Law Commons^™

How Not To Apply Actavis, Michael A. Carrier

NULR Online

No abstract provided.

Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that can …

Recent Journalism Awards Won By "Old," "New," And "Hybrid" Media, Robert H. Lande, Thomas J. Horton, Virginia Callahan

All Faculty Scholarship

This compares the quality of the "old" media to that of the "new" media by determining how often each type of media source wins major journalism awards. It divides media sources into three categories: old, new and hybrid. New media is limited to publications that were started purely as online news publications. Old media is classified in the traditional sense to include such newspapers as the New York Times. Hybrid media combines elements of both new and old media. Our research compares the number of Pulitzer Prizes and other major journalism awards won by these three types of media sources …

Market Power Without Market Definition, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law has traditionally required proof of market power in most cases and has analyzed market power through a market definition/market share lens. In recent years, this indirect or structural approach to proving market power has come under attack as misguided in practice and intellectually incoherent. If market definition collapses in the courts and antitrust agencies, as it seems poised to do, this will rupture antitrust analysis and create urgent pressures for an alternative approach to proving market power through direct evidence. None of the leading theoretic approaches—such as the Lerner Index or a search for supracompetitive profits—provides a robust …

Brief Of Amici Curiae Antitrust Law Professors In O'Bannon V. Ncaa, Thomas C. Arthur, Amitai Aviram, Edward D. Cavanagh, Jorge L. Contreras, Daniel A. Crane, Susan Beth Farmer, Herbert Hovenkamp, Keith N. Hylton, Michael S. Jacobs, Alan J. Meese, Salil K. Mehra, William H. Page, Gary R. Roberts, D. Daniel Sokol, Alexander Volokh

Faculty Scholarship

On November 21, 2014, 15 professors of antitrust law at leading U.S. universities submitted an amicus brief in the O'Bannon v. NCAA 9th Circuit appeal in support of the NCAA. They have an interest in the proper development of antitrust jurisprudence, and they agree that the court below misapplied the “less restrictive alternative” prong of the rule of reason inquiry for assessing the legality of restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. They are concerned that the district court’s approach to the antitrust rule of reason, if affirmed, would grant undue authority to …

Teece's Competing Through Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay reviews David J. Teece's book, Competing Through Innovation: Technological Strategies and Antitrust Policies (2013).

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.

As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to …

Non-Price Competition In “Substitute" Drugs: The Ftc's Blind Spot, Gregory Dolin

All Faculty Scholarship

As the recent case of United States v. Lundbeck illustrates, the Federal Trade Commission’s lack of knowledge in medical and pharmacological sciences affects its evaluation of transactions between medical and pharmaceutical companies that involve transfers of rights to manufacture or sell drugs, causing the agency to object to such transactions without solid basis for doing so. This article argues that in order to properly define a pharmaceutical market, one must not just consider the condition that competing drugs are meant to treat, but also take into account whether there are “off-label” drugs that are used to treat a relevant condition, …

Our 'Patchwork' Health Care System: Melodic Variations, Counterpoint, And The Future Role Of Physicians, William M. Sage

Faculty Scholarship

This Foreword to a forthcoming symposium on the "patchwork" health care system to be published in the Houston Journal of Health Law & Policy considers whether current reactions to fragmentation in health care represent minor variations on a longstanding theme in US health policy or offer a more substantial counterpoint to that theme. The theme is this: that perfect physicians should be allowed to control health care even if safeguards are needed in practice because real physicians are not perfect. The Foreword previews four scholarly articles featured in the published symposium. It concludes that, while all the articles present original …

Death By Daubert: The Continued Attack On Private Antitrust, Christine P. Bartholomew

Journal Articles

In 2011, with five words of dicta, the Supreme Court opened Pandora’s box for private antitrust enforcement. By suggesting trial courts must evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony at class certification, the Court placed a significant obstacle in the path of antitrust class actions. Following the Supreme Court’s lead, most courts now permit parties to bring expert challenges far earlier than the traditional summary judgment or pretrial timing. Premature rejection of expert testimony dooms budding private antitrust suits — cases that play an essential role in modern antitrust enforcement. The dangers for private antitrust plaintiffs are compounded by the Court’s …

In Search Of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Organizational Guidelines for over twenty years have offered firms a significant financial incentive to develop an ethical organizational culture. Nonetheless, corporate crime persists. Too many ethics programs remain ineffective.

As this Article explores, the Guidelines' current approach is not working. The evidence, including sentencing data over the past twenty years, reveals that few firms have effective ethics and compliance programs. Nor is there much hope that the Guidelines' incentive will induce companies, after the economic crisis, to become more ethical.

The problem is not attributable to three assumptions underlying the Guidelines. The empirical research, while still …

Where Do We Go From Here: Open Questions And Policy Considerations, Jonathan Baker, Fiona Scott Morton, Daniel Crane, Richard Steuer, Michael Whinston, C. Hemphill, Deborah Feinstein, Renata Hesse

Presentations

The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice held a one-day public workshop on June 23, 2014 to explore the economics and legal policy implications of certain pricing practices, such as loyalty and bundled pricing. The workshop, consisted of presentations and roundtable discussions, that focused on practices in which prices are explicitly or effectively contingent on commitments to purchase or sell a specified share or volume of a single product or a mix of multiple products. Workshop participants considered theoretical and empirical developments in the economic understanding of these practices, discussed developments in the relevant …

Crossing The Rubicon: Why The Comcast/Time Warner Cable Merger Should Be Blocked, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

Comcast and Time Warner Cable say their proposed $45 billion merger would not raise prices -- and instead lead to real benefits -- for cable and broadband customers across the country.But, as we discuss, the deal raises serious concerns of a creeping monopolist and the ability of a powerful media buyer to harm rivals.

Crossing The Rubicon: Why The Comcast/Time Warner Cable Merger Should Be Blocked, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

Scholarly Works

Comcast and Time Warner Cable say their proposed $45 billion merger would not raise prices -- and instead lead to real benefits -- for cable and broadband customers across the country.

But, as we discuss, the deal raises serious concerns of a creeping monopolist and the ability of a powerful media buyer to harm rivals.

Antitrust And The Close Look: Transaction Cost Economics In Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper briefly examines the contributions of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to antitrust analysis, focusing on vertical integration and its contractual substitutes, mainly, minimum and maximum resale price maintenance, vertical nonprice restraints, tying, bundled discounts and exclusive dealing and related exclusionary contracts.

TCE generally assumes that business firms organize their activities so as to maximize their value, which they can do both by economizing and also by obtaining higher prices. Sensible antitrust policy recognizes that both advantageous contracting and monopoly can be profitable to a firm, and it can be expected to pursue both when they are available. Nevertheless, the …

Avishalom Tor Presented At 3rd Haifa-Loyola Conference On Recent Challenges To Antitrust, Avishalom Tor

Faculty Lectures and Presentations

Professor Tor presented his work on Boundedly Rational Consumers: Three Challenges for Antitrust at the 3^rdHaifa-Loyola Conference on Recent Challenges to Antitrust on May 9.

The Beneficent Monopolist, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

In examining Comcast's proposed acquisition of Time Warner Cable (TWC), we assess three of the arguments Comcast likely will make to the Department of Justice and FCC. Comcast will likely argue that its acquisition of TWC is unlikely to lessen competition because: (a) the broadband market is becoming more competitive: Google has introduced Google Fiber in a number of markets, and mobile broadband offered by wireless providers like AT&T and Sprint is competitive with fixed broadband; (b) Netflix and traditional media companies have sufficient clout to negotiate with Comcast and the government should not intervene on their behalf; and (c) …

The Beneficent Monopolist, Maurice Stucke, Allen Grunes

Scholarly Works

In examining Comcast's proposed acquisition of Time Warner Cable (TWC), we assess three of the arguments Comcast likely will make to the Department of Justice and FCC. Comcast will likely argue that its acquisition of TWC is unlikely to lessen competition because: (a) the broadband market is becoming more competitive: Google has introduced Google Fiber in a number of markets, and mobile broadband offered by wireless providers like AT&T and Sprint is competitive with fixed broadband; (b) Netflix and traditional media companies have sufficient clout to negotiate with Comcast and the government should not intervene on their behalf; and (c) …

The Proposed Damages Directive: The Real Lessons From The United States, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Europeans should be doubly cautious when they study the U.S. experience with private antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, there are ten specific lessons they can learn. None, however, is consistent with the conventional wisdom in the international competition community that U.S.-style private enforcement has been a disaster. Each should help Europe objectively consider the Commission's proposed Directive concerning private enforcement of Competition law.

Consent Of The Governed Or Consent Of The Government? The Problems With Consent Decrees In Government-Defendant Cases, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

Consent decrees raise serious Article III concerns. When litigants agree on their rights and jointly seek the same relief from a court, they are no longer adverse and a justiciable controversy no longer exists between them. In the absence of an actual controversy between opposing parties, it is both inappropriate and unnecessary for a court to issue a substantive order declaring or modifying the litigants' rights. Whether Article Ill's adverseness requirement is seen as jurisdictional or prudential, federal courts should decline to issue consent decrees and instead require litigants that wish to voluntarily resolve a case to execute a settlement …

Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation. One important welfare debate is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general “total welfare” principle.

The simple version of the consumer welfare test is not a balancing test. If consumers are harmed by reduced output or higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power, …

Merger Policy And The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

New Horizontal Merger Guidelines were issued jointly by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission in August, 2010, replacing Guidelines issued in 1992 that no longer reflected either the law or government enforcement policy. The new Guidelines are a striking improvement. They are less technocratic, accommodating a greater and more realistic variety of theories about why mergers of competitors can be anticompetitive and, accordingly, a greater variety of methodologies for assessing them.

The unifying theme of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is to prevent the enhancement of market power that might result from mergers. The 2010 Guidelines state that “[a] …

Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for assessing the competitive effects of horizontal mergers under the antitrust laws. These Guidelines were long awaited not merely because of the lengthy interval between them and previous Guidelines but also because enforcement policy had drifted far from the standards articulated in the previous Guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines are distinctive mainly for two things. One is briefer and less detailed treatment of market delineation. The other is an expanded set of theories of harm that justify preventing mergers or reversing mergers that have already occurred.

The …

The Influences Of Strategic Management On Antitrust Discourse, Hillary Greene, Dennis A. Yao

Faculty Articles and Papers

This article examines how antitrust law and policy can benefit from ideas developed in the academic strategy field. Because accurate assessment and prediction of the effects of firm conduct depend in part on understanding individual firm capabilities, knowledge from the strategy field and other business fields complements the contributions from industrial organization economics (10). These business fields also offer theoretical and empirical challenges to the 10 paradigm, which dominates antitrust analysis. The article begins with a comparison between strategy and 10 and then illustrates how the strategy field can contribute to antitrust merger analysis. The article then assesses the influence …

A Regulatory Solution To Better Promote The Educational Values And Economic Sustainability Of Intercollegiate Athletics, Stephen F. Ross, Matt Mitten

Journal Articles

Currently there are several pending antitrust suits challenging NCAA rules restricting the economic benefits intercollegiate athletes may receive for their sports participation. Although remedying the inherent problems of commercialized college sports (primarily Division I football and men’s basketball) is a laudable objective, a free market solution mandated by antitrust law may have unintended adverse consequences. Judicial invalidation of these rules may inhibit universities from providing many athletes with a college education they would not otherwise receive, by eliminating or reducing the value of scholarships for many players whose economic value is less than the cost of an education. A wholly …

Channeling And Contending With Bill Kovacic, Jonathan B. Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

Patent Dialogue, Jonas Anderson

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This Article examines the unique dialogic relationship that exists between the Supreme Court and Congress concerning patent law. In most areas of the law, Congress and the Supreme Court engage directly with each other to craft legal rules. When it comes to patent law, however, Congress and the Court often interact via an intermediary institution: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In patent law, dialogue often begins when Congress or the Supreme Court acts as a dialogic catalyst, signaling reform priorities to which the Federal Circuit often responds.

Appreciating the unique nature of patent dialogue has important …

Market Structure And Political Law: A Taxonomy Of Power, Zephyr Teachout, Lina M. Khan

Faculty Scholarship

The goal of this Article is to create a way of seeing how market structure is innately political. It provides a taxonomy of ways in which large companies frequently exercise powers that possess the character of governance. Broadly, these exercises of power map onto three bodies of activity we generally assign to government: to set policy, to regulate markets, and to tax. We add a fourth category – which we call "dominance," after Brandeis – as a kind of catchall describing the other political impacts. The activities we outline will not always fit neatly into these categories, nor do all …

Measuring Benchmark Damages In Antitrust Litigation, Justin Mccrary, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Faculty Scholarship

We compare the two dominant approaches to estimation of benchmark damages in antitrust litigation, the forecasting approach and the dummy variable approach. We give conditions under which the two approaches are equivalent and present the results of a small simulation study.

Delay And Its Benefits For Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s increasing use of science and social science in its decision-making has a rationalizing effect on law that helps ensure that a rule will have its desired effect. But resting doctrine on the shifting sands of scientific and social scientific opinion endangers legal stability. The Court must be be responsive, but not reactive, to new scientific findings and theories, a difficult balance for lay justices to strike. This Article argues that the Court uses delay — defined as refusing to make or change a rule in light of new scientific arguments at time one, and then making or …