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Contractual Arbitrage, Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott
Contractual Arbitrage, Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
Standard-form contracts are likely to be incomplete because they are not tailored to the needs of particular deals. In an attempt to reduce incompleteness, standard-form contracts often contain clauses with vague or ambiguous terms. Terms with indeterminate meaning present opportunities for strategic behavior well after a contract has been executed. This linguistic uncertainty in standard-form commercial contracts creates an opportunity for “contractual arbitrage”: parties may argue ex post that the uncertainties in expression mean something that the contracting parties did not contemplate ex ante. This chapter argues that the scope for contractual arbitrage is a direct function of the techniques …
Anticipating Litigation In Contract Design, Robert E. Scott, George G. Triantis
Anticipating Litigation In Contract Design, Robert E. Scott, George G. Triantis
Faculty Scholarship
Contract theory does not address the question of how parties design contracts under the existing adversarial system, which relies on the parties to establish relevant facts indirectly by the use of evidentiary proxies. In this Article, we advance a theory of contract design in a world of costly litigation. We examine the efficiency of investment at the front end and back end of the contracting process, where we focus on litigation as the back-end stage. In deciding whether to express their obligations in precise or vague terms, contracting parties implicitly allocate costs between the front and back end. When the …