Law Commons^™

Slavery And Information, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

This article shows how asymmetric information shaped slavery by determining the likelihood of manumission. A theoretical model explains the need to offer positive incentive to slaves working in occupations characterized by a high degree of asymmetric information. As a result, masters freed (and, more generally, rewarded) slaves who performed well. The model’s implications are then tested against the available evidence: both in Rome and in the Atlantic world, slaves with high-asymmetric-information tasks had greater chances of manumission. The analysis also sheds light on the master’s choices of carrots versus sticks and of labor versus slavery.

The Rise Of Carrots And The Decline Of Sticks, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Gerrit De Geest

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

There is a remarkable tendency in modern legal systems to increasingly use carrots. This trend is not limited to legal systems but can also be observed in, for instance, parenting styles, social control mechanisms, and even law schools’ teaching methods. Yet, at first glance, sticks appear to be a more efficient means of inducing people to comply with legal rules or social norms because they are not meant to be applied (thus minimizing transaction costs and risks) and may cause fewer unintended distributional distortions. So how can we justify the widespread use of carrots?

This Article shows that carrots can …

Luxury In Ancient Rome: Scope, Timing And Enforcement Of Sumptuary Laws, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Anna Plisecka

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

Between 182 BC and 18 BC, Roman lawmakers enacted a series of sumptuary laws regulating banquets (including the number of guests and the consumption of specific foods). Enforcement was hardly successful and these regulations had to be reiterated over time. Traditional explanations based on morals, protection of patrimonies and electoral competition do not fully account for the scope, timing and enforcement patterns of such laws. We advance and formalize a novel hypothesis holding that sumptuary legislation originated from the misalignment between political and economic power following the military and economic expansion of Rome in the last two centuries of the …

Legal And Market Uncertainty In Market-Based Instruments: The Case Of The Eu Ets, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Josephine Van Zeben

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

‘Legal uncertainty’ is the uncertainty experienced by the parties to a lawsuit with respect to the outcome of litigation. When the consequences of a judgment extend to third parties, legal uncertainty can spread into markets and become ‘market uncertainty’. Thus, market uncertainty has relevant and pervasive consequences not only for the litigants but also for unrelated third parties. We argue that certain types of legal remedies cause the transformation from legal uncertainty into market uncertainty. This problem is particular to ‘artificial markets’, such as those created by the legislator for the purposes of market-based regulation, e.g. the European Union Emission …

Limiting Limited Liability, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

Limited liability may result in inefficient accident prevention, because a relevant portion of the expected harm is externalized on victims. This paper shows that under some restrictive conditions further limiting liability by means of a liability cap can improve caretaking.