Law Commons^™

Viewpoints From Olympus, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay examines the Supreme Court's treatment of content and viewpoint discrimination in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. In that opinion, the Court adopted a very expansive approach to what constitutes viewpoint discrimination, the form of content discrimination most disfavored by the Constitution. The Court held that a public university could not decline to fund publication of Wide Awake, a magazine devoted to proselytizing for Christianity, if it funded other student publications. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court accepted the argument of the sponsors of Wide Awake that the University had engaged in …

Preventive Detention And The Judicial Prediction Of Dangerousness For Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, Jeffery Fagan, Martin Guggenheim

Faculty Scholarship

Since 1970, legislatures have increasingly relied on preventive detention – detention before trial ordered solely to prevent an accused from committing crime during the pretrial period – as an instrument of social control. Prior to this period, detention before trial was usually ordered only to assure an accused's presence at trial or to ensure the integrity of the trial process by preventing an accused from tampering with witnesses. Today, the majority of states and the federal system have changed their laws to allow judges to detain arrestees who pose a risk to society if released during the pretrial period. Half …

Holmes's Legacy And The New Constitutional History, Eben Moglen

Faculty Scholarship

The most significant collaborative effort in the literature of American constitutional history, the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, is nearing completion. A generation has passed since the appearance of the first volume, authored by Julius Goebel, Jr., and (after many vicissitudes affecting several of the works in the series) the appearance of this volume marks the antepenultimate stage. Though Professor Fiss's remarkable achievement deserves to be viewed primarily on the basis of its own merits as a study of the Fuller Court, a just appreciation of its contribution to the literature requires …

Brecht V. Abrahamson: Harmful Error In Habeas Corpus Law, James S. Liebman, Randy Hertz

Faculty Scholarship

For the past two and one-half decades, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have applied the same rule for assessing the harmlessness of constitutional error in habeas corpus proceedings as they have applied on direct appeal of both state and federal convictions. Under that rule, which applied to all constitutional errors except those deemed per se prejudicial or per se reversible, the state could avoid reversal upon a finding of error only by proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court adopted this stringent standard in Chapman v. California to fulfill the federal …

Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, And The Interpretation Of Statutes, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist is often viewed as the ultimate "political" judge. According to Mark Tushnet, for example, "[o]ne could account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist' s bottom-line results by looking, not at anything in the United States Reports, but rather at the platforms of the Republican Party." Nowhere is this attitude more prevalent than with respect to issues of statutory interpretation. When I informed colleagues I was working on an article about Chief Justice Rehnquist's theory of statutory interpretation, the almost universal response was: "What theory?"

Contrary to the common view that Chief Justice Rehnquist …

Textualism And The Future Of The Chevron Doctrine, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The last decade has been a remarkable one for statutory interpretation. For most of our history, American judges have been pragmatists when it comes to interpreting statutes. They have drawn on various conventions – the plain meaning rule, legislative history, considerations of statutory purpose, canons of construction – "much as a golfer selects the proper club when he gauges the distance to the pin and the contours of the course." The arrival of Justice Scalia on the Supreme Court has changed this. Justice Scalia is a foundationalist, insisting that certain interpretational tools should be permanently banned from judicial use. What …

Of Laws And Men: An Essay On Justice Marshall's View Of Criminal Procedure, Daniel C. Richman, Bruce A. Green

Faculty Scholarship

As a general rule, criminal defendants whose cases made it to the Supreme Court between 1967 and 1991 must have thought that, as long as Justice Thurgood Marshall occupied one of the nine seats, they had one vote for sure. And Justice Marshall rarely disappointed them – certainly not in cases of any broad constitutional significance. From his votes and opinions, particularly his dissents, many were quick to conclude that the Justice was another of those "bleeding heart liberals," hostile to the mission of law enforcement officers and ready to overlook the gravity of the crimes of which the defendants …

A Modest Proposal For A Political Court, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

I offer a modest proposal. You can decide for yourself whether it is offered in the spirit of Jonathan Swift, or whether I mean it to be taken seriously.

A Vigil For Thurgood Marshall, Eben Moglen

Faculty Scholarship

Three days after his death, on January 27th, Thurgood Marshall came to the Supreme Court, up the marble steps, for the last time. Congress had ordered Abraham Lincoln's catafalque brought to the Court, and on it the casket of Thurgood Marshall lay in state. His beloved Chief, Earl Warren, had been so honored in the Great Hall of the Court, and no one else. Congress made the right decision about the bier, and it spoke with the voice of the people: no other American, of any age, so deserved to lie where Lincoln slept.

To him, all day on Wednesday, …

What He Was For, Eben Moglen

Faculty Scholarship

It will be said frequently in the years to come that an era in American history died when Thurgood Marshall left us. It will take some time for us to absorb the truth, for our sadness to be replaced by desperation. More than an era closed when his gallant heart failed him at last; in every corner of our battered country, maimed as it is by years of recklessly cultivated hatred, we lost the voice that constantly called us to attend to the work of our salvation.

The Constitutional Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has had many occasions in recent years to consider what it calls "the constitutional principle of separation of powers." The principle in question has been effusively praised and on occasion vigorously enforced. But just what is it? The Court clearly believes that the Constitution contains an organizing principle that is more than the sum of the specific clauses that govern relations among the branches. Yet notwithstanding the many testimonials to the importance of the principle, its content remains remarkably elusive.

The central problem, as many have observed, is that the Court has employed two very different conceptions …

No "Sweat"? Copyright And Other Protection Of Works Of Information After Feist V. Rural Telephone, Jane C. Ginsburg

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court's unanimous decision last Term in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. proscribed copyright protection for works of information that fail to manifest a modicum of creative originality in selection or arrangement. Discarding a long – if lately uneasy – tradition of U.S. copyright coverage of informational works that display far greater industriousness than imagination, the Court ruled that copyright does not secure the "sweat of the brow" or the investment of resources in the compilation of a work of information. The Court thus stripped away or sharply reduced the copyright protection afforded a variety …

Justice Harlan's Conservatism And Altenative Possibilites, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

Bruce Ackerman and Charles Fried's rich essays address the subject of Justice Harlan as a conservative. One who comes to this topic has in mind questions like: Was Justice Harlan a conservative? If so, what kind of a conservative was he? How did his judicial actions exemplify a conservative approach? Most importantly, is his conservatism an appealing model for modern judicial practice?

Professors Ackerman and Fried's slices on this topic reflect their own casts of mind and philosophies of judging. Fried looks at a broad range of Justice Harlan's opinions and sets them against particular conservative qualities that Fried commends. …

Legislative Theory And The Rule Of Law: Some Comments On Rubin, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Rubin's article is an admirable piece of work on many levels, from its attention to jurisprudence to its concern with the practical changes in the Congress and its function, and their implications. In commenting on it, I mean to restrict myself to the latter subjects. These are the matters that have the closest tangency to my own work and produce for me the strongest response. Professor Rubin has given us a compelling statement of the problems posed for contemporary constitutional and legislative theory by one transformation in statutory practice accompanying the rise of the administrative state, the change from …

Considering Political Alternatives To "Hard Look" Review, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

That is absolutely right. I am sufficiently confused by the facts that are already on the table – two of them in particular. One (the dog that I thought was barking in that interesting first chart Don Elliott put up, on which he did not remark), is that the first two periods of judicial review he showed us had 337 and 294 cases of judicial review each; for the third period, for the same length of time, the figure is about 800. Something is going on there. The other is just a square conflict that our moderator is much better …

The Hague Evidence Convention In The Supreme Court: A Critique Of The Aérospatiale Decision, George A. Bermann

Faculty Scholarship

With its decision in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court, the United States Supreme Court resolved what had been widely regarded as "one of the most difficult and important issues in international civil litigation in United States courts." This opportunity arose out of the divergence of views among American courts on the proper way to reconcile the need for full disclosure of evidence with respect for the sensitivities of foreign states where that evidence might be located. The case before the Supreme Court, like many lower court cases, dealt specifically with the impact of the Hague …

The Confirmation Process: Law Or Politics?, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I argued (and still believe) that Judge Robert Bork possessed surpassing qualifications for an appointment to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, I became persuaded that my submission was incomplete. Additional argument was necessary to establish that my testimony, if accepted, imposed a constitutional duty on senators to vote for confirmation. To my surprise, further reflection convinces me that no such argument is possible.

Formal And Functional Approaches To Separation-Of-Powers Questions – A Foolish Inconsistency?, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Is it possible to give contemporary shape to the principles of constitutional structure we know as "separation of powers"? That question was sharply presented once again on the final day of the Supreme Court's most recent Term, when it decided two cases raising separation-of-powers issues. In Bowsher v. Synar, the subject of this symposium, the Court found constitutional fault in Congress's asserted expansion of its own powers at the expense of the President's article II authority. Commodity Future Trading Commission v. Schor, far less widely noted, upheld against constitutional challenge Congress's assignment to an administrative adjudicator of the …

Constitutional Decisions And The Supreme Law, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

What status do Supreme Court decisions have for officials in the political branches of our government? Six months ago, Attorney General Edwin Meese III rekindled controversy over this enduring and troublesome question when he claimed in a widely reported lecture that Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution are not the supreme law of the land, and are properly subject to forms of opposition by other governmental officials. The general reaction to the speech was that it was meant to reduce the perceived authority of Supreme Court opinions, and a close reading of the speech certainly leaves this impression. Yet, even …

One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications Of The Supreme Court's Limited Resources For Judicial Review Of Agency Action, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Recent writing about the Supreme Court has stressed the implications of the extraordinary growth in the Court's docket – and, even more, the growth in the overall level of judicial activity in the nation's courts – for its performance of its judicial task. Generally, this writing seeks first to determine whether the Court has been forced to bypass questions it ought normally to hear (for example, square conflicts between two of the federal circuits), editorializes about the increasing bureaucratization of the Court, and passes on to normative questions about what if anything ought to be done to ease the Court's …

The Place Of Agencies In Government: Separation Of Powers And The Fourth Branch, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

For the past few years the Supreme Court has been struggling with issues of government structure so fundamental that they might have been thought textbook simple, yet with results that seem to imperil the everyday exercise of law-administration. Under what circumstances can Congress assign the adjudication of contested issues in the first instance to tribunals that are not article III courts? The past century has witnessed the profuse growth of legislation assigning to special adjudicative tribunals – administrative agencies and other article I courts – the power to hold trial-type hearings that might otherwise have been placed in the article …

Was There A Baby In The Bathwater? A Comment On The Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Examining the Supreme Court's recent decisions in the legislative veto case, Professor Strauss stresses the importance of a distinction no Justice observed between use of the veto in matters affecting direct, continuing, political, executive-congressional relations, and use of the veto in a regulatory context. Only the latter, he argues, had to be reached by the Court; and only the latter presents the constitutional difficulties that troubled the Court. The utility of the veto in the political context makes the opinions' sweep regrettable.

Judicial Review And The National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration Of The Role Of The Supreme Court, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

Imagine a cold morning early in February. Slowly sipping coffee in an effort to awaken fully, you are reading through the Supreme Court advance sheets. You come across the following brief opinion:

PER CURIAM. Fisher v. Rye Co., No. 81-1, and First Savings Bank v. Smith, No. 81-2. These petitions for certiorari have been consolidated for disposition in a single opin-ion. No. 81-1 challenges an Executive Order that, in an effort to combat gender-based discrimination, requires government contractors to adopt affirmative action programs. No argument is made that the Executive Order is authorized by statute. Concluding that the …

Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

Taking Supreme Court opinions seriously emerged as a topic of discussion at a lunch I attended last year with several Supreme Court law clerks. Somehow we came round to a particular three-judge district court case which I confidently opined was "certain" to be reversed on the basis of principles announced in prior opinions. The clerks were models of politeness and circumspection; never once did they even intimate that the judgment would (by divided vote) be affirmed. But shortly after I had announced my views of that case, one of the clerks began to prod me, asking whether I simply took …

Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond The "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder As A Mitigating Factor, James S. Liebman, Michael J. Shepard

Faculty Scholarship

In five decisions handed down on July 2, 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty may be imposed for the crime of murder, so long as there are clear standards to guide the sentencing authority and the sanction is not imposed mandatorily. The authors examine the eighth amendment doctrinal framework used by the Court in the July 2 Cases, with particular reference to the requirement that individualized mitigating information be considered in the sentencing decision. Illustrating that requirement, they contend that mental disorder should be considered as a possibly mitigating factor and then suggest a standard …

Constitutional Common Law, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

Mr. Justice Powell has publicly characterized the 1974 Term of the Supreme. Court as a "dull" one. Whatever the accuracy of that description, the 1974 Term was, in the public eye, a quiet one. When, late in the Term, the Court ordered the death penalty case held over for reargument, it ensured that the 1974 Term would generate few front-page testimonials to the supreme authority of the Supreme Court. But neither a dull nor a quiet Term can obscure the current reality that the Court's claim to be the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution" appears to command more nearly universal …

Constitutional Adjucation: The Who And When, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

When the newly appointed Justices of the Supreme Court assembled in the Royal Exchange Building in New York for their first session on February 2, 1790, the most farsighted individual could not have foreseen what the future held for this tribunal. Now less than a generation short of its 200th anniversary, the Court is universally acknowledged to be the final and authoritative expositor of the Constitution. Yet after almost two centuries, questions concerning this power of the Court to interpret the Constitution remain. The first set of questions centers on the substantive standards for constitutional adjudication. The second, with which …