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Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Common Ownership And Executive Incentives: The Implausibility Of Compensation As An Anticompetitive Mechanism, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
Mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors are a growing presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies, rather than the value of individual companies in isolation, this new reality has lead to a concern that companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition? Some commentators argue that one of the most …
Virtues Of Common Ownership, Anna Di Robilant
Virtues Of Common Ownership, Anna Di Robilant
Faculty Scholarship
Professor Michael Sandel's theory of justice is attractive and inspirational for lawyers interested in social change. Sandel's call to go beyond egalitarian liberalism has real and important implications for legal and institutional engineering. However, Sandel's theory of justice is parsimonious of recommendations for medium level institutional design. It offers little detailed guidance to private lawyers called upon to design background rules for the allocation of scarce resources and necessary burdens. This essay will discuss how Sandel's theory of justice may help orient the work of lawyers and policymakers interested in a question that is central to recent property debates: the …