Law Commons^™

Criminal Law And Common Sense: An Essay On The Perils And Promise Of Neuroscience, Stephen J. Morse

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is based on the author’s Barrock Lecture in Criminal Law presented at the Marquette University Law School. The central thesis is that the folk psychology that underpins criminal responsibility is correct and that our commonsense understanding of agency and responsibility and the legitimacy of criminal justice generally are not imperiled by contemporary discoveries in the various sciences, including neuroscience and genetics. These sciences will not revolutionize criminal law, at least not anytime soon, and at most they may make modest contributions to legal doctrine, practice, and policy. Until there are conceptual or scientific breakthroughs, this is my story …

The Constitutionality Of Lengthy Term-Of-Years Sentences For Juvenile Non-Homicide Offenders, Rebecca Lowry

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Part I discusses the development of the Court's ' kids are different" decisions. Part II argues that the rationale behind Graham applies not only to life-without-parole sentences but also to lengthy term-of-years sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders. Part III suggests a constitutional mandate as to when states must provide a meaningful opportunity for release and explores other legislative action states can employ to comply with Graham.

Wrongful Death Actions Under Section 1983, Martin A. Schwartz, Steven Steinglass, Richard Emery, Ilann Margalit Maazel

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.

The Relevance Of Culpability To The Punishment And Prevention Of Crime, R. J. Spjut

Akron Law Review

It follows that if a legal system may fairly punish only a person who culpably violated the law, a preventive restraint like self-defense is also fair only when it is used against a person whose offense or imminent offense is culpable. Such measures as punishment and prevention are justified because "a person who violates the order of fairness, which can be described as a system of rights,forfeits certain of his own rights." The forfeiture theory implicitly associates A's loss of rights with his deserts and suggests some analogy with punishment. Finnis' argument both makes explicit the analogy and shifts attention …

Culpability Evaluations In The State Supreme Courts From 1977 To 1999: A "Model" Assessment, Dannye Holley

Akron Law Review

A key premise of this article is that a fair assessment of the performance of state supreme court judges with regard to culpability evaluations must begin by differentiating among the states based upon the relative quality of statutory guidance available to each court on this crucial substantive criminal law issue. In light of the above discussion defining culpability evaluation and legislative action with regard thereto, this article categorizes states based on relative improvement in their statutory culpability evaluation scheme: first are those states with a set of hierarchical culpability concepts, which are specifically defined in relation to types of objective …

Punishment And Blame For Culpable Indifference, Kenneth Simons

Faculty Scholarship

In criminal law, the mental state of the defendant is a crucial determinant of the grade of crime that the defendant has committed and of whether the conduct is criminal at all. Under the widely accepted modern hierarchy of mental states, an actor is most culpable for causing harm purposely, and progressively less culpable for doing so knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. Notably, this hierarchy emphasizes cognitive rather than conative mental states. But this emphasis, I argue, is often unjustified. When we punish and blame for wrongful acts, we should look beyond the cognitive dimensions of the actor’s culpability, and should …

The Model Penal Code's Conceptual Error On The Nature Of Proximate Cause, And How To Fix It, Paul H. Robinson

All Faculty Scholarship

The Model Penal Code reconceptualized proximate cause to see it as part of the offense culpability requirements rather than as, in the traditional view, a minimum requirement for the strength of the connection between the actor's conduct and the prohibited result. That conceptual error, rare in the well-thought-out Model Code, invites misinterpretation and misapplication of the proximate cause provision, and can produce improper liability results. The failure is all the more unfortunate because the Model Code drafters did have an important improvement to offer in dealing with the challenging issue of proximate cause. Their jettison of fixed detailed rules in …