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Articles 1 - 30 of 34
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Domains Of Loyalty: Relationships Between Fiduciary Obligation And Intrinsic Motivation, Deborah A. Demott
The Domains Of Loyalty: Relationships Between Fiduciary Obligation And Intrinsic Motivation, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
Recent scholarly inquiry into fiduciary law predominantly focuses on whether the subject is a coherent field and not a piecemeal assortment of doctrinal detail. This Article looks to the future and to relationships between the formal domain of fiduciary law and other factors that shape conduct. These include intrinsic motivation, markets for professional services, and forces like the operation of reputation. The Article demonstrates that looking across domains, from the legal to the extralegal, casts in sharp relief the reasons why fiduciary law is distinctive. These stem from the specific qualities of relationships to which fiduciary law applies, as well …
Kidney Donation And The Consent Of The Poor, Philip J. Cook, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Kidney Donation And The Consent Of The Poor, Philip J. Cook, Kimberly D. Krawiec
Faculty Scholarship
In "Consentability," Nancy Kim tackles an important and current topic—in an age of increasing options about how to live, die, and procreate, what limits, if any, should the law place on those choices? "Consentability" is a valuable resource for scholars and policymakers alike, summarizing the arguments for and against government intrusion on the choices of consenting adults with encyclopedic thoroughness. After weighing the arguments, Kim proposes that “bodily integrity exchanges” be permitted, subject to limitations. Although we agree with the general conclusion that bodily integrity exchanges should be permitted, we disagree with the specific limitations that treat the decisions of …
Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations And Legal Efficacy, Steven L. Schwarcz
Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations And Legal Efficacy, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
This Article examines how insights into limited human rationality can improve financial regulation. The Article identifies four categories of limitations—herd behavior, cognitive biases, overreliance on heuristics, and a proclivity to panic—that undermine the perfect-market regulatory assumptions that parties have full information and will act in their rational self-interest. The Article then analyzes how insights into these limitations can be used to correct resulting market failures. Requiring more robust disclosure and due diligence, for example, can help to reduce reliance on misleading information cascades that motivate herd behavior. Debiasing through law, such as requiring more specific, poignant, and concrete disclosure of …
Aggregating Moral Preferences, Matthew D. Adler
Aggregating Moral Preferences, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. “Ideal-advisor” accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, what are the moral facts (in particular, the comparative moral goodness of the alternatives) when the advisors do diverge? …
Marriage On The Ballot: An Analysis Of Same-Sex Marriage Referendums In North Carolina, Minnesota, And Washington During The 2012 Elections, Craig M. Burnett, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Marriage On The Ballot: An Analysis Of Same-Sex Marriage Referendums In North Carolina, Minnesota, And Washington During The 2012 Elections, Craig M. Burnett, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Nashbots: How Political Scientists Have Underestimated Human Rationality, And How To Fix It, Daniel Enemark, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Nashbots: How Political Scientists Have Underestimated Human Rationality, And How To Fix It, Daniel Enemark, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Faculty Scholarship
Political scientists use experiments to test the predictions of game-theoretic models. In a typical experiment, each subject makes choices that determine her own earnings and the earnings of other subjects, with payments corresponding to the utility payoffs of a theoretical game. But social preferences distort the correspondence between a subject’s cash earnings and her subjective utility, and since social preferences vary, anonymously matched subjects cannot know their opponents’ preferences between outcomes, turning many laboratory tasks into games of incomplete information. We reduce the distortion of social preferences by pitting subjects against algorithmic agents (“Nashbots”). Across 11 experimental tasks, subjects facing …
Against Game Theory, Gale M. Lucas, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Against Game Theory, Gale M. Lucas, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Faculty Scholarship
People make choices. Often, the outcome depends on choices other people make. What mental steps do people go through when making such choices? Game theory, the most influential model of choice in economics and the social sciences, offers an answer, one based on games of strategy such as chess and checkers: the chooser considers the choices that others will make and makes a choice that will lead to a better outcome for the chooser, given all those choices by other people. It is universally established in the social sciences that classical game theory (even when heavily modified) is bad at …
Are Individuals Fickle-Minded?, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Are Individuals Fickle-Minded?, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Faculty Scholarship
Game theory has been used to model large-scale social events — such as constitutional law, democratic stability, standard setting, gender roles, social movements, communication, markets, the selection of officials by means of elections, coalition formation, resource allocation, distribution of goods, and war — as the aggregate result of individual choices in interdependent decision-making. Game theory in this way assumes methodological individualism. The widespread observation that game theory predictions do not in general match observation has led to many attempts to repair game theory by creating behavioral game theory, which adds corrective terms to the game theoretic predictions in the hope …
Extended Preferences And Interpersonal Comparisons: A New Account, Matthew D. Adler
Extended Preferences And Interpersonal Comparisons: A New Account, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Algorithms And Speech, Stuart M. Benjamin
Algorithms And Speech, Stuart M. Benjamin
Faculty Scholarship
One of the central questions in free speech jurisprudence is what activities the First Amendment encompasses. This Article considers that question in the context of an area of increasing importance – algorithm-based decisions. I begin by looking to broadly accepted legal sources, which for the First Amendment means primarily Supreme Court jurisprudence. That jurisprudence provides for very broad First Amendment coverage, and the Court has reinforced that breadth in recent cases. Under the Court’s jurisprudence the First Amendment (and the heightened scrutiny it entails) would apply to many algorithm-based decisions, specifically those entailing substantive communications. We could of course adopt …
Cheap, Easy, Or Connected: The Conditions For Creating Group Coordination, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel Rodriguez, Nicholas Weller
Cheap, Easy, Or Connected: The Conditions For Creating Group Coordination, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel Rodriguez, Nicholas Weller
Faculty Scholarship
In both legal and political settings there has been a push toward adopting institutions that encourage consensus. The key feature of these institutions is that they bring interested parties together to communicate with each other. Existing research about the success or failure of particular institutions is ambiguous. Therefore, we turn our attention to understanding the general conditions when consensus is achievable, and we test experimentally three crucial factors that affect a group's ability to achieve consensus: (1) the difficulty of the problem, (2) the costs of communication, and (3) the structure of communication. Using multiple experimental approaches, we find that …
Gaming Direct Democracy: How Voters’ Views Of Job Performance Interact With Elite Endorsements Of Ballot Measures, Craig M. Burnett, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Gaming Direct Democracy: How Voters’ Views Of Job Performance Interact With Elite Endorsements Of Ballot Measures, Craig M. Burnett, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
Voters are thought to rely on elite endorsements in helping them make decisions. Their ability to use these endorsements is especially important in direct democracy, since ballot measures are complex policy proposals that lack partisan cues printed on the ballot. Using an exit survey, we look at California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s endorsement of four Indian gaming measures on the ballot during the presidential primary election of 2008. We find that voters who had knowledge of the elite endorsement differed little from those who did not. We show, however, that Schwarzenegger’s endorsement was conditionally related to support for the measures, depending …
Can We Build Behavioral Game Theory?, Gale M. Lucas, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Can We Build Behavioral Game Theory?, Gale M. Lucas, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner
Faculty Scholarship
The way economists and other social scientists model how people make interdependent decisions is through the theory of games. Psychologists and behavioral economists, however, have established many deviations from the predictions of game theory. In response to these findings, a broad movement has arisen to salvage the core of game theory. Extant models of interdependent decision-making try to improve their explanatory domain by adding some corrective terms or limits. We will make the argument that this approach is misguided. For this approach to work, the deviations would have to be consistent. Drawing in part on our experimental results, we will …
Comment On “Excessive Ambitions (Ii)” By (Jon Elster), Donald L. Horowitz
Comment On “Excessive Ambitions (Ii)” By (Jon Elster), Donald L. Horowitz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Theory Of Minds Within The Theory Of Games, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nicholas Weller
The Theory Of Minds Within The Theory Of Games, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Mark Turner, Nicholas Weller
Faculty Scholarship
Classical rationality as accepted by game theory assumes that a human chooser in a given moment has consistent preferences and beliefs and that actions result consistently from those preferences and beliefs, and moreover that these preferences, beliefs, and actions remain the same across equal choice moments. Since, as is widely found in prior experiments, subjects do not follow the predictions of classical rationality, behavioral game theorists have assumed consistent deviations from classical rationality by assigning to subjects certain dispositions— risk preference, cognitive abilities, social norms, etc. All of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories, making claims about how individual human …
Law For The Common Man: An Individual-Level Theory Of Values, Expanded Rationality, And The Law , Amir N. Licht
Law For The Common Man: An Individual-Level Theory Of Values, Expanded Rationality, And The Law , Amir N. Licht
Law and Contemporary Problems
This article makes an admittedly bold attempt at outlining an analytical framework for addressing this question. Instead of looking at the legal implications of bounded rationality -- an exercise highly worthy in its own right -- this article advances a theory of expanded rationality. This theory retains the element of rationality in that people respond to incentives in an attempt to attain utility, and it does not question the observation that decision-making is often bounded due to various factors.
Stealing Sunshine, Ronen Perry, Dana Weimann-Saks
Stealing Sunshine, Ronen Perry, Dana Weimann-Saks
Law and Contemporary Problems
This study is the first to examine the efficacy of this tactic, both theoretically and empirically, contributing to the growing literature on the impact of various trial-advocacy techniques on decision-makers' perceptions and trial outcomes. Given the primacy of the work, the authors draw on existing literature on a related courtroom technique commonly known as "stealing thunder," which is -- in a sense -- the mirror image of the tactic under scrutiny.
Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness Of Rules-Based Jurisprudence, Joseph Blocher
Roberts’ Rules: The Assertiveness Of Rules-Based Jurisprudence, Joseph Blocher
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Blind Leading The Blind: Who Gets Polling Information And Does It Improve Decisions?, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins
The Blind Leading The Blind: Who Gets Polling Information And Does It Improve Decisions?, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
We analyze whether and when polls help citizens to improve their decisions. Specifically, we use experiments to investigate 1) whether and when citizens are willing to obtain polls and 2) whether and when polls help citizens to make better choices than they would have made on their own. We find that citizens are more likely to obtain polls when the decisions they must make are difficult and when they are unsophisticated. Ironically, when the decisions are difficult, the pollees are also uninformed and, therefore, do not provide useful information. We also find that when polls indicate the welfare-improving choice, citizens …
Making Talk Cheap (And Problems Easy): How Legal And Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Nicholas Weller
Making Talk Cheap (And Problems Easy): How Legal And Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Nicholas Weller
Faculty Scholarship
In many legal, political, and social settings, people must reach a consensus before particular outcomes can be achieved and failing to reach a consensus may be costly. In this article, we present a theory and conduct experiments that take into account the costs associated with communicating, as well as the difficulty of the decisions that groups make. We find that when there is even a small cost (relative to the potential benefit) associated with sending information to others and/or listening, groups are much less likely to reach a consensus, primarily because they are less willing to communicate with one another. …
Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage Of Science And Law, Susan Haack
Irreconcilable Differences? The Troubled Marriage Of Science And Law, Susan Haack
Law and Contemporary Problems
There haven't always been scientific witnesses: in fact, there haven't always been witnesses. In early medieval times, courts relied on tests by oath, ordeal, and sometimes by combat. Here, Haack provides a brief historical background to the use of scientific experts in law and then proceeds to discuss in greater detail the values underlying scientific inquiry, the uncertainty in the quest of knowledge and understanding, and the methods by which consensus is reached, even if that consensus is always tentative. She then contrasts scientific inquiry with the law's quest for "truth" in the courtroom and, particularly, the normative and temporal …
Using Decision Analysis To Improve Malaria Control Policy Making, Jonathan B. Wiener, Randall A. Kramer, Katherine L. Dickinson, Richard M. Anderson, Vance G. Fowler, Marie Lynn Miranda, Clifford M. Mutero, Kathryn A. Saterson
Using Decision Analysis To Improve Malaria Control Policy Making, Jonathan B. Wiener, Randall A. Kramer, Katherine L. Dickinson, Richard M. Anderson, Vance G. Fowler, Marie Lynn Miranda, Clifford M. Mutero, Kathryn A. Saterson
Faculty Scholarship
Malaria and other vector-borne diseases represent a significant and growing burden in many tropical countries. Successfully addressing these threats will require policies that expand access to and use of existing control methods, such as insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) and artemesinin combination therapies (ACTs) for malaria, while weighing the costs and benefits of alternative approaches over time. This paper argues that decision analysis provides a valuable framework for formulating such policies and combating the emergence and re-emergence of malaria and other diseases. We outline five challenges that policy makers and practitioners face in the struggle against malaria, and demonstrate how decision …
Knowing When To Trust Others: An Erp Study Of Decision-Making After Receiving Information From Unknown People, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Seana Coulson
Knowing When To Trust Others: An Erp Study Of Decision-Making After Receiving Information From Unknown People, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Seana Coulson
Faculty Scholarship
To address the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie choices made after receiving information from an anonymous individual, reaction times (Experiment 1) and event-related brain potentials (Experiment 2) were recorded as participants played 3 variants of the Coin Toss game. In this game, participants guess the outcomes of unseen coin tosses after a person in another room (dubbed “the reporter”) observes the coin toss outcomes and then sends reports (which may or may not be truthful) to participants about whether the coins landed on heads or tails. Participants knew that the reporter's interests either were aligned with their own (Common Interests), opposed …
Competition In The Courtroom: When Does Expert Testimony Improve Jurors’ Decisions?, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Competition In The Courtroom: When Does Expert Testimony Improve Jurors’ Decisions?, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
Many scholars lament the increasing complexity of jury trials and question whether the testimony of competing experts helps unsophisticated jurors to make informed decisions. In this article, we analyze experimentally the effects that the testimony of competing experts has on (1) sophisticated versus unsophisticated subjects' decisions and (2) subjects' deci- sions on difficult versus easy problems. Our results demonstrate that competing expert testimony, by itself, does not help unsophisticated subjects to behave as though they are sophisticated, nor does it help subjects make comparable decisions on difficult and easy problems. When we impose additional institutions (such as penalties for lying …
How Much Evidence Is Enough? Conventions Of Causal Inference, David Kriebel
How Much Evidence Is Enough? Conventions Of Causal Inference, David Kriebel
Law and Contemporary Problems
One of the most important issues for science in the courtroom is the determination of causality. Like science in the courtroom, science in the regulatory arena can also bring a clash of cultures, misunderstanding, and controversy--especially when decisions must be made with some urgency with interested parties watching closely. Here, Kriebel discusses some conventions in the conduct of science and in the ways that scientific information is communicated to nonscientists that can make it difficult for judges, lawyers, regulators, and politicians to do their jobs making decisions about complex environmental and health issues.
Nothing But The Truth? Experiments On Adversarial Competition, Expert Testimony, And Decision Making, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Nothing But The Truth? Experiments On Adversarial Competition, Expert Testimony, And Decision Making, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
Many scholars debate whether a competition between experts in legal, political, or economic contexts elicits truthful information and, in turn, enables people to make informed decisions. Thus, we analyze experimentally the conditions under which competition between experts induces the experts to make truthful statements and enables jurors listening to these statements to improve their decisions. Our results demonstrate that, contrary to game theoretic predictions and contrary to critics of our adversarial legal system, competition induces enough truth telling to allow jurors to improve their decisions. Then, when we impose additional institutions (such as penalties for lying or the threat of …
Foreword: Making Sense Of Information For Environmental Protection, James Salzman, Douglas A. Kysar
Foreword: Making Sense Of Information For Environmental Protection, James Salzman, Douglas A. Kysar
Faculty Scholarship
Despite the ubiquity of information, no one has proposed calling the present era the Knowledge Age. Knowledge depends not only on access to reliable information, but also on sound judgment regarding which information to access and how to situate that information in relation to the values and purposes that comprise the individual's or the social group's larger projects. This is certainly the case for wise and effective environmental governance. A regulator needs accurate information to understand the nature of a problem and the consequences of potential responses. Likewise, the regulated community needs information to decide how best to comply with …
Why De Minimis?, Matthew D. Adler
Why De Minimis?, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
De minimis cutoffs are a familiar feature of risk regulation. This includes the quantitative individual risk thresholds for fatality risks employed in many contexts by EPA, FDA, and other agencies, such as the 1-in-1 million lifetime cancer risk cutoff; extreme event cutoffs for addressing natural hazards, such as the 100 - year - flood or 475 - year - earthquake; de minimis failure probabilities for built structures; the exclusion of low - probability causal models; and other policymaking criteria. All these tests have a common structure, as I show in the Article. A de minimis test, broadly defined, tells the …
When Does Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez
When Does Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
A Behavioral Analysis Of Private Judging, Christopher R. Drahozal
A Behavioral Analysis Of Private Judging, Christopher R. Drahozal
Law and Contemporary Problems
Businesses cite arbitration as a way to avoid aberrant jury verdicts, implicitly if not explicitly assuming that arbitrators make "better" decisions than juries. By contrast, consumer advocates criticize arbitration as a way for businesses to avoid paying damages to deserving claimants, effectively assuming that juries make better decisions than arbitrators. These conflicting perspectives pose an important question in the debate over predispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts: How do decisions by arbitrators compare to decisions by juries?