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Full-Text Articles in Law

Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes In Corporate Takeovers, Robert P. Bartlett Iii Aug 2016

Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding Outcomes In Corporate Takeovers, Robert P. Bartlett Iii

Robert Bartlett

Economic analysis of corporate takeovers has traditionally advocated legal doctrines that ensure a target company in a takeover contest is acquired by the bidder willing to pay the most for it. The reason stems from the conventional assumption that a bidder's offer price should reflect its ability to put a target's assets to productive use. This Article challenges this assumption by turning to the success of private equity firms in outbidding publicly traded, strategic bidders during the takeover wave of 2004 to 2007. Using standard valuation modeling, this Article reveals how a critical component of any bidder's valuation of a …


Venture Capital, Agency Costs, And The False Dichotomy Of The Corporation, Robert P. Bartlett Aug 2016

Venture Capital, Agency Costs, And The False Dichotomy Of The Corporation, Robert P. Bartlett

Robert Bartlett

No abstract provided.


Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii Aug 2016

Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii

Robert Bartlett

In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …