Law Commons^™

Transnational Litigation As A Prisoner's Dilemma, Maya Steinitz, Paul Gowder

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article we use game theory to argue that perceptions of widespread corruption in the judicial processes in developing countries create ex ante incentives to act corruptly. It is rational (though not moral) to preemptively act corruptly when litigating in the courts of many developing nations. The upshot of this analysis is to highlight that, contrary to judicial narratives in individual cases — such as the (in)famous Chevron–Ecuador dispute used herein as an illustration — the problem of corruption in transnational litigation is structural and as such calls for structural solutions. The article offers one such solution: the establishment …

Litigation: Time To Revisit Chevron Difference, Jack M. Beermann, Charles J. Cooper, Thomas W. Merrill, Amy Wildermuth, Don R. Wildermouth

Faculty Scholarship

Article is a transcript from the 2014 National Lawyers Convention panel on Millennials, Equity, and the Rule of Law. A video recording of the panel can be viewed here.

JUSTICE DON WILLETT: ... because Chevron deference is kind of like bacon. Some people like their Chevron deference rigid and crisp. Other people like it a little squishy and a little bendable. A few people dislike it altogether, no matter how it's served. But Chevron' is now thirty years old, older than a number of people in the audience today, and a lot has changed. The regulatory state …