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Full-Text Articles in Law
Re-Reading Chevron, Thomas W. Merrill
Re-Reading Chevron, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
Though increasingly disfavored by the Supreme Court, Chevron remains central to administrative law doctrine. This Article suggests a way for the Court to reformulate the Chevron doctrine without overruling the Chevron decision. Through careful attention to the language of Chevron itself, the Court can honor the decision’s underlying value of harnessing comparative institutional advantage in judicial review, while setting aside a highly selective reading that unduly narrows judicial review. This re-reading would put the Chevron doctrine – and with it, an entire branch of administrative law – on firmer footing.
Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang
Coordinating Injunctions, Bert I. Huang
Faculty Scholarship
Consider this scenario: Two judges with parallel cases are each ready to issue an injunction. But their injunctions may clash, ordering incompatible actions by the defendant. Each judge has written an opinion justifying her own intended relief, but the need to avoid conflicting injunctions presses her to make a further choice – “Should I issue the injunction or should I stay it for now?” Each must make this decision in anticipation of what the other will do.
This Article analyzes such a judicial coordination problem, drawing on recent examples including the DACA cases and the “sanctuary cities” cases. It then …
Rights As Trumps?, Jamal Greene
Rights As Trumps?, Jamal Greene
Faculty Scholarship
Rights are more than mere interests, but they are not absolute. And so two competing frames have emerged for adjudicating conflicts over rights. Under the first frame, rights are absolute but for the exceptional circumstances in which they may be limited. Constitutional adjudication within this frame is primarily an interpretive exercise fixed on identifying the substance and reach of any constitutional rights at issue. Under the second frame, rights are limited but for the exceptional circumstances in which they are absolute. Adjudication within this frame is primarily an empirical exercise fixed on testing the government’s justification for its action. In …
Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen
Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
The concepts of good faith and bad faith play a central role in many areas of private law and international law. Typically associated with honesty, loyalty, and fair dealing, good faith is said to supply the fundamental principle of every legal system, if not the foundation of all law. With limited exceptions, however, good faith and bad faith go unmentioned in constitutional cases brought by or against government institutions. This doctrinal deficit is especially striking given that the U.S. Constitution twice refers to faithfulness and that insinuations of bad faith pervade constitutional discourse.
This Article investigates these points and their …
The Challenges Of Fitting Principled Modern Government – A Unified Public Law – To An Eighteenth Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
The Challenges Of Fitting Principled Modern Government – A Unified Public Law – To An Eighteenth Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
The papers presented at a fall 2016 conference at Cambridge University, The Unity of Public Law?, generally addressed issues of judicial review in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, often from a comparative perspective and the view that unifying impulses in “public law” arose from the common law. Accepting what Justice Harlan Fisk Stone once characterized as the ideal of “a unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless whole by [judges],” The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harvard L Rev 4 (1936), this paper considers a variety of issues that have complicated maintaining …
Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias
Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias
Faculty Scholarship
American government is dysfunctional: Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power, everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance. Who, or what, is to blame? In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political parties. That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit: Concentrated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends. The only way to understand our current constitutional predicament – and to rectify it – is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in our system of checks and balances.
This Article shows that the increasing concentration …
In Search Of Skidmore, Peter L. Strauss
In Search Of Skidmore, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
Ever since 1827, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that when a court is interpreting a statute that falls within the authority of an administrative agency, the court in reaching its own judgment about the statute's meaning should give substantial weight to the agency's view. Repeated again and again over the years in varying formulations, this proposition found its apotheosis in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Jackson in 1944. His opinion took the proposition to be so obvious that no citation was required. Justice Jackson's typically incisive and memorable formulation stuck. It …
What Happened In Iowa?, David Pozen
What Happened In Iowa?, David Pozen
Faculty Scholarship
Reply to Nicole Mansker & Neal Devins, Do Judicial Elections Facilitate Popular Constitutionalism; Can They?, 111 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 27 (2011).
November 2, 2010 is the latest milestone in the evolution of state judicial elections from sleepy, sterile affairs into meaningful political contests. Following an aggressive ouster campaign, voters in Iowa removed three supreme court justices, including the chief justice, who had joined an opinion finding a right to same-sex marriage under the state constitution. Supporters of the campaign rallied around the mantra, “It’s we the people, not we the courts.” Voter turnout surged to unprecedented levels; the national …
Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
A Constitution that strongly separates legislative from executive activity makes it difficult to reconcile executive adoption of regulations (that is, departmentally adopted texts resembling statutes and having the force of law, if valid) with the proposition that the President is not ‘to be a lawmaker’. Such activity is, of course, an essential of government in the era of the regulatory state. United States courts readily accept the delegation to responsible agencies of authority to engage in it, what we call ‘rulemaking’, so long as it occurs in a framework that permits them to assess the legality of any particular exercise. …
Marbury V. Madison And European Union "Constitutional" Review, George A. Bermann
Marbury V. Madison And European Union "Constitutional" Review, George A. Bermann
Faculty Scholarship
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison specifically raises the question of the legitimacy of a "horizontal" species of judicial review, that is, review by courts of the exercise of powers by the coordinate branches of government. The same question could be asked with respect to judicial review in the European Union. More particularly, how problematic or contestable has "horizontal" judicial review been within the European Union as a matter of principle? And, irrespective of its contestability, how have the courts of the European Union exercised "horizontal" review? We will find, however, that it is not the "horizontal" …
The Contradictions Of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Gary Peller
The Contradictions Of Mainstream Constitutional Theory, Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Gary Peller
Faculty Scholarship
For the last four decades, some form of "process" theory has dominated conventional constitutional theory, on the bench and in the academy. The organizing, usually implicit, background assumption is that the exercise of governmental power – whether by legislatures or courts – is to be tested for normative legitimacy against a set of procedures. Writing as critics of the basic framework of process theory, Professors Kimberli Crenshaw and Gary Peller discuss the contributions and constraints of a proceduralist constitutional law discourse. In light of direct democracy initiatives claiming the power of legislation, and a substantively conservative judiciary defining the "law," …
Constitutional Decisions And The Supreme Law, Kent Greenawalt
Constitutional Decisions And The Supreme Law, Kent Greenawalt
Faculty Scholarship
What status do Supreme Court decisions have for officials in the political branches of our government? Six months ago, Attorney General Edwin Meese III rekindled controversy over this enduring and troublesome question when he claimed in a widely reported lecture that Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution are not the supreme law of the land, and are properly subject to forms of opposition by other governmental officials. The general reaction to the speech was that it was meant to reduce the perceived authority of Supreme Court opinions, and a close reading of the speech certainly leaves this impression. Yet, even …
Comment On Professor Van Alstyne's Paper, Henry P. Monaghan
Comment On Professor Van Alstyne's Paper, Henry P. Monaghan
Faculty Scholarship
My major difficulty with Professor Van Alstyne's paper is its incomplete character. In the end, he makes only two points: first, judges are authorized to apply "this Constitution," not to do justice; and second, judges should not lie about what they are doing. The danger is that after a while the first point sounds somewhat empty, while the actual content of the second point seems entirely parasitic on the first.
Constitutional Fate, Philip Chase Bobbitt
Constitutional Fate, Philip Chase Bobbitt
Faculty Scholarship
The Mary Ireland Graves Dougherty Lectures in Constitutional Law were established in 1979 at the University of Texas School of Law in the memory of Mrs. Dougherty by her family. Professor Bobbitt delivered the inaugural series of these lectures on three evenings in April 1979. Of those in attendance, only Professor Bobbitt's students, who had witnessed the evolution of his ideas during that year, and a few colleagues with whom he must have shared his thoughts, could have expected what followed on those spring evenings in Austin. His subject was "the question of judicial review." So stated, the subject hardly …