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Full-Text Articles in Law
Arrests: Legal And Illegal, Daniel Yeager
Arrests: Legal And Illegal, Daniel Yeager
Faculty Scholarship
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. An arrest—manifesting a police intention to transport a suspect to the stationhouse for booking, fingerprinting, and photographing—is a mode of seizure. Because arrests are so intrusive, they require roughly a fifty percent chance that an arrestable offense has occurred. Because nonarrest seizures (aka Terry stops), though no “petty indignity,” are less intrusive than arrests, they require roughly just a twenty-five percent chance that crime is afoot. Any arrest not supported by probable cause is illegal. It would therefore seem to follow that any arrest supported by probable cause is legal. But it …
Certain Certiorari: The Digital Privacy Rights Of Probationers, Daniel Yeager
Certain Certiorari: The Digital Privacy Rights Of Probationers, Daniel Yeager
Faculty Scholarship
In a recent oral argument, a judge on the California Court of Appeal told me they had "at least 50" pending cases on the constitutionality of probation conditions authorizing suspicionless searches of digital devices. As counsel of record in three of those cases, I feel positioned to comment on this hot topic within criminal law. My intention here is less to reconcile California's cases on suspicionless searches of probationers' digital devices than to locate them within the precedents of the United States Supreme Court, which is bound before long to pick up a case for the same purpose.
Overcoming Hiddenness: The Role Of Intentions In Fourth Amendment Analysis, Daniel B. Yeager
Overcoming Hiddenness: The Role Of Intentions In Fourth Amendment Analysis, Daniel B. Yeager
Faculty Scholarship
This Article rehearses a response to the problems posed to and by the Supreme Court's attempts to work out the meaning and operation of the word "search." After commencing Part II by meditating on the notion of privacy, I take up its relation to the antecedent suspicion or knowledge that Fourth-Amendment law requires as a justification for all privacy invasions. From there, I look specifically at that uneasy relation in Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has come to privilege privacy over property as a Fourth Amendment value. From there, Part III reviews the sources or bases that can tell us what …
Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager
Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager
Faculty Scholarship
This Article will reflect on (1) how the Whren v. United States failure to acknowledge what counts as a pretext accounts for the residual confusion as to whether or not Whren really has killed off the pretext argument in constitutional criminal procedure, and (2) the extent to which the Court in Sullivan compounded that failure, which I hope to lightly correct here by distinguishing motives from intentions and then by elaborating the role that each plays, or at least should play, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.