Law Commons^™

The Moral Reading As A Practice: A Response To Three Comments On Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, many originalists have claimed a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. In my book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 1 I reject originalisms—whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral reading” of the United States Constitution, or a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood—not merely historical research to discover relatively …

Dworkin's Perfectionism, Linda C. Mcclain, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, we shall interpret Dworkin's constitutional theory in light of three varieties of perfectionism: (1) the idea that government should undertake a formative project of inculcating civic virtues and encouraging responsibility in the exercise of rights; (2) the idea that we should interpret the American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be; and (3) the idea that we should defend a Constitution-perfecting theory that would secure not only procedural liberties essential for democratic self-government but also substantive liberties essential for personal self-government. We shall identify three gaps left by Dworkin's work and sketch how …

Corporate Conscience And The Contraceptive Mandate: A Dworkinian Reading, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

When a closely-divided U.S. Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), upholding a challenge by three for-profit corporations to the contraceptive coverage provisions (“contraceptive mandate”) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”), sadly missing in the flurry of commentary was the late Ronald Dworkin’s assessment. This essay asks, “What would Dworkin do?,” if evaluating that case as well as Wheaton College v. Burwell, in which, over a strong dissent by Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan, the Court granted Wheaton College emergency relief from complying with ACA’s accommodation procedure for religious nonprofit organizations who object to …

Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that the best interpretation of a Constitution should both fit and justify the legal materials, for example, the text, original meaning, and precedents. In his recent book, Against Obligation (Harvard University Press, 2012), Abner S. Greene provocatively and creatively bucks the tendencies of constitutional theorists to profess fidelity with the past in constitutional interpretation. He rejects originalist understandings of obligation to follow original meaning in interpreting the Constitution. And indeed he rejects interpretive obligation to follow precedent. In this Essay I focus on Greene’s arguments against interpretive obligation to the past, in particular, his argument that …

Introduction, Symposium On Ronald Dworkin's Religion Without God, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Boston University School of Law and the Boston University Law Review are proud to publish this Symposium on Dworkin’s final book, Religion Without God (Harvard University Press, 2013), as a sequel to our 2009 Symposium on his Justice for Hedgehogs. The Symposium includes an introduction and eulogy by James E. Fleming and contributions by a number of the most distinguished scholars of law and religion in the United States and the United Kingdom: Jeremy Waldron, Stephen L. Carter, Paul Horwitz, Andrew Koppelman, Cécile Laborde, Linda C. McClain, Micah Schwartzman, and Steven D. Smith.

Can Religion Without God Lead To Religious Liberty Without Conflict?, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

This Article engages with Ronald Dworkin’s final book, Religion Without God, which proposes to shrink the size and importance of the fierce “culture wars” in the United States between believers and nonbelievers – theists and atheists – by separating out the “science” and “value” components of religion to show these groups that they share a “fundamental religious impulse.” Religion Without God also calls for framing religious freedom as part of a general right to ethical independence rather than a “troublesome” special right for religious people. This article compares the argumentative strategy of Religion Without God with prior Dworkin works, such …

Living Originalism And Living Constitutionalism As Moral Readings Of The American Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

With this event – A Symposium on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism and David Strauss’s The Living Constitution – we launch a Boston University School of Law series of symposia on significant recent books in law. The distinctive format is to pick two significant books that join issue on an important topic, to invite the author of each book to write an essay on the other book, and to invite several Boston University School of Law faculty to write an essay on one or both books.

What are the justifications for pairing Balkin’s Living Originalism1 and Strauss’s The Living Constitution2 in …

Respecting Freedom And Cultivating Virtues In Justifying Constitutional Rights, Linda C. Mcclain, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

What’s new in the long-standing debate between civic republicans and liberals about how best to understand and justify rights? This article picks up the thread with political philosopher Michael Sandel’s recent, internationally-renowned book, Justice: What’s the Right Thing To Do? The article evaluates the sharp contrasts his book draws between justice as cultivating virtues and justice as respecting freedom, using his example of contemporary arguments for and against opening up civil marriage to same-sex couples. Sandel contends that “liberal neutrality” and a public square denuded of religious arguments and convictions are impossible on this issue. Drawing on Aristotle, he contends …

Taking Responsibilities As Well As Rights Seriously, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In his first book, Ronald Dworkin famously called for “taking rights seriously” by treating them as “trumps” over considerations of utility or the general welfare.1 Taking Rights Seriously (along with other works) provoked calls for taking responsibilities as well as (or instead of) rights seriously, or for engaging in “responsibility talk,” not just “rights talk.”2 In Life’s Dominion, Dworkin himself got on the responsibility bandwagon in justifying the right to procreative autonomy and the right to die.3 He countenanced that government may encourage women to take the decision whether to have an abortion responsibly, so long as it does not …

Justice And Elegance For Hedgehogs - In Life, Law, And Literature, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

At a time when value pluralism and even value polarization seem to be undeniable facts of contemporary life, Ronald Dworkin unrepentantly defends the unity of value. His point of departure is the Greek poet Archilochus’s saying, “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing,” made famous in liberal philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s essay, The Hedgehog and the Fox. In his forthcoming book, Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin argues for the integration of ethics, personal morality, and political morality and contends that law is a branch of political morality that in turn is a branch of morality, broadly understood. …

Human Rights For Hedgehogs?: Global Value Pluralism, International Law, And Some Reservations Of The Fox, Robert D. Sloane

Faculty Scholarship

This essay, a contribution to the Boston University Law Review’s symposium on Ronald Dworkin’s forthcoming book, Justice for Hedgehogs, critiques the manuscript’s account of international human rights on five grounds. First, it is vague: it fails to offer much if any guidance relative to many of the most difficult concrete issues that arise in the field of international human rights law and policy - precisely the circumstances in which international lawyers might benefit from the guidance that moral foundations supposedly promise. It is also troubling, and puzzling given Dworkin’s well-known commitment to the right-answer thesis, that his account of human …

The Place Of History And Philosophy In The Moral Reading Of The American Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Dworkin argues that commitment to interpretive fidelity requires that we recognize that the Constitution embodies abstract moral principles rather than laying down a particular historical conception, and that interpreting those principles requires fresh judgments of political theory about how they are best understood. This interpretive strategy — Dworkin's ‘moral reading’ of the Constitution — stands in opposition to the narrow originalists' claim that interpretive fidelity requires following the rules laid down by the framers of the Constitution. Some theorists have responded to the originalists by attempting to carve out an intermediate theory between narrow originalism and the moral reading. Dworkin …

Red Versus Blue (And Purple) States In The Same-Sex Marriage Debate: From Values Polarization To Common Ground?, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

What is the role of courts in circumstances of "values polarization"? The framing of this question brings to mind, but differs from, some familiar inquiries about the judicial role in circumstances of conscientious moral disagreement or value pluralism and debates about liberty, morality, and community. Using the conflict over whether civil marriage should extend to same-sex couples as an example, I contrast two recent analyses of values polarization and its implications for finding agreement, Ronald Dworkin’s book, Is Democracy Possible Here?, and June Carbone and Naomi Cahn's project, Red Families v. Blue Families. Dworkin's strategy is to identify shared principles …

Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

What is the question of fidelity a question about? The topic of our Symposium, "Fidelity in Constitutional Theory," raises two fundamental questions: Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity? The short answer to the first-fidelity to the Constitution-poses a further question: What is the Constitution? For example, does the Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or enact relatively concrete historical rules? And does the Constitution presuppose a political theory of majoritarian democracy or one of constitutional democracy? The short answer to the second-being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting it-leads to another question: How should the Constitution be interpreted?' Does …

The Connection Between Law And Morality: Comments On Dworkin, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Our discussions yesterday seemed haunted by a contrast--never quite formulated--between Natural Law and Legal Positivism. The standard interpretation turns on the idea of a "necessary connection" between law and morality. Positivism has often been understood to hold, and Natural Law to deny, that there can be unjust laws.

Principles, Positivism, And Legal Theory, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

A complete theory of law, writes Ronald Dworkin, tells us what law is and what it ought to be. The current "ruling" theory of law combines legal positivism with utilitarianism: it holds, first, that law is a set of explicitly adopted rules and, second, that law ought to maximize the general welfare. Dworkin rejects both branches of that theory. He argues that law contains "principles" as well as rules and that these principles cannot be traced to any explicit adoption or enactment. Dworkin argues further that the ruling theory neglects moral rights, which must be respected, he claims, even if …