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Full-Text Articles in Law
Toward A Public Enforcement Model For Directors' Duty Of Oversight, Renee Jones, Michelle Welsh
Toward A Public Enforcement Model For Directors' Duty Of Oversight, Renee Jones, Michelle Welsh
Renee Jones
This Article proposes a public enforcement model for the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Under the dominant model of corporate governance, the principal function of the board of directors is to oversee the conduct of senior corporate officials. When directors fail to provide proper oversight, the consequences can be severe for shareholders, creditors, employees, and society at large. Despite general agreement on the importance of director oversight, courts have yet to develop a coherent doctrine governing director liability for the breach of oversight duties. In Delaware, the dominant state for U.S. corporate law, the courts tout the importance of board …
Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones
Corporate Governance And Accountability, Renee M. Jones
Renee Jones
This book chapter on Corporate Governance and Accountability is a contribution to the book CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE (Wiley, forthcoming 2010), edited by Ronald Anderson and H. Kent Baker. This chapter describes the sources of corporate governance standards for American corporations and analyzes the accountability mechanisms designed to ensure that corporate officials act faithfully in their management of corporate affairs. The chapter focuses on the financial reporting system under the U.S. securities laws which forms the foundation of the accountability system, and discusses structures and rules designed to ensure the integrity of financial reporting. The …
Law, Norms, And The Breakdown Of The Board, Renee M. Jones
Law, Norms, And The Breakdown Of The Board, Renee M. Jones
Renee Jones
This Article considers the dominant claim in corporate law literature that extra-legal mechanisms such as markets and social norms provide adequate safeguards against corporate mismanagement and opportunism. After noting recognized deficiencies in the arguments from market discipline, the Article draws on psychological insights to show that certain behavioral phenomena prevent social norms from appropriately constraining corporate conduct. It then argues that because neither markets nor social norms can sufficiently discipline corporate officials, a credible accountability mechanism is necessary to prevent director conduct standards from deteriorating. Unfortunately, an inveterate tradition of judicial deference in corporate law has undermined the role of …
Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role In The Corporate Governance Debate, Renee Jones
Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role In The Corporate Governance Debate, Renee Jones
Renee Jones
No abstract provided.