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Columbia Law School

Corporate performance

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Impact Investing As A Form Of Lobbying And Its Corporate-Governance Effects, Andrzej Rapaczynski Jan 2016

Impact Investing As A Form Of Lobbying And Its Corporate-Governance Effects, Andrzej Rapaczynski

Faculty Scholarship

Impact investment is attractive to many because it seems to combine support for progressive causes with an apparent commitment to the principles of a market economy. In fact, however, a rational impact investor is not simply creating demand for certain types of corporate actions; he/she is attempting to use corporate governance mechanisms to influence fiduciary decisions of the management. The cost of this tactic for the health of the capitalist economy is potentially very considerable. The American capitalist system relies heavily on a relatively fragile corporate governance arrangement in which the agency problems of a modern corporation are minimized ...


The Limits Of Discipline: Ownership And Hard Budget Constraints In The Transition Economies, Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, Marek P. Hessel, Andrzej Rapaczynski Jan 1999

The Limits Of Discipline: Ownership And Hard Budget Constraints In The Transition Economies, Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, Marek P. Hessel, Andrzej Rapaczynski

Faculty Scholarship

This paper, based on a large sample of mid-sized manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, argues that the imposition of financial discipline is not sufficient to remedy ownership and governance-related deficiencies of corporate performance. The study offers three main conclusions. First, we find that state enterprises represent a higher credit risk both because of their inferior economic performance and because of their lesser willingness or propensity to meet their payment obligations. Second, the brunt of the state firms' lower creditworthiness is borne by their state creditors, as state enterprises deflect the higher risk away from private creditors ...