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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Negotiating Executive Compensation In Lieu Of Regulation, Urska Velikonja
Negotiating Executive Compensation In Lieu Of Regulation, Urska Velikonja
Urska Velikonja
No abstract provided.
The Cost Of Securities Fraud, Urska Velikonja
The Cost Of Securities Fraud, Urska Velikonja
Urska Velikonja
Under the dominant account, securities fraud by public firms harms the firms’ shareholders and, more generally, capital markets. Recent financial legislation—the JOBS Act and the Dodd-Frank Act—as well as the influential 2011 D.C. Circuit decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC reinforce that same worldview. This Article contends that the account is wrong. Misreporting distorts economic decision-making by all firms, both those committing fraud and not. False information, coupled with efforts to hide fraud and avoid detection, impairs risk assessment by providers of human and financial capital, suppliers and customers, and thus misdirects capital and labor to lower-value projects. If fraud …
The Social Cost Of Financial Misrepresentations, Urska Velikonja
The Social Cost Of Financial Misrepresentations, Urska Velikonja
Urska Velikonja
Policy makers, regulators, and academics have traditionally looked for the harm from securities fraud in the easy-to-study financial markets. However, by doing so, they have missed the significantly larger social welfare losses caused by securities fraud that fall outside financial markets. False financial disclosures, which are the most common variant of securities fraud, distort real economic decisions that firms, their rivals, suppliers, vendors, lenders, and workers make, thus distorting markets for inputs and outputs. When the fraud is revealed, every party affected makes costly adjustments. Many fraud-committing firms file for bankruptcy. Their rivals face doubts, called contagion. All firms must …
The Costs Of Multiple Gestation Pregnancies In Assisted Reproduction, Urska Velikonja
The Costs Of Multiple Gestation Pregnancies In Assisted Reproduction, Urska Velikonja
Urska Velikonja
The United States, unlike most developed countries, does not regulate its fertility industry. Rather, it vests control over the industry to professional organizations and to market forces. While lack of regulation has produced a vibrant market for fertility services, it has also produced an undesirable consequence: a high rate of multiple gestation pregnancies, including twin pregnancies. This Article summarizes the data on the medical, psychological, and financial costs associated with multiple pregnancies to the parents, the children, and American society. It suggests that the current U.S. regulatory regime has not only failed to address these costs as they surfaced but …
Making Peace And Making Money: Economic Analysis Of The Market For Mediators In Private Practice, Urska Velikonja
Making Peace And Making Money: Economic Analysis Of The Market For Mediators In Private Practice, Urska Velikonja
Urska Velikonja
Mediation has grown tremendously in the last three decades, yet only a small number of mediators have been able to benefit financially from its growth. The supply of willing mediators by far exceeds the demand for their services. Mediator trainee overoptimism and the lack of formal barriers to entry result in excess entry in the market for mediators. However, the lack of a formal barrier, but the existence of de facto barriers to entry, such as mediator selection practices and specialization, combined with excessive individual optimism, creates inefficiently high levels of entry. This is socially suboptimal: many aspirant mediators spend …
Leverage, Sanctions, And Deterrence Of Accounting Fraud, Urska Velikonja
Leverage, Sanctions, And Deterrence Of Accounting Fraud, Urska Velikonja
Urska Velikonja
The empirical evidence suggests that firms overpay for fraud liability and overspend on internal compliance mechanisms (which are not very effective at preventing fraud). Yet, insiders who commit fraud are rarely sanctioned for their wrongdoing, which produces moral hazard and individual underdeterrence.Two factors explain the failure to sanction managers who commit fraud. First, managers control the information revealing who was involved in account fraud and, thus, can impede external investigations and sanctions. Second, managers also influence whether the firm will investigate and sanction accounting fraud internally. Managers’ control over settlement and the availability of directors’ and officers’ insurance further reduce …