Law Commons^™

Blinking On The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

How do judges judge? Do they apply law to facts in a mechanical and deliberative way, as the formalists suggest they do, or do they rely on hunches and gut feelings, as the realists maintain? Debate has raged for decades, but researchers have offered little hard evidence in support of either model. Relying on empirical studies of judicial reasoning and decision making, we propose an entirely new model of judging that provides a more accurate explanation of judicial behavior. Our model accounts for the tendency of the human brain to make automatic, snap judgments, which are surprisingly accurate, but which …

Renewing Intraparty Democracy: Assessing Competition, Deliberation, And Associational Rights Of Political Parties, Jonathan J. Thessin

Jonathan J Thessin

Among the many schools of thought on the design of political institutions are two particularly fashionable ones: competitive market theories and deliberative democracy theories. Competitive democrats argue for destabilizing the two-party system by enabling third parties to compete effectively; by contrast, deliberative democrats argue for more discussion before political decisions are made. Neither theory, however, pays sufficient attention to the internal character of parties. Oftentimes, dominant parties lock up political institutions and restrict meaningful discussion not only by imposing ballot restrictions on third parties but also by restricting access to party leadership.

This article argues for a shift away from …

Renewing Intraparty Democracy: Assessing Competition, Deliberation, And Associational Rights Of Political Parties, Jonathan J. Thessin

Jonathan J Thessin

Among the many schools of thought on the design of political institutions are two particularly fashionable ones: competitive market theories and deliberative democracy theories. Competitive democrats argue for destabilizing the two-party system by enabling third parties to compete effectively; by contrast, deliberative democrats argue for more discussion before political decisions are made. Neither theory, however, pays sufficient attention to the internal character of parties. Oftentimes, dominant parties lock up political institutions and restrict meaningful discussion not only by imposing ballot restrictions on third parties but also by restricting access to party leadership.

This article argues for a shift away from …

Deliberation Or Tabulation? The Self-Undermining Constitutional Architecture Of Election Campaigns, James A. Gardner

Buffalo Law Review

Perhaps the one completely uncontested truth in the shared public ideology of American politics is that an election campaign ought to be a serious occasion in the life of a democratic polity, a time when citizens reflect maturely on the great public issues of the day. On this view, the ultimate purpose of election campaigns is to offer voters and candidates a meaningful opportunity for deliberation and persuasion. Of course, the typical modern American election campaign does not seem seriously reflective and deliberative so much as shallow and unengaging. Reasoned persuasion seems to play a minor role, if that. The …

Deliberative Dilemmas: A Critique Of Deliberation Day From The Perspective Of Election Law, Chad Flanders

All Faculty Scholarship

My paper deals with two subject areas - deliberative democracy theory and election law - that have had surprisingly little contact with another. My paper tries to remedy this lacuna by looking at how the two fields intersect and can contribute to the understanding of one another. In particular, I look in detail at a particularly prominent proposal by two political theorists, Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin's Deliberation Day, and how the aims of that proposal might be frustrated by the present structure of American election law. I argue that because they fail to take into account certain structural features …