Law Commons^™

Unity And Diversity In International Law, William W. Park

Faculty Scholarship

The primordial Greek sea-god Proteus could alter his shape at will, notwithstanding that his divine substance remained the same. Reinventing himself by adapting to new circumstances, Proteus still stayed unchanged in essence.

Unlike the sea-god’s protean nature, the substance of international law may well undergo alterations when examined through the telescope of legal culture, or with predispositions of divergent educational backgrounds. For the thoughtful reader, scholarly speculation on such variations will be triggered by reading Is International Law International?. In that book, Professor Anthea Roberts explores a variety of elements in the teaching and practice of international law, viewed …

Niklas Luhmann's Theory Of Autopoietic Legal Systems, Hugh Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Between 1984 and his death in 1998, German sociologist Niklas Luhmann developed a comprehensive theory of what he called autopoietic or self-referential systems.He worked out this approach both at the level of a social system as a whole and at the level of various social subsystems, such as state, economy, science, religion, education, art, family, and — the concern of the present article — law. My particular topics in this critical introduction to Luhmann’s theory are (a) its relation to more standard legal theory, (b) foundational or self-referential problems in law, and (c) the problem of law’s relation to other …

Review Of Law At The Vanishing Point By Aaron Fichtelberg, Robert D. Sloane

Faculty Scholarship

This is a largely critical review of Professor Aaron Fichtelberg’s philosophical analysis of international law. The centerpiece of the book’s affirmative agenda, a “non-reductionist” definition of international law that purports to elide various forms of international law skepticism, strikes the reviewer as circular, misguided in general, and, in its application to substantive international legal issues, difficult to distinguish from a rote form of legal positivism. Law at the Vanishing Point’s avowed empirical methodology and critical agenda, while largely unobjectionable, offer little that has not been said before, often with equal if not greater force. I commend the author’s effort to …

Osad Moralny A Teoria Prawa (Moral Judgment And Legal Theory), David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

My theme is the role of moral judgment in legal theory. My thesis is that moral judgment provides an important constraint on various aspects of legal theory. I shall illustrate that thesis by discussing, first, the so-called "separation" of law and morals (Section I); secondly, legal interpretation (Section II); and thirdly, the "rule of law" ideal (Section III).

The Liberal Future Of Relational Feminism: Robin West's Caring For Justice, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

Robin West is one of the most prolific1 and creative members of the legal academy. Her distinctive voice, as expressed in several books and numerous scholarly articles, informs and shapes debates within such diverse areas as constitutional theory (West 1990b; West 1994), feminist jurisprudence (West 1987; West 1988), and law and literature (West 1993). Indeed, some of her early articles concerning feminist jurisprudence (West 1987, West 1988) are now "classics" in a relatively new field of inquiry and appear in virtually every anthology or textbook in the field (Bartlett and Kennedy 1991, 201; Becker, Bowman, and Torrey 1994, 90; Fineman …

When Law Risks Madness, Susan P. Koniak

Faculty Scholarship

Within the United States in 1996, there is a community scattered among us with its own law, its own courts and its own well-armed militias. While the existence of these militias has prompted some debate in the legal literature, the community's law and its courts have been ignored. That law rejects the power of the courts of the federal government and those of the states over the "Sovereign Citizens" of this separate community. On the other hand, this community claims jurisdiction over us - should we interfere with its citizens in some way proscribed by its law - and over …

Proving The Law, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Interpretative theory has become a major growth industry over the past two decades. Legal academics in particular have invested heavily in the enterprise, producing a burgeoning literature that addresses many of the most important problems of legal interpretation.1 The discussion to date, however, has largely neglected one critical aspect of interpretative theory: the selection of appropriate standards of proof for legal propositions. That neglect will not bother or surprise interpretative skeptics who doubt the utility of searching for "true" or "better" meanings of texts, but it ought to prove troubling to any theorist who wants to make absolute or comparative …

Baseline Questions In Legal Reasoning: The Example Of Property In Jobs, Jack M. Beermann, Joseph William Singer

Faculty Scholarship

In what follows, we critique at-will employment by focusing on the baselines that underlie the analysis. Our ultimate goal is to develop persuasive arguments to move courts and businesses to provide greater job security for workers. One possible reason the courts have been so reluctant to change employment law is that judges analyze job security issues from the standpoint of a series of baselines which have the effect of creating a presumption against job security that is almost impossible to overcome. These baseline assumptions effectively place the burden of proof on advocates of job security.

Judges fail to recognize that …

Principles, Positivism, And Legal Theory, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

A complete theory of law, writes Ronald Dworkin, tells us what law is and what it ought to be. The current "ruling" theory of law combines legal positivism with utilitarianism: it holds, first, that law is a set of explicitly adopted rules and, second, that law ought to maximize the general welfare. Dworkin rejects both branches of that theory. He argues that law contains "principles" as well as rules and that these principles cannot be traced to any explicit adoption or enactment. Dworkin argues further that the ruling theory neglects moral rights, which must be respected, he claims, even if …