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How Must A Lawyer Be? A Response To Woolley And Wendel, David Luban
How Must A Lawyer Be? A Response To Woolley And Wendel, David Luban
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL Ethics, Alice Woolley and W. Bradley Wendel argue that theories of legal ethics may be evaluated by examining the kind of person a lawyer must be to conform to the normative demands of the theory. In their words, theories of legal ethics musts answer questions not only of what a lawyer must do, but how a lawyer must be. Woolley and Wendel examine three theories of legal ethics—those of Charles Fried, William Simon, and myself—and conclude that the theories they discuss impose demands on agency that are not realistic, functional, …
David Luban, Review Of Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy In A Democratic Age, David Luban
David Luban, Review Of Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy In A Democratic Age, David Luban
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Daniel Markovits offers a novel defense of the traditional partisan advocate’s role, based on the demands of personal integrity. Although he insists that the adversary system requires lawyers to lie and cheat (regardless of the particular ethics rules in place), it is possible to redescribe these lawyerly vices as the virtue of fidelity to a client, expressed through what John Keats called “negative capability”—a suppression of the self in order to allow someone else’s story to shine forth. These are first-personal moral ideals, and Markovits argues against the primacy of second- and third-personal moral ideals (such as Kantianism and utilitarianism) …
The Rule Of Law And Human Dignity: Reexamining Fuller’S Canons, David Luban
The Rule Of Law And Human Dignity: Reexamining Fuller’S Canons, David Luban
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Lon Fuller offered an analysis of the rule of law in the form of eight ‘canons’ of lawmaking. He argued (1) that these canons constitute a ‘procedural natural law’, as distinct from traditional ‘substantive’ natural law; but also (2) that lawmaking conforming to the canons will enhance human dignity—a ‘substantive’ result. This paper argues the following points: first, that Fuller mischaracterized his eight canons, which are substantive rather than procedural; second, that there is an important sense in which they enhance human dignity; third, that they fail to enhance human dignity to the fullest extent because they understand it in …