Law Commons^™

Regulating The Market For Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment Of The Tender Offer's Role In Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Better answers often await better questions. In the wake of a recent series of provocative articles dealing with contested tender offers, several questions have been vigorously debated:

(1) Should management of the target company be allowed to resist a hostile tender offer in order to remain an independent company? Which, if any, of the various "shark repellent" measures by which a potential target can make itself unattractive to a bidder are justified?;

(2) If defensive tactics were generally forbidden, should the target company's management still be permitted to encourage competing bids thereby creating an auction?; and

(3) Do hostile takeovers …

Federal Jurisdiction Over Preemption Claims: A Post-Franchise Tax Board Analysis, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

As Congress uses the commerce power to regulate areas of the economy previously controlled by the states, federal statutes conflict with state law with increasing frequency. When such conflicts occur, federal law "preempts" the state law under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Litigants who foresee a preemption issue often seek a declaratory judgment of preemption or nonpreemption in order to clarify their rights and duties. This Note addresses the scope of federal question jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which preemption is the only federal question raised.

The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, And The Economics Of Retailing Services, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court acknowledged what a group of law and economics scholars had been arguing for the previous two decades: vertical restrictions that limit intrabrand competition can have a desirable effect on interbrand competition. The Court approvingly accepted the argument that the free rider problem might justify a manufacturer's use of vertical restrictions. The argument, in its simplest form, is that if a retailer provides services such as advice and demonstrations to consumers, a consumer could make use of the service and then buy the product from a "no- frills" retailer. If the manufacturer cannot control the …

An Economic Analysis Of The Lost-Volume Retail Seller, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Suppose that a customer agrees to buy a boat and before it is delivered, he reneges. The dealer subsequently resells the boat to another customer at the same price. Has the seller suffered damages (aside from incidental damages) and, if so, should he be compensated? This question, dubbed the lost-volume seller problem, has been the subject of considerable legal analysis, usually in the context of explicating section 2-708(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). There have been a number of attempts to apply economic analysis to this difficult question, the most recent by Professors Goetz and Scott. Unfortunately, the economic …

Market Failure And The Economic Case For A Mandatory Disclosure System, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Recent academic commentary on the securities laws has much in common with the battles fought in historiography over the origins of the First World War. The same progression of phases is evident. First, there is an orthodox school, which tends to see historical events largely as a moral drama of good against evil. Next come the revisionists, debunking all and explaining that the good guys were actually the bad. Eventually, a new wave of more professional, craftsmanlike scholars arrives on the scene to correct the gross overstatements of the revisionists and produce a more balanced, if problematic, assessment.