Statutes, Scott A. Keller
Texas Versus Federal Law On Deference To Administrative Interpretations Of Statutes, Scott A. Keller
Scott A Keller
The growth of the administrative state in recent decades means that the issue of deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statute it enforces arises in many contexts. As the issue of agency deference pervades Texas’s legal system, courts and litigants will need to understand when agency statutory interpretations merit deference.
As this article shows, Texas’s doctrine on deference to agency statutory interpretations is not as developed as the federal doctrine. However, the Texas Supreme Court in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water recently began to develop a comprehensive doctrine on deference …
Depoliticizing Judicial Review Of Agency Rulemaking, Scott A. Keller
Depoliticizing Judicial Review Of Agency Rulemaking, Scott A. Keller
Scott A Keller
Administrative law doctrines for reviewing agency rulemaking currently give judges a significant amount of discretion to invalidate agency rules. Many commentators have recognized that this has politicized judicial review of agency rulemaking, as judges appointed by a president of one political party are more likely to invalidate agency rules promulgated under the presidential administration of a different political party. Unelected judges, though, should not be able to use indeterminate administrative law doctrines to invalidate agency rules on the basis that they disagree with the policy decisions of a presidential administration.
This Article therefore argues for the elimination of the Supreme …