Law Commons^™

Still Square Pegs In Round Holes? A Look At Ancsa Corporations, Corporate Governance, And Indeterminate Form Or Operation Of Legal Entities, Douglas M. Branson

Alaska Law Review

No abstract provided.

Executive Fraud And Canada's Regulation Of Executive Compensation, Bo James Howell

University of Miami Inter-American Law Review

No abstract provided.

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

Guests At The Table?: Independent Directors In Family-Influenced Public Companies, Deborah A. Demott

Deborah A DeMott

By some measures, family-controlled companies account for about a third of public companies in the United States. Public companies that retain characteristics of family companies pose a series of intriguing questions about corporate governance that center in particular on the roles and duties of directors. These are surprisingly unexplored in legal scholarship. Although concentrated ownership is more extensive in many capital markets outside the United States, numerous recent examples raise questions about governance within publicly-held family companies. In such companies, shareholders who are members of the founding family often have perspectives and interests that diverge from those of non-family public …

Stock Market, Corporations And Their Regulation: A Few Glimpses Into Reality, Palladam M. Vasudev

Palladam M Vasudev

The paper examines events in three public companies – Enron Corp., Sycamore Networks and Amazon.com, from the perspective of corporate law and securities law. The events are interpreted in terms of the applicable law, and explain how it influences them. In particular, the paper demonstrates how the prevailing loose legal regime for corporations and the stock market-centricity of corporate arrangements give rise to specific varieties of negative behaviour. The paper adopts a critical approach, and is an effort to describe the consequences of the minimalist philosophy underlying corporate and securities regulation.

Companies And Corporations: Their Transition From Status To Contract And Its Political Economy, Palladam M. Vasudev

Palladam M Vasudev

This article traces the state of corporate law in the English-speaking world since 1720, identifies the political economy of the changes that occurred since mid-nineteenth century, and the consequences for corporate law. During this period, there was a transition from the position that incorporation was a status to be conferred by the law to the position that they were the products of private contracts. In addition, they came to be treated as the property of their shareholders. These conceptual changes have had far-reaching consequences for the growth of corporations and were used to largely abandon the public regulation of corporations. …

Sex, Trust, And Corporate Boards, Joan Macleod Heminway

Scholarly Works

This article collects and interprets social science research on sex and trust and uses this work to shed new light on the emerging case for gender diversity on corporate boards. Specifically, the article describes social science research findings indicating (1) that men and women trust and are trustworthy on different bases and (2) that there is a bias against women in chief executive officer (and potentially other corporate leadership) positions. Based on this research, the nature of corporate management and control, and current legal scholarship on corporate governance, the article asserts that gender diversity on corporate boards may be desirable …

Financial Accounting And Corporate Behavior, David I. Walker

Washington and Lee Law Review

The power of financial accounting to shape corporate behavior is underappreciated. Advocates of positive accounting theory have argued that even cosmetic changes in reported earnings can affect share value, not because market participants are unable to see through such changes to the underlying fundamentals, but because of implicit or explicit contracts that are based on reported earnings and transaction costs. However, agency theory suggests that accounting choices and corporate responses to accounting standard changes will not necessarily be those that maximize share value. For a number of reasons, including the fact that executive compensation is often tied to reported earnings, …

Rewarding Outside Directors, Assaf Hamdani, Reinier Kraakman

Michigan Law Review

While they often rely on the threat of penalties to produce deterrence, legal systems rarely use the promise of rewards. In this Article, we consider the use of rewards to motivate director vigilance. Measures to enhance director liability are commonly perceived to be too costly. We, however demonstrate that properly designed reward regimes could match the behavioral incentives offered by negligence-based liability regimes but with significantly lower costs. We further argue that the market itself cannot implement such a regime in the form of equity compensation for directors. We conclude by providing preliminary sketches of two alternative reward regimes. While …

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

The Mythical Benefits Of Shareholder Control, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In "The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise," Professor Lucian Bebchuk elegantly argues that the notion that shareholders in public corporations have the power to remove directors is a myth. Although a director facing a proxy contest might find this to be a bit of an overstatement, the core idea is sound. In a public company with widely dispersed share ownership, it is difficult and expensive for shareholders to overcome obstacles to collective action and wage a proxy battle to oust an incumbent board. Nor is success likely when directors can use corporate funds to solicit proxies to stay in place. …

Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this article, we document and examine the nature of hedge fund activism, how and why it differs from activism by traditional institutional investors, and its implications for corporate governance and regulatory reform. We argue that hedge fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways: it is directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, systemic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than intermittent and ex post). The reasons for these differences may lie in …

Cross-Monitoring And Corporate Governance, Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung, Albert H. Yoon

Faculty Scholarship

We take the view that corporate governance must involve more than corporate law. Despite corporate scholars' nearly exclusive focus on corporate law mechanisms for controlling managerial agency costs, shareholders are not the only constituency concerned with such costs. Given the thick web of firms' contractual commitments, it should not be a surprise that other financial claimants may also attempt to control agency costs in their contracts with the firm. We hypothesize that this cross-monitoring by other claimants has value for shareholders.

We examine bank loans for empirical evidence of the value of cross-monitoring. Our approach builds on prior empirical work …

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

Who Cares About Director Independence? Presentation (Pdf Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Giulia Paone

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

The Mythical Benefits Of Shareholder Control, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In a forthcoming Virginia Law Review article, Professor Lucian Bebchuk argues that the notion that shareholders in public corporations have the power to remove directors is a myth. This is perhaps an overstatement, but Bebchuk is correct to suggest that in a public company with widely dispersed share ownership, it is difficult and expensive for shareholders to overcome obstacles to collective action and wage a proxy battle to oust an incumbent board. Nor is success likely when directors can use corporate funds to solicit proxies to stay in place. The end result, as Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously observed …

The Expressive Function Of Directors’ Duties To Creditors, Jonathan C. Lipson

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article offers an explanation of the “doctrine” of directors’ duties to creditors. Courts frequently say—but rarely hold—that corporate directors owe duties to or for the benefit of corporate creditors when the corporation is in distress. These cases are puzzling for at least two reasons. First, they link fiduciary duty to priority in right of payment, effectively treating creditors as if they were shareholders, at least for certain purposes. But this ignores the fact that priority is a complex and volatile concept. Moreover, contract and other rights at law usually protect creditors, even (especially) when a firm is distressed. It …

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

Developing Governance And Regulation For Emerging Capital And Securities Markets, Ali Adnan Ibrahim

Ali A Ibrahim

This paper discusses various legal and regulatory issues for developing strong capital and securities markets in the transition economies. Toward this end, the paper analyses the available literature, and emphasizes that: (i) the development of corporate governance should be gradual and must take into consideration the customary laws that impact on the ownership structures and related preferences for doing business in the emerging markets; and (ii) the foreign investment policies should be consistent with the development of corporate governance and vice versa.

What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap For Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, Robert C. Illig

Robert C Illig

Hedge funds and other private equity funds are aggressive monitors of corporate America. Their investment strategies are designed to squeeze agency costs and other inefficiencies out of underperforming companies. Mutual funds and public pension funds, by contrast, have remained relentlessly passive despite their many resources. Rather than seek to improve the performance of their portfolio companies, they generally prefer to exit any investments that turn sour. Why the difference? In this Article, Professor Illig compares the business environments and regulatory regimes affecting different types of institutional investors. He concludes that the primary reason that most institutional investors do not better …

Fuzzy Logic And Corporate Governance Theories, Z. Jill Barclift

Faculty Scholarship

Fuzzy logic is a theory that categorizes concepts or things belonging to more than one group. A methodology that explains how things function in multiple groups (not fully in one group or another) offers advantages when one definition or membership in a group accounts for belonging to multiple groups. A principal/agent model of corporate governance has some characterizations of fuzzy logic theory. The purpose of this article it to evaluate other models of corporate governance that account for the multi-agent role of senior officers of public companies and assess the accountability to the corporation. Corporate governance theorists continue to debate …

Court Of Law And Court Of Public Opinion: Symbiotic Regulation Of The Corporate Management Duty Of Care, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation the Delaware court exonerated the defendants for their handling of the Ovitz Affair, and yet condemned them. It is a classic example of how a court of law can make law without making law. By an obiter dictum, the Chancellor established the facts of the case and footnoted the sources much like a treatise or a casebook, recounted the general principles of the law, used strong words to describe the defendants' behavior, delved into the moral and business judgment of the defendants, and assisted the market in judging and enforcing its best …

The Rise Of Independent Directors In The United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value And Stock Market Prices, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Between 1950 and 2005, the composition of large public company boards dramatically shifted towards independent directors, from approximately 20% independents to 75% independents. The standards for independence also became increasingly rigorous over the period. The available empirical evidence provides no convincing explanation for this change. This Article explains the trend in terms of two interrelated developments in U.S. political economy: first, the shift to shareholder value as the primary corporate objective; second, the greater informativeness of stock market prices. The overriding effect is to commit the firm to a shareholder wealth maximizing strategy as best measured by stock price performance. …

The Role Of Financial Journalists In Corporate Governance, Michael J. Borden

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

This Article pursues the important theme of disclosure, but focuses on a feature that has remained almost entirely overlooked by corporate and securities law scholars: the role of financial journalists in corporate governance. This omission is perhaps due to the fact that journalists do not fit easily into a legal discussion because they are largely unregulated. They are, in a sense, not legal actors, and, therefore do not comfortably become the subject of a legal prescription. Nevertheless, journalists contribute in many ways to the legal system at large and the system of corporate governance in particular.This Article uses case studies …

Self-Handicapping And Managers’ Duty Of Care, David A. Hoffman

All Faculty Scholarship

This symposium essay focuses on the relationship between managers' duty of care and self-handicapping, or constructing obstacles to performance with the goal of influencing subsequent explanations about outcomes. Conventional explanations for failures of caretaking by managers have focused on motives (greed) and incentives (agency costs). This account of manager behavior has led some modern jurists, concerned about recent corporate scandals, to advocate for stronger deterrent measures to realign manager and shareholder incentives. * Self-handicapping theory, by contrast, teaches that bad manager behavior may occur even when incentives are well-aligned. Highly successful individuals in particular come to fear the pressure of …

What Critiques Of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation Of Nonprofit Governance, Ellen P. Aprill

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Two Goals For Executive Compensation Reform, Brett H. Mcdonnell

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.