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Articles 1 - 18 of 18
Full-Text Articles in Law
“Government By Injunction,” Legal Elites, And The Making Of The Modern Federal Courts, Kristin Collins
“Government By Injunction,” Legal Elites, And The Making Of The Modern Federal Courts, Kristin Collins
Faculty Scholarship
The tendency of legal discourse to obscure the processes by which social and political forces shape the law’s development is well known, but the field of federal courts in American constitutional law may provide a particularly clear example of this phenomenon. According to conventional accounts, Congress’s authority to regulate the lower federal courts’ “jurisdiction”—generally understood to include their power to issue injunctions— has been a durable feature of American constitutional law since the founding. By contrast, the story I tell in this essay is one of change. During the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, many jurists considered the federal …
A Non-Contentious Account Of Article Iii's Domestic Relations Exception, James E. Pfander, Emily K. Damrau
A Non-Contentious Account Of Article Iii's Domestic Relations Exception, James E. Pfander, Emily K. Damrau
Notre Dame Law Review
Scholars and jurists have long debated the origins and current scope of the so-called domestic relations exception to Article III. Rooted in the perception that certain family law matters lie beyond the power of the federal courts, the exception was first articulated in the nineteenth-century decisional law of the Supreme Court and has perplexed observers ever since. Scholarly debate continues, despite the Court’s twentieth-century decision to place the exception firmly on statutory grounds in an effort to limit its potentially disruptive force.
This Article offers a novel, historically grounded account of the domestic relations exception, connecting its origins to the …
Honoring Dan Meltzer—Congressional Standing And The Institutional Framework Of Article Iii: A Comparative Perspective, Vickie C. Jackson
Honoring Dan Meltzer—Congressional Standing And The Institutional Framework Of Article Iii: A Comparative Perspective, Vickie C. Jackson
Notre Dame Law Review
In this short Essay, I focus on only one aspect of the broader question of government standing to sue: congressional standing. For one thing, separation of powers problems are more acutely presented in federal level disputes.
Given an increased interest by parts of the Congress, especially the House of Representatives, in seeking to intervene in ongoing litigation, there are pressing new issues in the lower federal courts: U.S. District Court Judge Rosemary Collyer recently upheld congressional standing to challenge an asserted violation of the Appropriations Clause in connection with spending under the Affordable Care Act, while rejecting the House’s standing …
Dc Circuit In Al-Nashiri: All Clear For Military Commission Trial, Peter Margulies
Dc Circuit In Al-Nashiri: All Clear For Military Commission Trial, Peter Margulies
Law Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia
The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia
Anthony J. Bellia
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …
Article Iii Standing For Private Plaintiffs Challenging Greenhouse Gas Regulations, Bradford C. Mank
Article Iii Standing For Private Plaintiffs Challenging Greenhouse Gas Regulations, Bradford C. Mank
San Diego Law Review
An important unresolved question is whether non-state plaintiffs have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to sue in federal courts in climate change cases. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held a state government could sue the U.S. government to address climate change issues, and suggested, but did not decide, that private litigants might have lesser rights than states. In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, the Ninth Circuit held that private groups did not have standing to challenge Washington State’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from five oil refineries, and implied that private plaintiffs may …
Law Enforcement As Political Question, Zachary S. Price
Law Enforcement As Political Question, Zachary S. Price
Notre Dame Law Review
Across a range of contexts, federal courts have crafted doctrines that limit judicial secondguessing of executive nonenforcement decisions. Key case law, however, carries important ambiguities of scope and rationale. In particular, key decisions have combined rationales rooted in executive prerogative with concerns about nonenforcement’s “unsuitability” for judicial resolution. With one nonenforcement initiative now before the Supreme Court and other related issues percolating in lower courts, this Article makes the case for the latter rationale. Judicial review of nonenforcement, on this account, involves a form of political question, in the sense of the “political question doctrine”: while executive officials hold a …
The Shochu Conundrum: Economics And Gatt Article Iii, Alex Davis
The Shochu Conundrum: Economics And Gatt Article Iii, Alex Davis
Undergraduate Economic Review
This paper will discuss the National Treatment (NT) obligation contained in Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 as applied in precedential tax discrimination cases. Case law has not taken a firm stance on the economic versus legal interpretation of the likeness/directly competitive or substitutable (DCS) criterion or the principle of “so as to afford protection” (SATAP) captured in Article III.2. After examining the case law on discriminatory taxation, I conclude that the NT obligation in trade agreements is imperfect. Nonetheless, NT is a critical component of these agreements, and the international trade order would …
S16rs Sgb No. 4 (So Points), Kelsey Wheatley, Kevin Ellis
S16rs Sgb No. 4 (So Points), Kelsey Wheatley, Kevin Ellis
Student Senate Enrolled Legislation
No abstract provided.
Standing For (And Up To) Separation Of Powers, Kent H. Barnett
Standing For (And Up To) Separation Of Powers, Kent H. Barnett
Indiana Law Journal
The U.S. Constitution requires federal agencies to comply with separation-of-powers (or structural) safeguards, such as by obtaining valid appointments, exercising certain limited powers, and being sufficiently subject to the President’s control. Who can best protect these safeguards? A growing number of scholars would allow only the political branches—Congress and the President—to defend them. These scholars would limit or end judicial review because private judicial challenges are aberrant to justiciability doctrine and lead courts to meddle in minor matters that rarely affect regulatory outcomes.
This Article defends the right of private parties to assert justiciable structural causes of action, arguing that …
“Spooky Action At A Distance”: Intangible Injury In Fact In The Information Age, Seth F. Kreimer
“Spooky Action At A Distance”: Intangible Injury In Fact In The Information Age, Seth F. Kreimer
All Faculty Scholarship
Two decades after Justice Douglas coined “injury in fact” as the token of admission to federal court under Article III, Justice Scalia sealed it into the constitutional canon in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. In the two decades since Lujan, Justice Scalia has thrown increasingly pointed barbs at the permissive standing doctrine of the Warren Court, maintaining it is founded on impermissible recognition of “Psychic Injury.” Justice Scalia and his acolytes take the position that Article III requires a tough minded, common sense and practical approach. Injuries in fact must be "tangible" "direct" "concrete" "de facto" realities in time and …
Article Iii Standing For Private Plaintiffs Challenging Greenhouse Gas Regulations, Bradford Mank
Article Iii Standing For Private Plaintiffs Challenging Greenhouse Gas Regulations, Bradford Mank
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
An important unresolved question is whether non-state plaintiffs have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to sue in federal courts in climate change cases. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held a state government could sue the U.S. government to address climate change issues, and suggested, but did not decide, that private litigants might have lesser rights than states. In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, the Ninth Circuit held that private groups did not have standing to challenge Washington State’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from five oil refineries, and implied that private plaintiffs may …
Data Breaches, Identity Theft And Article Iii Standing: Will The Supreme Court Resolve The Split In The Circuits, Bradford Mank
Data Breaches, Identity Theft And Article Iii Standing: Will The Supreme Court Resolve The Split In The Circuits, Bradford Mank
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
In data breach cases, the lower federal courts have split on the question of whether the plaintiffs meet Article III standing requirements for injury and causation. In its 2013 decision Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court, in a case involving alleged electronic surveillance by the U.S. government’s National Security Agency, declared that a plaintiff alleging that it will suffer future injuries from a defendant’s allegedly improper conduct must show that such injuries are “certainly impending.” Since the Clapper decision, a majority of the lower federal courts addressing “lost data” or potential identity theft cases in which there is …
Does A House Of Congress Have Standing Over Appropriations?: The House Of Representatives Challenges The Affordable Care Act, Bradford Mank
Does A House Of Congress Have Standing Over Appropriations?: The House Of Representatives Challenges The Affordable Care Act, Bradford Mank
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
In U.S. House of Representatives v. Sylvia Matthews Burwell, the District Court for D.C. in 2015 held that the House of Representatives has Article III standing to challenge certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act as violations of the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on legislative standing is complicated. The Court has generally avoided the contentious question of whether Congress has standing to challenge certain presidential actions because of the difficult separation-of-powers concerns in such cases. In Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that individual members of Congress generally do not have Article III standing by simply holding …
Psychological Harm And Constitutional Standing, Rachel Bayefsky
Psychological Harm And Constitutional Standing, Rachel Bayefsky
Brooklyn Law Review
When do psychological or emotional harms count as “injury-in-fact” for the purposes of satisfying Article III standing requirements, and when should they? Courts have wrestled with whether to grant standing, for example, to family members of a man killed by the police who argued that as relatives of the deceased, they had suffered emotional pain; members of an animal-welfare organization who claimed they had undergone “sleeplessness, depression, and anger” when they were unable to visit an elephant at the zoo; and members of a Catholic organization who challenged a city resolution criticizing the Catholic Church’s stance on adoption by same-sex …
Non-Contentious Jurisdiction And Consent Decrees, Michael T. Morley
Non-Contentious Jurisdiction And Consent Decrees, Michael T. Morley
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Spelling Out Spokeo, Craig Konnoth, Seth F. Kreimer
Spelling Out Spokeo, Craig Konnoth, Seth F. Kreimer
All Faculty Scholarship
For almost five decades, the injury-in-fact requirement has been a mainstay of Article III standing doctrine. Critics have attacked the requirement as incoherent and unduly malleable. But the Supreme Court has continued to announce “injury in fact” as the bedrock of justiciability. In Spokeo v. Robins, the Supreme Court confronted a high profile and recurrent conflict regarding the standing of plaintiffs claiming statutory damages. It clarified some matters, but remanded the case for final resolution. This Essay derives from the cryptic language of Spokeo a six stage process (complete with flowchart) that represents the Court’s current equilibrium. We put …
The Founding Fathers Said I Am Not Subject To Term Limits, Elias Arroyo
The Founding Fathers Said I Am Not Subject To Term Limits, Elias Arroyo
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.