Law Commons^™

Flunking The Class-Of-One/Failing Equal Protection, William D. Araiza

William & Mary Law Review

This Article considers the equal protection “class-of-one” doctrine in light of recent developments, both at the Supreme Court and in the lower courts. After Part I explains the background and current state of the doctrine, Part II considers how that doctrine provides insights into such basic equal protection concepts as discriminatory intent and animus. It also critiques the Court’s analysis of the class-of-one, arguing that the Court has mishandled these concepts and in so doing caused doctrinal anomalies and lower court confusion. Part II offers an alternative approach to the class-of-one that corrects those problems while still addressing the concerns …

Backward-Looking Laws And Equal Protection: The Case Of Black Reparations, Daniel A. Farber

Daniel A Farber

No abstract provided.

Rights Of Belonging For Women, Rebecca E. Zietlow

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

No abstract provided.

Is The Antidiscrimination Project Being Ended?, Michael J. Zimmer

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

No abstract provided.

Bush V. Gore: What Happened, And What Does The Supreme Court's New Equal Protection Standard Mean For State Election Officials?, Michael Louis Newman

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

From Romer V. Evans To United States V. Windsor: Law As A Vehicle For Moral Disapproval In Amendment 2 And The Defense Of Marriage Act, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

This article considers the intertwined fates of Romer v. Evans and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which both date back to 1996. In United States v. Windsor, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, struck down Section 3 of DOMA, using Romer as a template. This article reflects on Romer as it bears on the use of law as a vehicle to express morality, in particular, “moral disapproval of homosexuality” and moral approval -- and the defense and nurture -- of “traditional, heterosexual marriage.” Proponents of Amendment 2 (struck down in Romer, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy) and …

Proposition 8 Is Unconstitutional, But Not Because The Ninth Circuit Said So: The Equal Protection Clause Does Not Support A Legal Distinction Between Denying The Right To Same-Sex Marriage And Not Providing It In The First Place, Nathan Rouse

Seattle University Law Review

In Perry v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit held that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. But in doing so, the court stepped back from the breadth of the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit did not address whether same-sex marriage is a fundamental constitutional right. Nor did the Ninth Circuit address whether the Equal Protection Clause categorically prevents states from limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. Instead, the Ninth Circuit reached the narrow conclusion that Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause because it withdrew a preexisting legal right from a marginalized group without any legitimate purpose. The Ninth Circuit should have held …

Lawrence's Stealth Constitutionalism And Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, Eric Berger

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Constitutional law scholarship often focuses on two taxonomies: doctrinal categories and interpretive methodologies. Consequently, constitutional scholars sometimes neglect other important facets of constitutional decisionmaking, particularly extra-doctrinal stealth determinations that courts render frequently in constitutional opinions. The U.S. Supreme Court regularly confronts the questions underlying these determinations, but despite their centrality to constitutional decisionmaking, these issues often escape careful scrutiny.

Lawrence v. Texas exemplifies the phenomenon. Lawrence framed its central question at a broad level of generality; relied on hybrid reasoning, using equal-protection rationales to support a substantive due process holding; declined to identify a level of scrutiny; and invoked changing …

Crossing The Final Border: Securing Equal Gender Protection In Immigration Cases, Michelle L. Sudano

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.

E Pluribus Unum: Liberalism's March To Be The Singular Influence On Civil Rights At The Supreme Court, Aaron J. Shuler

Aaron J Shuler

Rogers Smith writes that American political culture can best be understood as a blend of liberal, republican and illiberal ascriptive ideologies. The U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has largely reflected this thesis. While the Court moved away from permitting laws that explicitly construct hierarchies in the 20th century and made tepid references to egalitarian principles during the Warren Court, liberalism has prevailed in the majority of the Court’s decisions. Gains in civil rights through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses were achieved primarily through liberal notions of de-regulation, a market economy and individual freedom. Conversely, State …

Animus And Marriage Equality, Susannah W. Pollvogt

Susannah W Pollvogt

Many scholars have speculated about the approach the United States Supreme Court might take in the marriage equality cases currently on its docket. One option that is underexplored is that the Court may revive and rationalize the doctrine of unconstitutional animus. Dormant since the 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans, the doctrine of unconstitutional animus has made only fleeting appearances in the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, and when it has appeared, it has taken on a distinct incarnation in every instance. For this reason, both scholars and practitioners consider the doctrine to be ill-defined and unreliable. Nonetheless, the doctrine of …

Equality Between Adults And Children: Its Meaning, Implications, And Opposition, James G. Dwyer

Faculty Publications

Family law scholars have devoted much attention to equality among groups of adults and some attention to equality between groups of children. There has been little exploration, however, of the notion of equality between adults and children. In this Article, I first explain what it means at a basic, theoretical level to speak of such equality. I then identify some practical implications. Finally, I consider why there is great resistance to many practical implications of children's equality, even among those who would consider themselves advocates for child welfare.

How Quickly We Forget: The Short And Undistinguished Career Of Affirmative Action, Robert A. Parrish

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.

'Lonesome Road': Driving Without The Fourth Amendment, Lewis R. Katz

Faculty Publications

American states and municipalities have so many minor traffic regulations that every time a driver gets behind the wheel of a car he or she is likely to commit multiple violations. The violation of any traffic regulation empowers police officers to stop the vehicle, ticket and, in some states, arrest the motorist. Police are physically unable to stop and ticket, let alone arrest, every motorist committing a traffic violation. Instead, police are vested with unlimited discretion when choosing which motorists to stop, warn, ticket, or arrest. So long as there is probable cause for a traffic violation, courts will not …

Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, And The Virtues Of The Middle Ground, Allen K. Rostron

Faculty Works

When the Supreme Court hears arguments this fall about the constitutionality of affirmative action policies at the University of Texas, attention will be focused once again on Justice Anthony Kennedy. With the rest of the Court split between a bloc of four reliably liberal jurists and an equally solid cadre of four conservatives, the spotlight regularly falls on Kennedy, the swing voter that each side in every closely divided and ideologically charged case desperately hopes to attract. Critics condemn Kennedy for having an unprincipled, capricious, and self-aggrandizing style of decision-making. Though he is often decisive in the sense of casting …

Doing Affirmative Action, Stephen Clowney

Stephen Clowney

Antidiscrimination Law And The Multiracial Experience: A Reply To Nancy Leong, Tina F. Botts

Tina F Botts

Misunderstanding the concept of race as based in biology is the root error of Professor Nancy Leong's recommendation of a switch to "perceived race" in antidiscrimination law in order to protect multiracial persons from illegal racial discrimination. Once race is understood as socio-historically constructed and context-dependent rather than as rooted in biology, antidiscrimination law need only add multiracial persons to the categories of specially protected groups in order to protect multiracial persons from illegal discrimination.