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Full-Text Articles in Law
Behavioral Public Choice And The Law, Gary M. Lucas Jr., Slaviša Tasić
Behavioral Public Choice And The Law, Gary M. Lucas Jr., Slaviša Tasić
Gary M. Lucas Jr.
Behavioral public choice is the study of irrationality among political actors. In this context, irrationality means systematic bias, a deviation from rational expectations, or other departure from economists’ conception of rationality. Behavioral public choice scholars extend the insights of behavioral economics to the political realm and show that irrational behavior is an important source of government failure. This Article makes an original contribution to the legal literature by systematically reviewing the findings of behavioral public choice and explaining their implications for the law and legal institutions. We discuss the various biases and heuristics that lead political actors to support and …
Mandatory Process, Matthew Lawrence
Mandatory Process, Matthew Lawrence
Matthew B. Lawrence
Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, And Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, And Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Legal scholars commonly argue that the widespread presence of cognitive errors in judgment justifies legal intervention to save people from predictable mistakes. Such arguments often fail to account for individual variation in the commission of such errors even though individual variation is probably common. If predictable groups of people avoid making the errors that others commit, then law should account for such differences because those who avoid errors will not benefit from paternalistic interventions and indeed may be harmed by them. The research on individual variation suggests three parameters that might distinguish people who can avoid error: cognitive ability, experience …
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, Avishalom Tor
Understanding Behavioral Antitrust, Avishalom Tor
Avishalom Tor
Behavioral antitrust – the application to antitrust analysis of empirical evidence of robust behavioral deviations from strict rationality – is increasingly popular and hotly debated by legal scholars and the enforcement agencies alike. This Article shows, however, that both proponents and opponents of behavioral antitrust frequently and fundamentally misconstrue its methodology, treating concrete empirical phenomena as if they were broad hypothetical assumptions. Because of this fundamental methodological error, scholars often make three classes of mistakes in behavioral antitrust analyses: First, they fail to appreciate the variability and heterogeneity of behavioral phenomena; second, they disregard the concrete ways in which markets, …
Incentives To Create Under A "Lifetime-Plus-Years" Copyright Duration: Lessons From A Behavioral Economic Analysis For Eldred V. Ashcroft, Avishalom Tor, Dotan Oliar
Incentives To Create Under A "Lifetime-Plus-Years" Copyright Duration: Lessons From A Behavioral Economic Analysis For Eldred V. Ashcroft, Avishalom Tor, Dotan Oliar
Avishalom Tor
In this Article, we highlight for the first time some of the significant but hitherto unrecognized behavioral effects of copyright law on individuals' incentives to create and then examine the implications of our findings for the constitutional analysis of Eldred v. Ashcroft. We show that behavioral biases - namely, individuals' optimistic bias regarding their future longevity and their subadditive judgments in circumstances resembling the extant rule of copyright duration - explain the otherwise puzzling lifetime-plus-years basis for copyright protection given to individual authors, and reveal how this regime provides superior incentives to create. Thus, insofar as the provision of increased …
A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts And Conventional Contract Law, Shmuel I. Becher
A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts And Conventional Contract Law, Shmuel I. Becher
Shmuel I Becher
Consumer contracts diverge from the traditional paradigm of contract law in various conspicuous ways. They are pre-drafted by one party; they cannot be altered or negotiated; they are executed between unfamiliar contracting parties unequal in their market power and sophistication; they are offered frequently by agents who act on behalf of the seller; and promisees (i.e., consumers) do not read or understand them. Consumer contracts are thus useful in modern markets of mass production, but they cast doubt on some fundamental notions of contract law. To reframe the long-lasting debate over consumer contracts this Article develops a superior legal regime …