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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Reform Of The Corporate Duty Of Care In China -- From The Introspection Of Delaware And Taiwan, Jui-Chien Cheng
The Reform Of The Corporate Duty Of Care In China -- From The Introspection Of Delaware And Taiwan, Jui-Chien Cheng
Maurer Theses and Dissertations
The concept of fiduciary duty, derived from common law, was introduced to the Company Law of People’s Republic of China in 2005. The fiduciary duty plays an extremely important role in common law, particularly in U.S. corporate law. For this reason, one might have expected dramatic consequences from its introduction to Chinese law. In reality, however, few fiduciary lawsuits have been brought to the courts of China since 2005. There are three main reasons for the rarity of due care lawsuits.
First, Chinese fiduciary law has neither clear content nor a practical enforcement. This is especially true of the body …
Independent Directors And Shared Board Control In Venture Finance, Brian J. Broughman
Independent Directors And Shared Board Control In Venture Finance, Brian J. Broughman
Articles by Maurer Faculty
In most VC-backed firms neither the entrepreneurs nor the VC investors control the board. Instead control is typically shared with a mutually appointed independent director holding the tie-breaking seat. Contract theory, which treats control as an indivisible right held by one party, does not have a good explanation for this practice. Using a bargaining game similar to final offer arbitration, I show that an independent director as tie-breaker can reduce holdup by moderating each party’s ex post threat position, potentially expanding the range of firms which receive external financing. This project contributes to the literature on incomplete contracting and holdup, …
The Sec Staff's "Cybersecurity Disclosure" Guidance: Will It Help Investors Or Cyber-Thieves More?, Sarah Jane Hughes, Roland L. Trope
The Sec Staff's "Cybersecurity Disclosure" Guidance: Will It Help Investors Or Cyber-Thieves More?, Sarah Jane Hughes, Roland L. Trope
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Enforcing The Fundamental Premises Of Partnership Taxation, Rebecca S. Rudnick
Enforcing The Fundamental Premises Of Partnership Taxation, Rebecca S. Rudnick
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Who Should Pay The Corporate Tax In A Flat Tax World?, Rebecca S. Rudnick
Who Should Pay The Corporate Tax In A Flat Tax World?, Rebecca S. Rudnick
Articles by Maurer Faculty
This article reviews the corporate tax system within the context of the historical bias and current effects of the current system of taxation of corporations and shareholders. Drawing on public finance theory, financial markets microstructure research, and perspectives on corporate governance, Professor Rudnick proposes a profits tax on the liquid equity of firms. She finds this to be a normative rationale for a double tax system under optimal tax principles due to the inelasticity of demand for and supply of liquidity and the economic rent it produces. The value of liquidity in different capital markets is the crucial determinate. Under …
Commercial Paper: An Exempted Security Under Section 3 (A) (3) Of The Securities Act Of 1933, J. William Hicks
Commercial Paper: An Exempted Security Under Section 3 (A) (3) Of The Securities Act Of 1933, J. William Hicks
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Recapitalizations Under Section 3 (A) (9) Of The Securities Act Of 1933, J. William Hicks
Recapitalizations Under Section 3 (A) (9) Of The Securities Act Of 1933, J. William Hicks
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Intrastate Offerings Under Rule 147, J. William Hicks
Intrastate Offerings Under Rule 147, J. William Hicks
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.