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Full-Text Articles in Law

Taking A Break From Acrimony: The Feminist Method Of Ann Scales, Katherine M. Franke Jan 2013

Taking A Break From Acrimony: The Feminist Method Of Ann Scales, Katherine M. Franke

Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, written as part of a symposium honoring the work of Professor Ann Scales, Professor Katherine Franke explores how Professor Scales may have approached the cutting edge problem of same-sex couples divorcing. Professor Scales's work evidenced a deep commitment to the twin projects of recognizing structural gender disadvantage suffered by women and the tyranny of gender stereotypes. This Essay speculates that Professor Scales's feminist commitments would be unsettled by the application to divorcing same-sex couples of rules and norms of divorce forged in the heterosexual context where gender inequality set the parameters of justice. Indeed, Franke ...


Brief Of Amici Curiae Professors Nan D. Hunter, Et Al., Addressing The Merits In Support Of Respondents, Nan D. Hunter, Suzanne B. Goldberg Jan 2013

Brief Of Amici Curiae Professors Nan D. Hunter, Et Al., Addressing The Merits In Support Of Respondents, Nan D. Hunter, Suzanne B. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In this amicus brief filed in United States v. Windsor, pending before the Supreme Court, amici constitutional law professors argue that all classifications that carry the indicia of invidiousness should trigger a more searching inquiry than the traditional rational basis test under the Equal Protection Clause would suggest. Classifications that already receive heightened scrutiny, such as race or sex, fit easily into this approach. But the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has become muddied in a series of cases in which it says rational basis review, but appears to do a more rigorous review. Sexual orientation classifications seemingly were analyzed ...


Article Iii Double-Dipping: Proposition 8'S Proponents, Blag, And The Government's Interest, Suzanne B. Goldberg Jan 2013

Article Iii Double-Dipping: Proposition 8'S Proponents, Blag, And The Government's Interest, Suzanne B. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Two fundamental standing problems plague Proposition 8’s proponents and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) in the marriage cases currently before the U.S. Supreme Court. First is the Article III double-dipping problem, to which this Essay’s title refers. This problem arises because those parties purport to derive their Article III standing by asserting the governments’ interest in defending the challenged marriage laws. Yet the governments in both cases, via their chief legal officers, have taken the position that excluding same-sex couples from marriage is unconstitutional. To permit this Janus-faced commitment to both sides of the cases would ...


Compulsory Sexuality, Elizabeth F. Emens Jan 2013

Compulsory Sexuality, Elizabeth F. Emens

Faculty Scholarship

Asexuality is an emerging identity category that challenges the common assumption that everyone is defined by some type of sexual attraction. Asexuals — those who report feeling no sexual attraction to others — constitute one percent of the population, according to one prominent study. In recent years, some individuals have begun to identify as asexual and to connect around their experiences interacting with a sexual society. Asexuality has also become a protected classification under the antidiscrimination law of one state and several localities, but legal scholarship has thus far neglected the subject. This Article introduces asexuality to the legal literature as a ...


The Collapse Of The Harm Principle Redux: On Same-Sex Marriage, The Supreme Court's Opinion In United States V. Windsor, John Stuart Mill's Essay On Liberty (1859), And H. L. A. Hart's Modern Harm Principle, Bernard E. Harcourt Jan 2013

The Collapse Of The Harm Principle Redux: On Same-Sex Marriage, The Supreme Court's Opinion In United States V. Windsor, John Stuart Mill's Essay On Liberty (1859), And H. L. A. Hart's Modern Harm Principle, Bernard E. Harcourt

Faculty Scholarship

In an article published in 1999, titled The Collapse of the Harm Principle, I argued that the harm principle, originally articulated in John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty (1859), had collapsed under the weight of its own success and no longer serves, today, as a limiting principle on the legal enforcement of morality. Several readers raised forceful questions about the relationship between Mill’s original essay and the harm principle, as well as about the continuing vitality of Mill’s argument. In this article, I return to my original argument to draw an important distinction and clarify a central ...