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Columbia Law School

Contracts

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Limits Of Smart Contracts, Jens Frankenreiter Jan 2019

The Limits Of Smart Contracts, Jens Frankenreiter

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

This essay investigates the potential of smart contracts to replace the legal system as an infrastructure for transactions. It argues that (contract) law remains relevant for most transactions even if they are entirely structured by way of smart contract. The reason for this is that the power of smart contracts to create and enforce obligations against attempts by the legal system to thwart their execution is limited. These limitations are most relevant for obligations to perform certain actions outside the blockchain, but also apply to other obligations contingent on facts outside the records stored on the blockchain.


Constraints On Private Benefits Of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms Versus Ex Post Transaction Review, Ronald J. Gilson, Alan Schwartz Jan 2013

Constraints On Private Benefits Of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms Versus Ex Post Transaction Review, Ronald J. Gilson, Alan Schwartz

Faculty Scholarship

We ask how to regulate pecuniary private benefit consumption. These benefits can compensate controlling shareholders for monitoring managers and investing effort in implementing projects. Controlling shareholders may consume excessive benefits, however. We argue (a) ex post judicial review of controlled transactions dominates ex ante restrictions on the controlled structures: the latter eliminate efficiencies along with abuses of the controlled company form; (b) controlling shareholders should be permitted to contract with investors over private benefit levels. Both work with better courts. Hence, we recommend creating a European-level corporate court, whose jurisdiction parties can invoke by contract.


The Measure Of A Mac: A Quasi-Experimental Protocol For Tokenizing Force Majeure Clauses In M&A Agreements, Eric L. Talley, Drew O'Kane Jan 2012

The Measure Of A Mac: A Quasi-Experimental Protocol For Tokenizing Force Majeure Clauses In M&A; Agreements, Eric L. Talley, Drew O'Kane

Faculty Scholarship

This paper develops a protocol for using a familiar data set on force majeure provisions in corporate acquisitions agreements to tokenize and calibrate a machine-learning algorithm of textual analysis. Our protocol, built on regular expression (RE) and latent semantic analysis (LSA) approaches, serves to replicate, correct, and extend the hand-coded data. Our preliminary results indicate that both approaches perform well, though a hybridized approach improves predictive power further. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that our results are generally robust to out-of-sample predictions. We conclude that similar approaches could be used more broadly in empirical legal scholarship, especially including in business law.


Impossibility And Related Excuses, Victor P. Goldberg Jan 1988

Impossibility And Related Excuses, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In the first section I present an e of why reasonable businessmen would choose to excuse performance for some changed circumstances, but not others. In the remainder of the paper I will analyze specific problems that have arisen in the impossibility case law and literature. The explanation forwarded in Section 1 will play a prominent role in much of that discussion. Largely because their paper stimulated my thoughts on the problem, I will contrast my analysis of some of the specific cases to that of Posner and Rosenfield [1977]. I will not, except in passing, critique the case law, the …


Clarifying The Record: A Comment, Victor P. Goldberg Jan 1988

Clarifying The Record: A Comment, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In their recent article in this journal, Boudreaux and Ekelund [1987] ha presented a distorted characterization of some of my work on the economics o regulation. The editor of this journal has graciously offered me the opportunity to respond to their criticisms and to redress some ambiguities, real or imagine in my earlier work.