Law Commons^™

Credit, Crises And Infrastructure: The Differing Fates Of Large And Small Businesses, Todd Baker, Kathryn Judge, Aaron Klein

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay sheds new light on the importance of credit creation infrastructure in determining who actually receives government support during periods of distress, and who continues to benefit after the acute phase of a crisis and the government’s formal support programs come to an end. The pandemic revealed, and the government’s response accentuated, meaningful asymmetries in the capacities of small and large businesses to access needed funding.

At first glance, it would seem that small businesses benefitted more than large ones from the government’s pandemic-support programs, as more government funds flowed into small businesses. Yet closer inspection of the range …

Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting In Corporate Law, Sean J. Griffith, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a disinterested vote of shareholders as the pathway out of heightened judicial scrutiny. The stated rationale for this policy is that shareholders, the real party at interest, are better protected by the ballot box than by the courtroom. As long as informed, disinterested shareholders with an economic stake in the outcome of the vote can effectively express their preferences through voting — the court need not scrutinize the underlying transaction. Rather, it can defer to the outcome under the business judgment rule.

But shareholder voting is not always as direct as this reasoning implies. Instead, voting …

The Core Corporate Governance Puzzle: Contextualizing The Link To Performance, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson, Darius Palia

Faculty Scholarship

There is a puzzle at the core of corporate governance theory. Prior scholarship reports a strong relationship between firms best at creating shareholder value and those rated highly by the established corporate governance indices. Little work explores why, however. We hypothesize that the link between governance and performance depends centrally on context. We illustrate the importance of context by exploring circumstances when a firm's governance structure can operate as a signal of the quality of its management. The idea is that better managers are on average more likely to choose a highly rated governance structure than are bad managers because …

Contextual Analysis Of Tax Ownership, Alex Raskolnikov

Faculty Scholarship

Ownership is one of the most fundamental concepts in tax law, yet it remains remarkably confused. The uncertainty inhibits tax planning, leads to inconsistent responses from the government, and produces unexpected outcomes in the courts. There has been no shortage of scholarly attention to the issue, but most of the commentary has been either exceedingly narrow or focused on far-reaching reforms. As a result, the law of tax ownership lacks conceptual foundation. This article attempts to remedy the deficiency by proposing a comprehensive approach to tax ownership and demonstrating that the doctrine may (and should) be significantly clarified without a …

Partnoy's Complaint: A Response, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

My article attempts to strike a balance and find a middle ground between the polar positions of those who favor strict liability (of whom Professor Partnoy is probably the most notable) and recent critics who believe it would produce market failure. Necessarily, those who take a middle position are exposed to fire from both sides. Although I admire Professor Partnoy's originality and incisive style, I do not believe that the market could easily survive his reforms and suspect that he has undervalued the hidden costs of strict liability. Deterrence is needed – but there can be too much of a …

Gatekeeper Failure And Reform: The Challenge Of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Securities markets have long employed "gatekeepers" – independent professionals who pledge their reputational capital – to protect the interests of dispersed investors who cannot easily take collective action. The clearest examples of such reputational intermediaries are auditors and securities analysts, who verify or assess corporate disclosures in order to advise investors in different ways. But during the late 1990s, these protections seemingly failed, and a unique concentration of financial scandals followed, all involving the common denominator .of accounting irregularities. What caused this sudden outburst of scandals, involving an apparent epidemic of accounting and related financial irregularities, that broke over the …