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California Western School of Law

Faculty Scholarship

Series

2003

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

Adoptions By Lesbian And Gay Parents Must Be Recognized By Sister States Under The Full Faith And Credit Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes That Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, Barbara Cox Jan 2003

Adoptions By Lesbian And Gay Parents Must Be Recognized By Sister States Under The Full Faith And Credit Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes That Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, Barbara Cox

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

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The Meaning Of Quality, Steven R. Smith Jan 2003

The Meaning Of Quality, Steven R. Smith

Faculty Scholarship

This essay considers the qualities that constitute excellent lawyers in any society. It thereby suggests the qualities that law schools should seek to ensure that their graduates possess as they leave law schools and enter the practice of law.

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Stuck In A Rut: The Role Of Creative Thinking In Problem Solving And Legal Education, Janet Weinstein, Linda H. Morton Jan 2003

Stuck In A Rut: The Role Of Creative Thinking In Problem Solving And Legal Education, Janet Weinstein, Linda H. Morton

Faculty Scholarship

This article focuses on the mental process of creative thinking. We discuss what it is, why we have difficulty engaging in it, and how we can overcome this difficulty through specific techniques and a more conducive environment. Creative thinking is an essential component to problem solving. In training future lawyers, we must do a better job of incorporating and supporting creative thinking in legal education. We conclude the article with a description of some of our efforts toward this objective.

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Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager Jan 2003

Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

This Article will reflect on (1) how the Whren v. United States failure to acknowledge what counts as a pretext accounts for the residual confusion as to whether or not Whren really has killed off the pretext argument in constitutional criminal procedure, and (2) the extent to which the Court in Sullivan compounded that failure, which I hope to lightly correct here by distinguishing motives from intentions and then by elaborating the role that each plays, or at least should play, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

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