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Full-Text Articles in Law
Recursive Collective Actions Problems: The Structure Of Procyclicality In Financial And Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies And Formally Similar Contexts, Robert C. Hockett
Recursive Collective Actions Problems: The Structure Of Procyclicality In Financial And Monetary Markets, Macroeconomies And Formally Similar Contexts, Robert C. Hockett
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The hallmark of a collective action problem is its aggregating multiple individually rational decisions into a collectively irrational outcome. Arms races, “commons tragedies” and “prisoners’ dilemmas” are well-known, indeed well-worn examples. What seem to be less widely appreciated are two complementary propositions: first, that some collective action problems bear iterative, self-exacerbating structures that render them particularly destructive; and second, that some of the most formidable challenges faced by economies, societies, and polities are iteratively self-worsening problems of precisely this sort. Financial markets, monetary systems and macroeconomies in particular are rife with them – as are other complex systems subject to …
Evidence Of The Need For Aggregate Litigation, Theodore Eisenberg
Evidence Of The Need For Aggregate Litigation, Theodore Eisenberg
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
In the experimental game designed by GÜTH et al. [2007], player 1 has promised to render a service to player 2. Player 1 either invests proper effort or shirks and performance may succeed or fail depending on random fluctuation. When player 1 fails to invest proper effort, and performance occurs or not through luck, player 2 must decide whether to punish player 1’s nonperformance. When the transaction fails, punishment may be sought through suing. When the transaction fails, player 2 may seek revenge or punishment though doing so incurs costs to player 2. The game’s design resembles civil enforcement rather …
Judges As Altruistic Hierarchs, Lynn A. Stout
Judges As Altruistic Hierarchs, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories Of Social Norms And The Pragmatics Of Explanation, W. Bradley Wendel
Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories Of Social Norms And The Pragmatics Of Explanation, W. Bradley Wendel
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The question of how societies secure cooperation and order in the absence of state enforced sanctions has long vexed law and economics scholars. Recently the concept of social norms--informally enforced rules of behavior--has occupied the attention of a large number of these theorists, who are concerned with understanding why economically rational actors would bother to follow rules whose costs seem to outweigh their benefits. Because of the prestige (or at least trendiness) of law and economics, it seems that now everyone in the legal academy is talking about social norms. This burgeoning scholarship is closely related to a wider concern …
Nonlegal Regulation Of The Legal Profession: Social Norms In Professional Communities, W. Bradley Wendel
Nonlegal Regulation Of The Legal Profession: Social Norms In Professional Communities, W. Bradley Wendel
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
What should be done about lawyers who persist in violating ethical norms that are not embodied in positive disciplinary rules? That question has been a recurrent theme in recent legal ethics scholarship. One response has been to propose, experiment, amend, tinker, draft, comment, and redraft, in an attempt to codify the standard of conduct observed to be flouted widely by the practicing bar. Bar associations and courts are seemingly engaged in a never-ending process of promulgating new codes of professional conduct or rules of procedure under which lawyers may be sanctioned for such conduct as bringing frivolous lawsuits, abusing the …