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Columbia Law School

Banking and Finance Law

Washington University Law Review

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Mandatory Disclosure And Individual Investors: Evidence From The Jobs Act, Colleen Honisberg, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Yu-Ting Forester Wong Jan 2015

Mandatory Disclosure And Individual Investors: Evidence From The Jobs Act, Colleen Honisberg, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Yu-Ting Forester Wong

Faculty Scholarship

One prominent justification for the mandatory disclosure rules that define modem securities law is that these rules encourage individual investors to participate in stock markets. Mandatory disclosure, the theory goes, gives individual investors access to information that puts them on a more equal playing field with sophisticated institutional shareholders. Although this reasoning has long been cited by regulators and commentators as a basis for mandating disclosure, recent work has questioned its validity. In particular, recent studies contend that individual investors are overwhelmed by the amount of information required to be disclosed under current law, and thus they cannot and do …


Japan's Experience With Deposit Insurance And Failing Banks: Implications For Financial Regulatory Design?, Curtis J. Milhaupt Jan 1999

Japan's Experience With Deposit Insurance And Failing Banks: Implications For Financial Regulatory Design?, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines three decades of Japanese experience with deposit insurance andfailing banks, and analyzes the implications of that experience for bank safety net reform in other countries. To date, the literature and policy debate on deposit insurance have been heavily colored by U.S. banking history and have focused almost exclusively on explicit deposit protection schemes. Analysis of Japan's safety net experience suggests that (a) deposit insurance, for all its flaws, is superior to the real-world alternative-implicit government protection of depositors and discretionary regulatory intervention in bank distress, (b) a well-designed explicit deposit insurance system that includes a credible bank …