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Full-Text Articles in Law

A United States Perspective On Digital Single Market Directive Art. 17, Jane C. Ginsburg Jan 2020

A United States Perspective On Digital Single Market Directive Art. 17, Jane C. Ginsburg

Faculty Scholarship

To a US appraiser, article 17 of the Digital Single Market Directive suggests the EU has learned from American mistakes (and from its own) in the allocation of internet intermediaries’ liability for hosting and communicating user-posted content. Before the DSM Directive, art. 14 of the 2000 eCommerce Directive set out a notice-and-takedown system very similar to the regime provided in 17 U.S.C. section 512(c). Both regimes replaced the normal copyright default, which requires authorization to exploit works, with a limitation on the liability of service providers who complied with statutory prerequisites. Because the limitation ensured that service providers would not …


Nascent Competitors, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu Jan 2020

Nascent Competitors, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

A nascent competitor is a firm whose prospective innovation represents a serious threat to an incumbent. Protecting such competition is a critical mission for antitrust law, given the outsized role of unproven outsiders as innovators and the uniquely potent threat they often pose to powerful entrenched firms. In this Article, we identify nascent competition as a distinct analytical category and outline a program of antitrust enforcement to protect it. We make the case for enforcement even where the ultimate competitive significance of the target is uncertain, and explain why a contrary view is mistaken as a matter of policy and …


Cyberattacks And The Constitution, Matthew C. Waxman Jan 2020

Cyberattacks And The Constitution, Matthew C. Waxman

Faculty Scholarship

Contrary to popular view, cyberattacks alone are rarely exercises of constitutional war powers – and they might never be. They are often instead best understood as exercises of other powers pertaining to nonwar military, foreign affairs, intelligence, and foreign commerce, for example. Although this more fine-grained, fact-specific conception of cyberattacks leaves room for broad executive leeway in some contexts, it also contains a strong constitutional basis for legislative regulation of cyber operations.


Internet Jurisdiction: Using Content Delivery Networks To Ascertain Intention, Patrick Lin Jan 2020

Internet Jurisdiction: Using Content Delivery Networks To Ascertain Intention, Patrick Lin

LL.M. Essays & Theses

Specific jurisdiction in civil litigation centers on the rather general,yet immutable, concept of intention. Although the word “intention” does not surface prominently in the personal jurisdiction case law, it is clearly intrinsic to the concept of “purposeful availment”. On the Internet, however, intention is hard to ascertain: how does a court, for example, determine whether the defendant intended that its website, application, or advertisement within a mobile application should end up in the forum state? In answering such a question, courts have historically used one of two approaches to establish intent: (i) a targeting test or (ii) a degree of …


The Promise And Limits Of Cyber Power In International Law: Remarks, Monica Hakimi, Ann Väljataga, Zhixiong Huang, Charles Allen, Sue Robertson, Doug Wilson Jan 2020

The Promise And Limits Of Cyber Power In International Law: Remarks, Monica Hakimi, Ann Väljataga, Zhixiong Huang, Charles Allen, Sue Robertson, Doug Wilson

Faculty Scholarship

Hi, everyone. I am Monica Hakimi from the University of Michigan Law School, and I would like to welcome you to our panel on cyber power and its limits. The topic almost does not need an introduction. We all know just from reading the news that our collective dependence on cyberspace is also a huge vulnerability, and state and non-state actors exploit this vulnerability to do one another harm. They use cyber technologies not just to spy on one another, but also, for example, to interfere in national elections, to steal trade secrets or other valuable information, to disrupt the …