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Articles 1 - 30 of 66
Full-Text Articles in Law
Concept Release On Harmonization Of Securities Offering Exemptions; File Number S7-08-19, Robert Anderson, Samantha Prince, John Neil Conkle, Sarah Zomaya
Concept Release On Harmonization Of Securities Offering Exemptions; File Number S7-08-19, Robert Anderson, Samantha Prince, John Neil Conkle, Sarah Zomaya
Samantha J. Prince
No abstract provided.
Coordinating Compliance Incentives, Veronica Root
Coordinating Compliance Incentives, Veronica Root
Veronica Root
In today’s regulatory environment, a corporation engaged in wrongdoing can be sure of one thing: regulators will point to an ineffective compliance program as a key cause of institutional misconduct. The explosion in the importance of compliance is unsurprising given the emphasis that governmental actors — from the Department of Justice, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to even the Commerce Department — place on the need for institutions to adopt “effective compliance programs.” The governmental actors that demand effective compliance programs, however, have narrow scopes of authority. DOJ Fraud handles violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, while the …
The Compliance Process, Veronica Root Martinez
The Compliance Process, Veronica Root Martinez
Veronica Root
Even as regulators and prosecutors proclaim the importance of effective compliance programs, failures persist. Organizations fail to ensure that they and their agents comply with legal and regulatory requirements, industry practices, and their own internal policies and norms. From the companies that provide our news, to the financial institutions that serve as our bankers, to the corporations that make our cars, compliance programs fail to prevent misconduct each and every day. The causes of these compliance failures are multifaceted and include general enforcement deficiencies, difficulties associated with overseeing compliance programs within complex organizations, and failures to establish a culture of …
Law And Corporate Governance, Robert P. Bartlett, Eric L. Talley
Law And Corporate Governance, Robert P. Bartlett, Eric L. Talley
Robert Bartlett
Pragmatic and effective research on corporate governance often turns critically on appreciating the legal institutions surrounding corporate entities – yet such nuances are often unfamiliar or poorly specified to economists and other social scientists without legal training. This chapter organizes and discusses key legal concepts of corporate governance, including statutes, regulations, and jurisprudential doctrines that “govern governance” in private and public companies, with concentration on the for-profit corporation. We review the literature concerning the nature and purpose of the corporation, the objects of fiduciary obligations, the means for decision making within the firm, as well as the overlay of state …
Sarbanes-Oxley's Purported Over-Criminalization Of Corporate Offenders, Lisa H. Nicholson
Sarbanes-Oxley's Purported Over-Criminalization Of Corporate Offenders, Lisa H. Nicholson
Lisa H. Nicholson
No abstract provided.
Sweetheart Deals, Deferred Prosecution, And Making A Mockery Of The Criminal Justice System: U.S. Corporate Dpas Rejected On Many Fronts, Peter Reilly
Peter R. Reilly
Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) are contracts negotiated between the federal government and defendants to address allegations of corporate misconduct without going to trial. The agreements are hailed as a model of speedy and efficient law enforcement, but also derided as making a “mockery” of America’s criminal justice system stemming from lenient deals being offered to some defendants. This Article questions why corporate DPAs are not given meaningful judicial review when such protection is required for other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) tools, including plea bargains, settlement agreements, and consent decrees. The Article also analyzes several cases in which federal district …
Solidarity Economy Lawyering, Renee Hatcher
Solidarity Economy Lawyering, Renee Hatcher
Renee Hatcher
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
The Public Cost Of Private Equity, William Magnuson
William J. Magnuson
This Article presents a theory of the corporate governance costs of private equity. In doing so, it challenges the common view that private equity’s governance structure has resolved, or at least significantly mitigated, one of the fundamental tensions in corporate law, that is, the conflict between management and ownership. The Article argues that this widespread perception about the corporate governance benefits of private equity overlooks the many ways in which the private equity model, far from eliminating agency costs, in fact exacerbates them. These governance costs include compensation structures that incentivize excessive risk-taking, governance rights that provide investors with few …
Regulating Fintech, William Magnuson
Regulating Fintech, William Magnuson
William J. Magnuson
The financial crisis of 2008 has led to dramatic changes in the way that finance is regulated: the Dodd-Frank Act imposed broad and systemic regulation on the industry on a level not seen since the New Deal. But the financial regulatory reforms enacted since the crisis have been premised on an outdated idea of what financial services look like and how they are provided. Regulation has failed to take into account the rise of financial technology (or “fintech”) firms and the fundamental changes they have ushered in on a variety of fronts, from the way that banking works, to the …
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
From "Federalization" To "Mixed Governance" In Corporate Law: A Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Robert B. Ahdieh
Robert B. Ahdieh
Since the very moment of its adoption, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been subject to a litany of critiques, many of them seemingly well-placed. The almost universal condemnation of the Act for its asserted 'federalization' of corporate law, by contrast, deserves short shrift. Though widely invoked - and blithely accepted - dissection of this argument against the legislation shows it to rely either on flawed assumptions or on normative preferences not ordinarily acknowledged (or perhaps even accepted) by those who criticize Sarbanes-Oxley for its federalization of state corporate law.
Once we appreciate as much, we can begin by replacing …
Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed Experiment In Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, Peter Reilly
Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed Experiment In Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, Peter Reilly
Peter R. Reilly
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), deferred prosecution agreements are said to occupy an “important middle ground” between declining to prosecute on the one hand, and trials or guilty pleas on the other. A top DOJ official has declared that, over the last decade, the agreements have become a “mainstay” of white collar criminal law enforcement; a prominent criminal law professor calls their increased use part of the “biggest change in corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years.”
However, despite deferred prosecution’s apparent rise in popularity among law enforcement officials, the article sets forth the argument …
Voter Primacy, Sarah C. Haan
Voter Primacy, Sarah C. Haan
Sarah Haan
This Article argues that Citizens United v. FEC expanded the audience for campaign finance disclosure to include a group that had never before been held relevant to campaign finance disclosure—corporate shareholders—and explores the constitutional, policy, and political consequences of this change. In part IV of Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court departed from more than thirty years of campaign finance disclosure analysis to treat corporate shareholders as a target audience for corporate electoral spending disclosure, holding that the governmental interest advanced by campaign finance disclosure laws includes an interest in helping corporate shareholders “determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances …
Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal Reflections On A Scholarly Career, David K. Millon
Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal Reflections On A Scholarly Career, David K. Millon
David K. Millon
No abstract provided.
Paper Dragon Thieves, J.S. Nelson
Paper Dragon Thieves, J.S. Nelson
J.S. Nelson
Structural Bias And The Need For Substantive Review, Julian Velasco
Structural Bias And The Need For Substantive Review, Julian Velasco
Julian Velasco
One of the fundamental debates in corporate law pits the authority of the board of directors to make business decisions without judicial interference against the accountability of directors to shareholders for their decisions. The business judgment rule attests to the value ascribed to authority by providing only limited judicial review for claims of breach of the duty of care, while the entire fairness test demonstrates the value ascribed to accountability by providing far more exacting scrutiny for claims of breach of the duty of loyalty. In cases involving structural bias, however, neither doctrine is appropriate. Whenever the interests of directors …
The Role Of Aspiration In Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Julian Velasco
The Role Of Aspiration In Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Julian Velasco
Julian Velasco
Corporate law is characterized by a pervasive divergence between standards of conduct and standards of review. Courts often opine on the relatively demanding standard of conduct, but their judgements must be based on the more forgiving standard of review. Commentators defend this state of affairs by insisting that it provides guidance to directors without imposing ruinous liability. However, the dichotomy can lead many, especially those who focus on the bottom line, to call into question the meaningfulness of standards of conduct. Of particular concern is the increasing popularity, in legal and scholarly circles, of the notion that fiduciary duty standards …
A Tale Of Two Trajectories, Cynthia A. Williams
A Tale Of Two Trajectories, Cynthia A. Williams
Cynthia A. Williams
No abstract provided.
Private Ordering With Shareholder Bylaws, D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, Marcus Kai Hintze
Private Ordering With Shareholder Bylaws, D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, Marcus Kai Hintze
D. Gordon Smith
In this Article, we propose legal reforms to empower shareholders in public corporations. Currently,most shareholders participate in corporate governance in three ways: they vote, they sell, and they sue. We would expand the menu for shareholders in public corporations by enabling them to contract using shareholder bylaws. We contend that such private ordering will improve shareholder monitoring of managers and create laboratories of corporate governance that benefit the entire corporate governance system.
The Corporate Shell Game, J.S. Nelson
The Corporate Shell Game, J.S. Nelson
J.S. Nelson
Relating Fiduciary Duties To Corporate Personhood And Corporate Purpose, Lyman P. Q. Johnson
Relating Fiduciary Duties To Corporate Personhood And Corporate Purpose, Lyman P. Q. Johnson
Lyman P. Q. Johnson
Individual And Collective Sovereignty In The Corporate Enterprise (Reviewing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fishel, The Economic Structure Of Corporate Law (1991) And Robert N. Bellah Et Al., The Good Society (1991), Lyman P. Q. Johnson
Lyman P. Q. Johnson
Not available.
Four Pillars To Build A New Corporate Law Federalism: Crowd Funding Exchanges, A Codified Internal Affairs Doctrine, City-Based Incorporation, And An Arbitrated Corporate Code, J.W. Verret
John W Verret
This article examines the event window opened by the pending creation of new crowdfunding platforms, a new means of creating publicly traded equity for smaller, early stage firms than have ever been permitted by the Securities and Exchange Commission to access the public securities markets. That event window could support a completely new paradigm for the development of corporation law and completely upend existing wisdom about interstate competition to develop corporate governance. This article considers the economics of crowdfunding precursors which share some of the attributes of equity crowdfunding, and also considers the expected attributes of equity crowdfunding, to demonstrate …
The Non-Merger Virtual Merger: Is Corporate Law Ready For Virtual Reality?, Stuart Cohn
The Non-Merger Virtual Merger: Is Corporate Law Ready For Virtual Reality?, Stuart Cohn
Stuart R. Cohn
The term virtual mergers describes the relatively recent phenomenon of companies entering into contractual arrangements that are functionally, but not legally, equivalent to mergers prescribed by corporate statutes. Virtual mergers usually involve the shared use of assets contributed by each of the companies. A central element of the transaction is that the two companies remain legally independent, each with its own directors, officers, and shareholders. The arrangements can usually be terminated by either party, allowing each company to return to the status quo ante or exercise buyout rights if contractually provided. Although virtual mergers have occurred among public companies in …
Can Peltz Score?: What’S Behind The May 13 Dupont Vs. Trian Contest, Lawrence A. Hamermesh
Can Peltz Score?: What’S Behind The May 13 Dupont Vs. Trian Contest, Lawrence A. Hamermesh
Lawrence A. Hamermesh
No abstract provided.
A Defense Of The Corporate Law Duty Of Care, Julian Velasco
A Defense Of The Corporate Law Duty Of Care, Julian Velasco
Julian Velasco
Most people would acknowledge the importance of the duty of loyalty, but the same is not true of the duty of care. Historically, the corporate law duty of care has been underenforced at best, and arguably unenforced entirely. Some scholars do not consider the duty of care to be a fiduciary duty at all, and there are those who would do away with it entirely. In this paper, I intend to provide a comprehensive defense of the corporate law fiduciary duty of care. I hope to show that the duty of care is not simply an ill-fitting appendage to the …
Exalting The Corporate Form Over Environmental Protection The Corporate Shell Game And The Enforcement Of Water Management Law In Florida, Mary Jane Angelo, Charles Lobdell, Tara Boonstra
Exalting The Corporate Form Over Environmental Protection The Corporate Shell Game And The Enforcement Of Water Management Law In Florida, Mary Jane Angelo, Charles Lobdell, Tara Boonstra
Mary Jane Angelo
Current laws in Florida afford substantial protection to the “people behind the corporations” (corporate principals) and generally do not allow environmental permitting agencies such as the water management districts to consider such people in their permitting or enforcement efforts. This article poses the question “Do existing corporate law principles of limited liability defeat the important public policy of water resource protection in Florida?” First, in Parts II and III, this article introduces the problem and provides an overview of Florida water management district permitting and enforcement authorities and processes. Next, in Part IV, this article explores the existing legal authorities …
The Divergence Of Standards Of Conduct And Standards Of Review In Corporate Law, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
The Divergence Of Standards Of Conduct And Standards Of Review In Corporate Law, Melvin Aron Eisenberg
Melvin A. Eisenberg
In this Article, Professor Eisenberg examines how and why standards of conduct and standards of review diverge in corporate law. Professor Eisenberg analyzes the relevant standards of conduct and review that apply in a number of corporate law contexts. He discusses the reasoning and policies underlying these diverging standards. Professor Eisenberg explains the basis of most existing standards of conduct and review and suggests modifications of several others.
Democracy In The Private Sector: The Rights Of Shareholders And Union Members, Michael Goldberg
Democracy In The Private Sector: The Rights Of Shareholders And Union Members, Michael Goldberg
Michael J Goldberg
In the years since Enron, there has been a lively debate over the value of shareholder democracy as a means to improve corporate performance and reduce the likelihood of future Enrons or Lehman Brothers. That debate has been enriched by comparative scholarship looking at corporate governance abroad, and comparing corporate governance with public government. This Article explores a different comparison, between corporations and their sometime adversaries across bargaining tables and picket lines – labor unions. More specifically, this article compares the regulation of corporate governance and the regulation of the internal affairs of unions, and the rights of shareholders and …