Law Commons^™

Complexity, Judgment, And Restraint, Gerard E. Lynch

Faculty Scholarship

I am honored to have been asked to give this year’s James Madison Lecture. I hesitate to single out any of my extraordinary predecessors at this podium – there are too many great judges to list, and too much risk of slighting any. So I will note only that the list includes both judges for whom I clerked more than forty years ago, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg, of the court on which I now serve. That long-ago law clerk could not have dreamed of being someday in a position once occupied by those two …

Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang

Faculty Scholarship

Consider this scenario: Two judges with parallel cases are each ready to issue an injunction. But their injunctions may clash, ordering incompatible actions by the defendant. Each judge has written an opinion justifying her own intended relief, but the need to avoid conflicting injunctions presses her to make a further choice – “Should I issue the injunction or should I stay it for now?” Each must make this decision in anticipation of what the other will do.

This Article analyzes such a judicial coordination problem, drawing on recent examples including the DACA cases and the “sanctuary cities” cases. It then …

Death By Stereotype: Race, Ethnicity, And California’S Failure To Implement Furman’S Narrowing Requirement, Catherine M. Grosso, Jeffrey A. Fagan, Michael Laurence, David C. Baldus, George W. Woodworth, Richard Newell

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines the possible racial and ethnic implications of California’s expansive death penalty statute in light of the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that each state statute narrow the subclass of offenders on whom a death sentence may be imposed. The narrowing requirement derives from the holding in Furman v. Georgia over forty-five years ago, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that existing death penalty statutes violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Citing statistics demonstrating arbitrary and capricious application of capital punishment, a majority of the Justices concluded that a death sentencing scheme is unconstitutional if it …

The Supreme Court, Judicial Elections, And Dark Money, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

Judges, even when popularly elected, are not representatives; they are not agents for their voters, nor should they take voter preferences into account in adjudicating cases. However, popularly elected judges are representatives for some election law purposes. Unlike other elected officials, judges are not politicians. But judges are policy-makers. Judicial elections are subject to the same constitutional doctrines that govern voting on legislators, executives, and ballot propositions. Except when they are not. The same First Amendment doctrine that protects campaign speech in legislative, executive, and ballot proposition elections applies to campaign speech in judicial elections – but not in quite …

Judicial Priorities, Bert I. Huang, Tejas N. Narechania

Faculty Scholarship

In an unprecedented move, the Illinois Supreme Court in the mid-1990s imposed hard caps on the state's appeals courts, drastically reducing the number of opinions they could publish, while also narrowing the formal criteria for opinions to qualify for publication. The high court explained that the amendment's purpose was to reduce the "avalanche of opinions emanating from [the] Appellate Court," which was causing legal research to become "unnecessarily burdensome, difficult and costly." This unusual and sudden policy shift offers the chance to observe the priorities of a common law court in its production of published opinions. The method we introduce …

Loser Pays: The Latest Installment In The Battle-Scarred, Cliff-Hanging Survival Of The Rule 10b-5 Class Action, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

When I was an upper-year student at Yale Law School in the late 1960s, I was sometimes as undermotivated as contemporary upper-year law students regularly appear to be. But there was then an appropriate role model for us: a graduate student, brimming with efficiency and self-discipline, who occupied a carrel in the law library, seemingly working day and night on a special research project. He had piled law review articles and cases a foot or more about his carrel, and anyone walking by could see that he seemed obsessed with something called Rule 10b-5. I had dimly heard of this …

Judging Similarity, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan

Faculty Scholarship

Copyright law’s requirement of substantial similarity requires a court to satisfy itself that a defendant’s copying, even when shown to exist as a factual matter, is quantitatively and qualitatively enough to render it actionable as infringement. By the time a jury reaches the question of substantial similarity, however, the court has usually heard and analyzed a good deal of evidence about: the plaintiff, the defendant, the creativity involved, the process through which the work was created, the reasons for which the work was produced, the defendant’s own creative efforts and behavior, and, on occasion, the market effects of the defendant’s …

Copyright Infringement Markets, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

Faculty Scholarship

Should copyright infringement claims be treated as marketable assets? Copyright law has long emphasized the free and independent alienability of its exclusive rights. Yet, the right to sue for infringement – which copyright law grants authors in order to render its exclusive rights operational – has never been thought of as independently assignable, or indeed as the target of investments by third parties. As a result, discussions of copyright law and policy rarely consider the possibility of an acquisition or investment market emerging for actionable copyright claims and the advantages that such a market might hold for copyright’s goals, objectives, …

Justice Stevens' Temperance, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

On the last opinion day of the last of his 35 Terms on the Supreme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens issued his valedictory opinion, a 57-page dissent in McDonald v. City of Chicago. Justice Stevens laid out an expansive vision of constitutional interpretation that Justice Alito aptly called "eloquent" in his plurality opinion. Not one for sentimental farewells, Justice Scalia was less generous: "Justice Stevens' approach," he wrote in the last line of his concurring opinion," puts democracy in peril."

U.S. Class Actions And The "Global Class", George A. Bermann

Faculty Scholarship

Robert Casad's articles on comparative civil procedure were among the first comparative law pieces that caught my eye when, as a freshly-minted associate at a leading New York law firm, I found myself leafing through comparative law journals, rather than amassing billable hours. I had no idea then that comparative law could be as fascinating as I have come to find it, certainly not in a field like civil procedure where the dividends of comparative law work were by no means obvious to me. (Comparative law was not even taught in any guise at Yale Law School in the late …

Rediscovering Client Decisionmaking: The Impact Of Role-Playing, Mary Zulack

Faculty Scholarship

There are more things of importance to representing clients than are disclosed through a typical interview or counseling session, even a session undertaken by a lawyer earnestly attempting to hear rather than ignore the client. We lawyers are often vividly aware, when we pause to contemplate the point, that we do not know all we should about our clients. We may also believe that we have great gulfs of knowledge and experience to cross in order to hear and understand any particular client. Further, we fear that our ability to cross these gulfs is limited by the human, and lawyerly, …

Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr., Bernard S. Black

Faculty Scholarship

A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large American public firms is why most institutional shareholders are passive. Why would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the Berle-Means paradigm – the belief that separation of ownership and control naturally characterizes the modern corporation – reigned supreme. Shareholder passivity was seen as an inevitable result of the scale of modern industrial enterprise and of the collective action problems that face shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of a large firm's shares.

A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypotheses have recently been offered …