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Saint Louis University School of Law

Business Organizations Law

Shareholder primacy

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Reconstructing The Corporation: A Mutual-Control Model Of Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie Jan 2019

Reconstructing The Corporation: A Mutual-Control Model Of Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are …


The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy To Shared Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie Jan 2019

The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy To Shared Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are …


Workers, Information, And Corporate Combinations: The Case For Non-Binding Employee Referenda In Transformative Transactions, Matthew T. Bodie Jan 2008

Workers, Information, And Corporate Combinations: The Case For Non-Binding Employee Referenda In Transformative Transactions, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

Employees present a curious puzzle for corporate law. The success of a corporation depends on its employees, from the chief executive officer down to the front-line production or service worker. But for the most part, corporate law relegates employees to the sidelines. Perhaps nowhere is this difference as dramatic as in the realm of mergers, acquisitions, and other transformative transactions. Such transactions are usually negotiated at the highest levels of management, approved by the board, and ultimately approved by the shareholders. In contrast, employees at most may be able to bargain about the effects of the merger through union representatives; …


Aol Time Warner And The False God Of Shareholder Primacy, Matthew T. Bodie Jan 2005

Aol Time Warner And The False God Of Shareholder Primacy, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

The blockbuster merger between AOL and Time Warner, in the twilight of the dot-com boom, is now characterized as perhaps the worst business combination ever. Shareholders lost over $200 billion in value; the deal's architects were forced out in disgrace; and the surviving executives jettisoned the AOL name as if towipe clean our collective memory. Despite the merger's seismic effects, relatively little has been written about its potential legal ramifications. In this article, I suggest that the collapse of AOL Time Warner is a cautionary tale for those who would advocate greater adherence to the norm of shareholder primacy. Before …