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Full-Text Articles in Law
On Foxes And Hedgehogs, Roger P. Alford
On Foxes And Hedgehogs, Roger P. Alford
Journal Articles
This Article is about John Nagle’s many means to one great end. It will outline the many themes of his scholarship: (i) environmental law, (ii) statutory interpretation, (iii) constitutional law, (iv) nuisance and pollution, (v) election law and campaign finance, (vi) Christianity and the environment, and (vii) national parks. It will offer conclusions on how he used his scholarly interests as a means to pursue his overarching worldview.
The Mischief Rule, Samuel L. Bray
The Mischief Rule, Samuel L. Bray
Journal Articles
The mischief rule tells an interpreter to read a statute in light of the “mischief” or “evil”—the problem that prompted the statute. The mischief rule has been associated with Blackstone’s appeal to a statute’s “reason and spirit” and with Hart-and-Sacks-style purposivism. Justice Scalia rejected the mischief rule. But the rule is widely misunderstood, both by those inclined to love it and those inclined to hate it. This Article reconsiders the mischief rule. It shows that the rule has two enduringly useful functions: guiding an interpreter to a stopping point for statutory language that can be given a broader or narrower …
Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, And The Law Of Stare Decisis, Randy J. Kozel
Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, And The Law Of Stare Decisis, Randy J. Kozel
Journal Articles
This Article examines three facets of the relationship between statutory interpretation and the law of stare decisis: judicial interpretation, administrative interpretation, and interpretive methodology. In analyzing these issues, I emphasize the role of stare decisis in pursuing balance between past and present. That role admits of no distinction between statutory and constitutional decisions, calling into question the practice of giving superstrong deference to judicial interpretations of statutes. The pursuit of balance also suggests that one Supreme Court cannot bind future Justices to a wide-ranging interpretive methodology. As for rules requiring deference to administrative interpretations of statutes and regulations, they are …
Technical Standards Meet Administrative Law: A Teaching Guide On Incorporation By Reference, Emily S. Bremer
Technical Standards Meet Administrative Law: A Teaching Guide On Incorporation By Reference, Emily S. Bremer
Journal Articles
When an agency incorporates by reference, it promulgates a rule that identifies—but does not reprint—material already published elsewhere. The incorporated materials thus become binding law without actually being printed in the agency's regulations. Sometimes the incorporated materials are privately developed technical standards, which are often copyrighted and available only for a fee. This restriction on access undermines transparency and public participation in the rulemaking process. Finding a solution is challenging because the problem is multidimensional, implicating public policy in the areas of administrative law, federal standards law and policy, and copyright.
This teaching guide is part of module that offers …
Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia
Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia
Journal Articles
In the realm of Federal Courts, the question of “implied rights of action” asks when, if ever, may a plaintiff bring a federal right of action for the violation of a federal statute that does not expressly create one. Justice Scalia argued that a court should not entertain an action for damages for the violation of a federal statute unless the text of the statute demonstrates that Congress meant to create a right of action. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority. Certain judges and scholars have argued …
Reading Statutes In The Common Law Tradition, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Reading Statutes In The Common Law Tradition, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Journal Articles
There is wide agreement in American law and scholarship about the role the common law tradition plays in statutory interpretation. Jurists and scholars of various stripes concur that the common law points away from formalist interpretive approaches like textualism and toward a more creative, independent role for courts. They simply differ over whether the common law tradition is worth preserving. Dynamic and strongly purposive interpreters claim the Anglo-American common law heritage in support of their approach to statutory interpretation, while arguing that formalism is an unjustified break from that tradition. Formalists reply that the common law mindset and methods are …
Administrative Change, Randy J. Kozel, Jeffrey Pojanowski
Administrative Change, Randy J. Kozel, Jeffrey Pojanowski
Journal Articles
Determining the standard of review for administrative actions has commanded judicial and scholarly interest like few other topics. Notwithstanding the extensive debates, far less consideration has been given to the unique features of agencies’ deviations from their own precedents. In this article we examine this puzzle of administrative change. By change, we mean a reversal of the agency’s former views about the best way to implement and interpret its regulatory mandate. We trace the lineage of administrative change at the Supreme Court and analyze features that distinguish agency reversals from other administrative actions. In particular, we contend that because administrative …
Substantive Canons And Faithful Agency, Amy Coney Barrett
Substantive Canons And Faithful Agency, Amy Coney Barrett
Journal Articles
Federal courts have long employed substantive canons of construction in the interpretation of statutes. For example, they apply the rule of lenity, which directs that ambiguous criminal statutes be interpreted in favor of the defendant, and the avoidance canon, which directs that statutes be interpreted in a manner that prevents the court from having to address serious constitutional questions. They also apply so-called “clear statement” rules — for example, absent a clear statement from Congress, a federal court will not interpret a statute to abrogate state sovereign immunity. While some commentators have attempted to rationalize these and other substantive canons …
State Courts And The Interpretation Of Federal Statutes, Anthony J. Bellia
State Courts And The Interpretation Of Federal Statutes, Anthony J. Bellia
Journal Articles
Scholars have long debated the separation of powers question of what judicial power federal courts have under Article III of the Constitution in the enterprise of interpreting federal statutes. Specifically, scholars have debated whether, in light of Founding-era English and state court judicial practice, the judicial power of the United States should be understood as a power to interpret statutes dynamically or as faithful agents of Congress. This Article argues that the question of how courts should interpret federal statutes is one not only of separation of powers but of federalism as well. State courts have a vital and often …
Foreign Relations As A Matter Of Interpretation: The Use And Abuse Of Charming Betsy, Roger P. Alford
Foreign Relations As A Matter Of Interpretation: The Use And Abuse Of Charming Betsy, Roger P. Alford
Journal Articles
Charming Betsy is a canon of construction that construes legislative enactments consistent with the law of nations. This canon promotes the passive virtue of avoiding constitutional problems by eschewing potential international law violations through statutory interpretation, thereby enhancing the United States' performance in foreign affairs. As a rule of separation of powers, Charming Betsy helps explain how foreign relations concerns clarify the scope of legislative, executive, and judicial authority. But when advocates contend that the Constitution likewise should be read through the lens of Charming Betsy, they abuse the doctrine by ignoring its purpose. While structural guarantees that relate to …
Proportionality And Federalization, Stephen F. Smith
Proportionality And Federalization, Stephen F. Smith
Journal Articles
The thesis of this Article is that proportionality of punishment has become a casualty of federalization and that the federal courts helped kill it. The federal courts like to portray themselves as the victims in the vicious cycle of federalization, left defenseless in the face of rapacious efforts by Congress and the Department of Justice to use the federal criminal code for their own selfish ends. The federal judiciary repeatedly complains that its judges are overburdened with criminal cases that belong in state court. This is the story the leading lights in the academy have accepted: Congress is responsible for …
Statutory Stare Decisis In The Courts Of Appeals, Amy Coney Barrett
Statutory Stare Decisis In The Courts Of Appeals, Amy Coney Barrett
Journal Articles
The Supreme Court has long given its cases interpreting statutes special protection from overruling. Two rationales exist for this practice. One line of thought interprets congressional silence following the Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute as approval of that interpretation. According to this way of thinking, a refusal to overrule statutory precedent is a refusal to veer from an interpretation that Congress has effectively approved. Another line of thought emphasizes that statutory interpretation inevitably involves policymaking, and that policymaking is an aspect of legislative, rather than judicial, power. According to this second way of thinking, the Supreme Court should refuse …
Direct Democracy And Hastily Enacted Statutes, John C. Nagle
Direct Democracy And Hastily Enacted Statutes, John C. Nagle
Journal Articles
Phil Frickey qualifies as the leading explorer of the borderline between statutory interpretation and constitutional law. Frickey explores ways to mediate the borderline between statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication in the context of direct democracy. His is an enormously helpful attempt to reconcile the constitutional issues discussed by Julian Eule and the statutory interpretation issues discussed by Jane Schacter. I agree with many of Frickey's suggestions. Indeed, I will suggest some additional devices that can perform the same role. But I wonder whether Frickey has proved more than he set out to accomplish. The problems of direct democracy are special, …