Law Commons^™

The American Corporation In The Twenty-First Century: Future Forms Of Structure And Governance, Azizah Y. Al-Hibri

Law Faculty Publications

This article focuses on corporate governance issues as they relate to the new technological developments and the issue of leapfrogging. I examine various theories about the new technologies and the changes in corporate governance that they may necessitate. I then assess and critique these theories in light of historical and other data. I suggest that our very concept of the corporation will be transformed by the Information Age. I also offer my own view as to the optimal forms of corporate governance that can equip American corporations with sufficient tools to win the accelerating competition anticipated for the next century. …

8th Biennial Midwest/Midsouth Bankruptcy Institute, Office Of Continuing Legal Education At The University Of Kentucky College Of Law, Lawrence Ponoroff, Douglass G. Boshkoff, Tracey N. Wise, Christopher W. Frost, Keith M. Lundin, Ray Reynolds Graves, David G. Epstein, Joe Lee, Robert E. Mckenzie, Conrad K. Cyr

Continuing Legal Education Materials

Materials from the 8th Biennial Midwest/Midsouth Bankruptcy Institute held December 1997.

The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change The Outcome Of Corporate Control Contests?, John C. Coffee Jr.

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

Defensive Measures In Anticipation Of And In Response To Unsolicited Takeover Proposals, Dennis J. Block, Jonathan M. Hoff, H. Esther Cochran

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

Institutional Investors: Agents Of Change, James E. Heard

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Why We Bother: A Primer In How Activism Enhances Returns, Jon Lukomnik

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Corporate Governance: Does It Make A Difference?, Martin Lipton

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The Activist Board And Corporate Governance, Terrence J. Gallagher

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

A New Direction For State Corporate Codes, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.

Introduction To The Essays Of Warren Buffett: Lessons For Corporate America, Lawrence A. Cunningham

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

This Professor Cunningham's Introduction to his edited collection of Warren Buffett's noted letters to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. The collection was prepared for a symposium held at Cardozo Law School in New York City in 1997 and originally published in the Cardozo Law Review. The Introduction serves as an encapsulation of the main themes of the resulting collection and locates them in contemporary discourse on matters of corporate governance; corporate finance and investing; mergers and acquisitions; and accounting and taxation. Professor Cunningham subsequently published the edited collection as a book under the title The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons …

Proposals For Reform Of Corporate Boards Of Directors: The Dual Board And Board Ombudsperson, Lynne L. Dallas

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Private Ownership And Corporate Performance: Some Lessons From Transition Economies, Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, Marek P. Hessel, Andrzej Rapaczynski

Faculty Scholarship

Data on mid-sized firms in three transition economies provide strong evidence that private ownership – for worker ownership – improves corporate performance. And the privatized firms' superior ability to generate revenues allows those firms to sustain or expand employment.

Using a large sample of data on mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapacynski compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the environment of the postcommunist transition.

They find strong evidence that private ownership – for worker ownership – improves corporate performance. They find no evidence of the privatization shock that was …

The Shaping Force Of Corporate Law In The New Economic Order, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

My topic for this Allen Chair lecture is the shaping force of corporate governance in the new economic order. It is easy to think of corporate law as an arcane field with mysterious terms and peculiar rules, ultimately of interest only to those who are prepared to bill at least 2000 hours a year to unravel its complexities. This is the view that there is a pointless mystery about shareholders, directors, common stocks, debentures, and the bizarre creature my class encountered recently, a convertible exchangeable cumulative preferred stock; and that ultimately corporate law and practice consists of the expert manipulation …

The Future Of Corporate Governance In The United States, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

This article is an interview of Professor Ronald J. Gilson, Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University Law School. The interviewer is Cheryl L. Conner, a third year law student at the University of Richmond School of Law and the Managing Editor of the Richmond Journal of Law and Technology.

The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change The Outcome Of Corporate Control Contests?, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

What, if anything, can institutional investors do to influence the course and outcome of corporate control contests? The traditional answer was relatively little. To be sure, institutions could tender their shares in a tender offer or vote in a proxy contest to oust the incumbent board, but such a role was essentially reactive and contingent. It required that an offer actually be made before institutions could respond on an after-the-fact basis. Similarly, institutions have occasionally conducted precatory proxy campaigns calling upon the board to redeem its poison pill, but management was free to ignore these requests (and has done so).