Law Commons^™

Uncivil Obedience, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars and activists have long been interested in conscientious law-breaking as a means of dissent. The civil disobedient violates the law in a bid to highlight its illegitimacy and motivate reform. A less heralded form of social action, however, involves nearly the opposite approach. As a wide range of examples attest, dissenters may also seek to disrupt legal regimes through hyperbolic, literalistic, or otherwise unanticipated adherence to their formal rules.

This Article asks how to make sense of these more paradoxical protests, involving not explicit law-breaking but rather extreme law following. We seek to identify, elucidate, and call attention to …

The Rites Of Dissent: Notes On Nationalist Federalism, Jessica Bulman-Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

Responding to Heather K. Gerken’s Childress Lecture, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?

In this response, I consider how the nationalist school of federalism reconceptualizes nationalism, and not only federalism. Taking as my starting point Gerken’s claim that federalism can be good for nationalism, that nationalists should “believe in giving power to the states,” I first outline two possible understandings of nationalism suggested by this claim — that “national” refers to the federal government, and that “national” refers to a unified American polity — and explain what it would mean for federalism to serve nationalism so understood. After rejecting …

Defining And Punishing Offenses Under Treaties, Sarah H. Cleveland, William S. Dodge

Faculty Scholarship

One of the principal aims of the U.S. Constitution was to give the federal government authority to comply with its international legal commitments. The scope of Congress's constitutional authority to implement treaties has recently received particular attention. In Bond v. United States, the Court avoided the constitutional questions by construing a statute to respect federalism, but these questions are unlikely to go away. This Article contributes to the ongoing debate by identifying the Offenses Clause as an additional source of Congress's constitutional authority to implement certain treaty commitments. Past scholarship has assumed that the Article I power to "define …