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Columbia Law School

Yale Law Journal

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Khan Jan 2017

Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Khan

Faculty Scholarship

Amazon is the titan of twenty-first century commerce. In addition to being a retailer, it is now a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading host of cloud server space. Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth, it generates meager profits, choosing to price below-cost and expand widely instead. Through this strategy, the company has positioned itself at the center of e-commerce and now serves as essential infrastructure for a host of other …


Parallel Exclusion, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu Jan 2012

Parallel Exclusion, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars and courts have long debated whether and when "parallel pricing" – adoption of the same price by every firm in a market – should be considered a violation of antitrust law. But there has been a comparative neglect of the importance of "parallel exclusion" – conduct, engaged in by multiple firms, that blocks or slows would-be market entrants. Parallel exclusion merits greater attention, for it can be far more harmful than parallel price elevation. Setting a high price leaves the field open for new entrants and may even attract them. In contrast, parallel action that excludes new entrants both …


Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, And The Per Se Standard, Daniel C. Richman Jan 1984

Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, And The Per Se Standard, Daniel C. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

In 1970, a district court observed: "We must confess at the outset that we find antitrust standing cases more than a little confusing and certainly beyond our powers of reconciliation." The court could hardly have been faulted, for the confusion it noted has been endemic to these cases since the creation of the treble-damages action. Courts have never read section 4 of the Clayton Act literally to allow treble damages to every plaintiff able to attribute an economic loss to an antitrust violation. This unwillingness to recognize every such injury is fully consistent with the essential principle of antitrust law …