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Deterrence And Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, Keith N. Hylton
Deterrence And Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on penalties against two groups of actors for deterrence: penalties against the violating firm and penalties against the violating firm's agents. Here, I examine the economics of punishing agents versus firms. My area of application is antitrust, but the argument applies generally to other fields in which the government has the choice of punishing the agent, the firm, or both. This analysis suggests that whenever the firm has an incentive, given existing penalties, to engage in some illegal act that may result in relatively modest punishment for its agents, the firm can almost always induce its …
Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences, Keith N. Hylton
Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Since China has modeled its antitrust regime on that of the EU, there are essentially two antitrust regime types: the U.S. and the EU. This chapter is a brief comparative study of the two regimes. I focus on three categories in which fundamental differences are observed: enforcement, legal standards, and procedure. Within each of the three categories, I narrow the focus to a specific illustrative feature. With respect to enforcement, the EU imposes gain-based penalties while the U.S. imposes harm-based penalties. In predation law, the U.S. has a marginal cost standard and the EU has an average cost standard. With …