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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Law
Creditors And Debt Governance, Charles K. Whitehead
Creditors And Debt Governance, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
This chapter from the book Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, eds.), provides an introduction to the law and economic theory relating to creditors and debt governance. The chapter begins with a look at the traditional role of debt, focusing on the impact of debt on corporate governance and, in particular, the effect of an illiquid credit market on creditors’ reliance on covenants and monitoring. It then turns to changes in the private credit market and their effect on lending structure. Greater liquidity raises its own set of agency costs. In response, loans …
Sandbagging: Default Rules And Acquisition Agreements, Charles K. Whitehead
Sandbagging: Default Rules And Acquisition Agreements, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
In the M&A world, a buyer "sandbags" a seller when, knowing the seller has materially breached a warranty, it closes the deal and then asserts a post-closing claim. Traditionally, the buyer must have relied on the warranty, without knowledge of the breach, in order to prevail. The modern trend, with some exceptions, permits the buyer to sue without regard to knowledge. Parties, in both cases, can contract around the default rule--so that the default rule should affect how acquisition agreements are structured. Yet, a survey of publicly available deals, from July 2007 to June 2011, reveals that--regardless of default rule--roughly …
What's Your Sign? -- International Norms, Signals, And Compliance, Charles K. Whitehead
What's Your Sign? -- International Norms, Signals, And Compliance, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
This Article proposes a new approach to analyzing state compliance with international obligations, positing that increased interaction among the world's regulators has reinforced norms within cross-border regulatory networks, influencing the actions of senior regulators who are network members and, in turn, affecting levels of state compliance. Network norms help define what state actions constitute signals and the meanings of those signals. Certain actions, such as implementing a substantive network standard, may be considered a concrete expression of an abstract network norm. States that fail to implement that standard risk failing to send the right signal, potentially incurring significant network sanctions. …
Reframing Financial Regulation, Charles K. Whitehead
Reframing Financial Regulation, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
Financial regulation today is largely framed by traditional business categories. The financial markets, however, have begun to bypass those categories, principally over the last thirty years. Chief among the changes has been convergence in the products and services offered by traditional intermediaries and new market entrants, as well as a shift in capital-raising and risk-bearing from traditional intermediation to the capital markets. The result has been the reintroduction of old problems addressed by (but now beyond the reach of) current regulation, and the rise of new problems that reflect change in how capital and financial risk can now be managed …
The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead
The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities - in effect, reintroducing to the financial markets a substantial portion of the Glass-Steagall Act’s static divide between banks and securities firms. This Article argues that the Glass-Steagall model is a fixture of the past - a financial Maginot Line within an evolving financial system. To be effective, new financial regulation must reflect new relationships in the marketplace. For the Volcker Rule, those relationships include a growing reliance by banks on new market participants to conduct traditional banking functions. Proprietary trading has moved to less-regulated businesses, in many cases, to hedge …
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors. This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, …
The Evolution Of Debt: Covenants, The Credit Market, And Corporate Governance, Charles K. Whitehead
The Evolution Of Debt: Covenants, The Credit Market, And Corporate Governance, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
No abstract provided.
Why Not A Ceo Term Limit?, Charles K. Whitehead
Why Not A Ceo Term Limit?, Charles K. Whitehead
Charles K Whitehead
In this Essay, I ask: Why not require a mandatory CEO term limit? My purpose is not to propose a term limit, but rather to ask why CEO term limits are out-of-bounds – not addressed within the corporate governance scholarship – when they have long been advocated for directors and, more recently, public company auditors. The traditional answer has been that CEOs are agents of the corporation, subject to control by the board, which holds primary responsibility for the firm’s business and affairs. Senior officers are largely shielded from outside interference, permitting them to execute consistent, long-term business strategies under …