Law Commons^™

Congress, The Court, And The Constitution: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, Charles T. Canady, Robert C. Scott, Louis Fisher, David P. Currie, Neal Devins, Neil Kinkopf, Nadine Strossen, Matthew J. Franck, Robert L. Clinton, Henry J. Hyde, Melvin L. Watt

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Book Review (Reviewing Louis Fisher's Congress: Protecting Individual Rights), Adeen Postar

Adeen Postar

Fisher is currently the Scholar in Residence at the Constitution Project, and is well known for his many years as Senior Specialist on Separation of Powers at the Congressional Research Service and as Specialist in Constitutional Law at the Law Library of Congress. He has extensive experience testifying before Congress on topics that include Congress and the constitution, war powers, executive power and privilege, and several aspects of the federal budget and its processes. He has written numerous books on these topics, including (to name only a few) The President and Congress: Power and Policy (1972); Defending Congress and the …

Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come To Generate Environmental Law Without Congress, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Bush, Obama And Beyond: Observations On The Prospect For Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims Before The Use Of Force, Leslie Gielow Jacobs

Leslie Gielow Jacobs

This piece looks at the recurring problem of inflated threat claims offered by executive branch actors to persuade the Nation to consent to the use of force. It sets out the experience of the Bush Administration’s use of incorrect threat claims to persuade the country to consent to the use of force in Iraq as a backdrop to evaluating the President Obama’s use of threat claims to support the continuing use of force in Afghanistan. Although comparison of threat advocacy by the Bush and Obama administrations must be imperfect, it allows for some observations about the extent to which the …

The Rehnquist Revolution, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

[Excerpt] "When historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, without a doubt they will say that its greatest changes in constitutional law were in the area of federalism. Over the past decade, and particularly over the last five years, the Supreme Court has dramatically limited the scope of Congress’ powers and has greatly expanded the protection of state Sovereign Immunity. Virtually every area of law, criminal and civil, is touched by these changes. Since I began teaching constitutional law in 1980, the most significant differences in constitutional law are a result of the Supreme Court’s revival of federalism as a …

The Limits Of The New Deal Analogy, Barry Cushman

Barry Cushman

The past three years of the Obama Administration inevitably have elicited comparisons between the present day and the era of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. While frequently illuminating, such comparisons often overlook an important point that many may have forgotten: compared with the major reform initiatives undertaken during President Obama’s tenure, a review of the roll call votes reveals that the measures enacted by the New Deal Congresses enjoyed a remarkable degree of bipartisan support. In addition, the Democrats enjoyed large majorities in the House of Representatives from 1933 forward, and a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate after 1934.These …

The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia

Anthony J. Bellia

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …

How National Park Law Really Works, John Copeland Nagle

John Copeland Nagle

This article provides the first explanation of the relationship between the three overlapping sources of national park law. It first explains how the Organic Act affords the National Park Service substantial discretion to manage the national parks, including deciding the proper balance between enjoyment and conservation in particular instances. It next shows how federal environmental statutes push national park management toward preservation rather than enjoyment. Third, Congress often intervenes to mandate particular management outcomes at individual parks, typically but not always toward enjoyment rather than preservation. The result is that the NPS has substantial discretion to manage national parks in …

Bargaining In The Shadow Of The Debt Ceiling: When Negotiating Over Spending And Tax Laws, Congress And The President Should Consider The Debt Ceiling A Dead Letter, Neil H. Buchanan, Michael C. Dorf

Michael C. Dorf

If the debt ceiling is inconsistent with existing spending and taxing laws, what must the President do? In earlier work, we argued that when Congress creates a “trilemma” — making it impossible for the President to spend as much as Congress has ordered, to tax only as much as Congress has ordered, and to borrow no more than Congress has permitted — the Constitution requires the President to choose the least unconstitutional path. In particular, he must honor Congress’s decisions and priorities regarding spending and taxing, and he must issue enough debt to do so. Here, we extend the analysis …

A Quantum Congress, Jorge R. Roig

Jorge R Roig

The Unconstitutionality Of The Filibuster, Josh Chafetz

Josh Chafetz

This Article, written for the Connecticut Law Review's 2010 "Is Our Constitutional Order Broken?" symposium, argues that the filibuster, as currently practiced, is unconstitutional.

After a brief introduction in Part I, Part II describes the current operation of the filibuster. Although the filibuster is often discussed in terms of "unlimited debate," this Part argues that its current operation is best understood in terms of a sixty-vote requirement to pass most bills and other measures through the Senate.

Part III presents a structural argument that this supermajority requirement for most Senate business is unconstitutional. This Part argues that the words "passed" …

Congressional Power And State Court Jurisdiction, Anthony J. Bellia

Anthony J. Bellia

Federal laws that regulate state institutions give rise to what the Supreme Court has described as the oldest question of constitutional law. In recent years, the Court has confronted questions of congressional power to regulate state legislatures and executives, but has not directly confronted any question of congressional power to regulate state courts. Since the Founding, questions of congressional power to regulate state court jurisdiction of Article III cases have arisen - most notably, congressional power to assign jurisdiction of federal criminal cases to state courts. Today, significant questions of congressional power to regulate state court jurisdiction over non-Article III …

Living Among Guatemalan Mayans Is Fascinating Experience, Irene Scharf

Irene Scharf

I have just lived a dream. Five years ago I learned of a school where students of all ages could study Spanish intensively while living among the Guatemalan Mayans. Peace Accords had been signed in 1996, the government was encouraging tourism, and it was, finally, safe to visit.

Why a dream? Because, 25 years ago, when I traveled through Central and South America, I promised my family I would avoid Guatemala because of the perceived was dangers. During that trip, as I met my Europeans and other who had visited, remained safe, and found it a fascinating country, I vowed …

Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A Three-Branch Problem, William K. Kelley

William K. Kelley

This article criticizes the cardinal rule of statutory construction known as the avoidance canon - that statutes must be interpreted to avoid raising serious constitutional questions - as failing to respect the proper constitutional roles of both Congress and the Executive. It argues that the avoidance canon in practice cannot be grounded in legislative supremacy, which is the common justification for it offered by the Supreme Court, because it assumes without foundation that Congress would always prefer not to come close to the constitutional line in enacting statutes. Instead, the avoidance canon creates pressure for courts to adopt statutory meanings …

Corrections Day, John Copeland Nagle

John Copeland Nagle

In July 1995, the House of Representatives established a Corrections Day procedure for fixing statutory mistakes. This article traces the history of the corrections day idea, beginning with suggestions offered by Justices Cardozo and Ginsburg many years apart. The article also recounts the early applications of Correction Day by the House. This article describes the problem of statutory mistakes: what they are, and who makes them. It explains that statutory mistakes do exist, regardless of how one defines mistake. Congress, agencies, and the courts all make mistakes, though the responsibility for them ultimately resides with Congress, the author of the …

A Twentieth Amendment Parable, John C. Nagle

John Copeland Nagle

The twentieth amendment receives virtually no attention in modern American constitutional law. Adopted in 1933, the primary purpose of the amendment was to eliminate lame-duck Congresses. The proponents of the amendment argued that lame-ducks were subject to nefarious influences and that allowing lame-duck legislation contradicted the voice of the people in the most recent election. But the text of the twentieth amendment simply moved the date on which the newly elected President and Congress took office from March to January, and does not expressly prohibit lame-duck legislation. The framers of the amendment could not conceive of Congress meeting during the …

The Recusal Alternative To Campaign Finance Legislation, John C. Nagle

John Copeland Nagle

Typical campaign finance proposals focus on limiting the amount of money that can be contributed to candidates and the amount of money that candidates can spend. This article suggests an alternative proposal that places no restrictions on contributions or spending, but rather targets the corrupting influence of contributions. Under the proposals, legislators would be required to recuse themselves from voting on issues directly affecting contributors. I contend that this proposal would prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption while remedying the first amendment objections to the regulation of money in campaigns.

Form, Function, And Justiciability, Anthony J. Bellia

Anthony J. Bellia

No abstract provided.

The Alien Tort Statute And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

Anthony J. Bellia

Courts and scholars have struggled to identify the original meaning of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). As enacted in 1789, the ATS provided "[t]hat the district courts... shall... have cognizance... of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The statute was rarely invoked for almost two centuries until, in the 1980s, lower federal courts began reading the statute expansively to allow foreign citizens to sue other foreign citizens for violations of modern customary international law that occurred outside the United States. In 2004 …

Book Review Of Arnold H. Leibowitz, An Historical-Legal Analysis Of The Impeachments Of Presidents Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, And William Clinton: Why The Process Went Wrong, Jeffrey B. Morris

Jeffrey B. Morris

No abstract provided.

Encyclopedia Of American History, Jeffrey Morris, Richard Morris

Jeffrey B. Morris

No abstract provided.

Retaliatorily Discharged Employees’ Standing To Sue Under The Antitrust Laws, Gary Shaw

Gary M. Shaw

No abstract provided.

Irresponsible Legislating: Reeling In The Aftermath Of Kelo, Patricia E. Salkin

Patricia E. Salkin

No abstract provided.

Congress Misses Twice With The Community Character Act: Will Three Times Be A Charm?, Patricia E. Salkin

Patricia E. Salkin

No abstract provided.

Attorney’S Fees In Civil Rights Cases—October 2009 Term, Martin A. Schwartz

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.

The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove

Tara L. Grove

Scholars have long viewed the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. In this Article, I argue that the Clause has been fundamentally misunderstood. The Exceptions Clause, as employed by Congress, serves primarily to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on recent social science research, I assert that Congress has a strong incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the …

The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove

Tara L. Grove

Scholars have long viewed the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. In this Article, I argue that the Clause has been fundamentally misunderstood. The Exceptions Clause, as employed by Congress, serves primarily to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on recent social science research, I assert that Congress has a strong incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the …

The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, Tara Grove

Tara L. Grove

Scholars have long viewed the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. In this Article, I argue that the Clause has been fundamentally misunderstood. The Exceptions Clause, as employed by Congress, serves primarily to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on recent social science research, I assert that Congress has a strong incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the …

Gerrymandering And The High Court, Alan E. Garfield

Alan E Garfield

No abstract provided.

Where Did My Privilege Go? Congress And Its Discretion To Ignore The Attorney-Client Privilege, Don Berthiaume, Jeffrey Ansley

Don R Berthiaume

“The right to counsel is too important to be passed over for prosecutorial convenience or executive branch whimsy. It has been engrained in American jurisprudence since the 18th century when the Bill of Rights was adopted... However, the right to counsel is largely ineffective unless the confidential communications made by a client to his or her lawyer are protected by law.”[1] So said Senator Arlen Specter on February 13, 2009, just seven months before Congress chose to ignore the very privilege he lauded. Why then, if the right to counsel is as important as Senator Specter articulated, does Congress maintain …