Law Commons^™

The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

American investors have begun to embrace the reality that academics have been championing for decades — that a broad-based, passive indexing strategy is superior to picking individual stocks or investing in actively managed funds. But there are several reasons to believe that the rise of passive investing will have harmful consequences for firm governance, shareholders, and the economy. First, because passive funds seek only to match the performance of an index — not outperform it — they lack a financial incentive to ensure that each of the companies in their very large portfolios are well-run. Second, passive funds face an …

Charitable Subsidies And Nonprofit Governance: Comparing The Charitable Deduction With The Exemption For Endowment Income, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Charitable subsidies are supposed to encourage positive externalities from charity. In principle, the government can pursue this goal by evaluating specific charitable initiatives and deciding how much each should receive. Although the government sometimes makes this sort of fine-grained judgment, this Article focuses on two income tax rules that leave the government essentially no discretion about which charities to fund: the deduction for donations to charity ("the deduction") and the exemption of a charity's investment income ("the exemption"). With each subsidy, federal dollars flow automatically as long as charities satisfy very general criteria.

As a result, these subsidies are especially …