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Reconstructing The Corporation: A Mutual-Control Model Of Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Reconstructing The Corporation: A Mutual-Control Model Of Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are …
The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy To Shared Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy To Shared Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are …
Shareholder Voting And The Symbolic Politics Of Corporation As Contract, Matthew T. Bodie, Grant M. Hayden
Shareholder Voting And The Symbolic Politics Of Corporation As Contract, Matthew T. Bodie, Grant M. Hayden
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American corporations are structured in such a way that shareholders, and shareholders alone, have the right to vote in all significant corporate decisions. Over the years, this exclusive shareholder franchise has been supported by an ongoing procession of justifications. But as those arguments have fallen by the wayside, shareholder primacists have circled back and latched upon a final argument for the special voting status of shareholders, arguing that this fundamental feature of corporate governance is the product of the set of freely-bargained-for agreements among all corporate constituents. Because this set of agreements reflects the preferences of all parties to the …
Workers, Information, And Corporate Combinations: The Case For Non-Binding Employee Referenda In Transformative Transactions, Matthew T. Bodie
Workers, Information, And Corporate Combinations: The Case For Non-Binding Employee Referenda In Transformative Transactions, Matthew T. Bodie
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Employees present a curious puzzle for corporate law. The success of a corporation depends on its employees, from the chief executive officer down to the front-line production or service worker. But for the most part, corporate law relegates employees to the sidelines. Perhaps nowhere is this difference as dramatic as in the realm of mergers, acquisitions, and other transformative transactions. Such transactions are usually negotiated at the highest levels of management, approved by the board, and ultimately approved by the shareholders. In contrast, employees at most may be able to bargain about the effects of the merger through union representatives; …
Aol Time Warner And The False God Of Shareholder Primacy, Matthew T. Bodie
Aol Time Warner And The False God Of Shareholder Primacy, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
The blockbuster merger between AOL and Time Warner, in the twilight of the dot-com boom, is now characterized as perhaps the worst business combination ever. Shareholders lost over $200 billion in value; the deal's architects were forced out in disgrace; and the surviving executives jettisoned the AOL name as if towipe clean our collective memory. Despite the merger's seismic effects, relatively little has been written about its potential legal ramifications. In this article, I suggest that the collapse of AOL Time Warner is a cautionary tale for those who would advocate greater adherence to the norm of shareholder primacy. Before …