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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
A Nonoriginalism For Originalists, Jamal Greene
A Nonoriginalism For Originalists, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
Originalism is an ideology, not a practice. It is a brand, an affiliation, a set of background principles, an often unstated set of restorative commitments. As James Fleming says in his book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, originalism is an "ism." As an "ism," Fleming writes, originalism did not exist before the 1970s: "Constitutional interpretation in light of original understanding did exist, but original understanding was seen as merely one source of constitutional decision-making among several-not as a general theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive legitimate theory."
This brief Comment on Fleming's book takes the practice Fleming identifies---"constitutional …
Constitutional Rhetoric, Jamal Greene
Constitutional Rhetoric, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
For close to a century, students of judicial behavior have suggested that what judges think is not altogether the same as what they say. Within the legal academy, this claim has long been associated with legal realists who have argued that the formal legal rules explicated in judicial opinions are at least partly epiphenomenal, masking the influence that the personal characteristics and dispositions of adjudicators exercise over legal outcomes. Political scientists have argued, variously, that such outcomes are determined by ideology, social background, or political, professional, or other institutional constraints.
The notion that at least some “extralegal” factors influence judicial …
Chevron Bias, Philip A. Hamburger
Chevron Bias, Philip A. Hamburger
Faculty Scholarship
This Article takes a fresh approach to Chevron deference. Chevron requires judges to defer to agency interpretations of statutes and justifies this on a theory of statutory authorization for agencies. This Article, however, points to a pair of constitutional questions about the role of judges – questions that have not yet been adequately asked, let alone answered.
One question concerns independent judgment. Judges have a constitutional office or duty of independent judgment, under which they must exercise their own independent judgment about what the law is. Accordingly, when they defer to agency interpretations of the law, it must be asked …