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Full-Text Articles in Law

Workers, Information, And Corporate Combinations: The Case For Non-Binding Employee Referenda In Transformative Transactions, Matthew T. Bodie Jan 2008

Workers, Information, And Corporate Combinations: The Case For Non-Binding Employee Referenda In Transformative Transactions, Matthew T. Bodie

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Employees present a curious puzzle for corporate law. The success of a corporation depends on its employees, from the chief executive officer down to the front-line production or service worker. But for the most part, corporate law relegates employees to the sidelines. Perhaps nowhere is this difference as dramatic as in the realm of mergers, acquisitions, and other transformative transactions. Such transactions are usually negotiated at the highest levels of management, approved by the board, and ultimately approved by the shareholders. In contrast, employees at most may be able to bargain about the effects of the merger through union representatives; …


Confusion And Unpredictability In Shareholder Derivative Litigation: The Delaware Courts' Response To Recent Corporate Scandals, Ann M. Scarlett Jan 2008

Confusion And Unpredictability In Shareholder Derivative Litigation: The Delaware Courts' Response To Recent Corporate Scandals, Ann M. Scarlett

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The Delaware courts responded to the recent wave of corporate scandals, exemplified by Enron and WorldCom, by changing their approach to shareholder derivative litigation. This Article analyzes the Delaware courts' response to these scandals and concludes that the courts have created doctrinal confusion and introduced unpredictability into derivative litigation. This Article also analyzes the future negative consequences for shareholders, corporations, directors, investors, and other litigants. Finally, this Article proposes improvements for derivative litigation that may alleviate the confusion and unpredictability created by the Delaware courts' response to the recent scandals.


A Better Approach For Balancing Authority And Accountability In Shareholder Derivative Litigation, Ann M. Scarlett Jan 2008

A Better Approach For Balancing Authority And Accountability In Shareholder Derivative Litigation, Ann M. Scarlett

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Corporations present an interesting illustration of the authority versus accountability dilemma. Shareholders elect the directors of the corporation and the law vests those directors with almost unlimited authority to manage the corporation. Yet, shareholders have few effective means for holding directors accountable for their decisions other than through shareholder derivative litigation. In such litigation, the business judgment rule serves as the mechanism by which courts attempt to balance directors' authority to make decisions for the corporation against shareholders' right to hold directors accountable for those decisions.

As this Article discusses, numerous theories exist as to the proper formulation of the …


The False Promise Of One Share, One Vote, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie Jan 2008

The False Promise Of One Share, One Vote, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

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Shareholder democracy has blossomed. The once moribund shareholder franchise is now critical in takeover contests, merger decisions, and board oversight. However, the mechanisms of this vote remain largely under theorized. In this Article, we use voting rights and social choice theory to develop a new approach to the corporate franchise. Political democracies typically tie the right to vote to the level of a person's interest in the outcome of the election. Corporate democracies, on the other hand, tend to define the requisite institutional interest quite narrowly, and thus restrict the right to vote to shareholders alone. This restriction has found …


Corporate Social Responsibility Of Multinational Enterprises And The International Business Law Curriculum, Constance Z. Wagner Jan 2008

Corporate Social Responsibility Of Multinational Enterprises And The International Business Law Curriculum, Constance Z. Wagner

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The author argues for expanded coverage of corporate social responsibility in the U.S. law school curriculum. Corporate social responsibility is of increasing importance for businesses, particularly for those companies that conduct multinational operations. Current national legal and regulatory regimes fail to adequately address the social and environmental issues that arise in business operations. As a result, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and businesses have begun to promulgate voluntary codes ofconduct. These codes touch on such subjects as core labor standards, environmental protection, bribery offoreign government officials in international business and human rights. Examples include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development …